IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO GET AN ACCOUNT, please write an
email to Administrator. User accounts are meant only to access repo
and report issues and/or generate pull requests.
This is a purpose-specific Git hosting for
BaseALT
projects. Thank you for your understanding!
Только зарегистрированные пользователи имеют доступ к сервису!
Для получения аккаунта, обратитесь к администратору.
The underlying problem
is that once SMBulogoff is called, all server_info contexts associated with the
vuid should become invalid, even if that's the context being currently used by
the connection struct (tid). When the SMBtdis comes in it doesn't need a valid
vuid value, but the code called inside vfs_full_audit always assumes that there
is one (and hence a valid conn->server_info pointer) available.
This is actually a bug inside the vfs_full_audit and other code inside Samba,
which should only indirect conn->server_info on calls which require AS_USER to
be set in our process table. I could fix all these issues, but there's no
guarentee that someone might not add more code that fails this assumption, as
it's a hard assumption to break (it's usually true).
So what I've done is to ensure that on SMBulogoff the previously used
conn->server_info struct is kept around to be used for print debugging purposes
(it won't be used to change to an invalid user context, as such calls need
AS_USER set). This isn't strictly correct, as there's no association with the
(now invalid) context being freed and the call that causes conn->server_info to
be indirected, but it's good enough for most cases.
The hard part was to ensure that once a valid context is used again (via new
sessionsetupX calls, or new calls on a still valid vuid on this tid) that we
don't leak memory by simply replacing the stored conn->server_info pointer. We
would never actually leak the memory (as all conn->server_info pointers are
talloc children of conn), but with the previous patch a malicious client could
cause many server_info structs to be talloced by the right combination of SMB
calls. This new patch introduces free_conn_server_info_if_unused(), which
protects against the above.
Jeremy.
We need to store the "force group" uid separately from the
conn->server_info token as we need to apply it separately also.
Volker PLEASE CHECK !
Jeremy.
We always free the value at the end of the function,
so we don't need a static variable to hold just NULL
for the time the function isn't executed.
metze
A somewhat more elegant fix than I could use for 3.2.x or 3.0.x.
Turns out the only part of check_user_ok() that needs to change
for share level security is the VUID cache pieces, so I can just
always use check_user_ok() for all lp_security() cases.
Jeremy
Remove the code in memcache that does a TALLOC_FREE on stored pointers. That's a disaster waiting
to happen. If you're storing talloc'ed pointers, you can't know their lifecycle and they should
be deleted when their parent context is deleted, so freeing them at some arbitrary point later
will be a double-free.
Jeremy.
Most already used it, these two still used SNUM(conn), where the only caller of
this routine (change_to_user) had set snum = SNUM(conn).
(This used to be commit b14e59bfdbfb62494002e22d0665c4d420484245)
This reverts commit 50c891d3dfb75c9f607f7ad2a578aa3ba5d91988.
There's more to this code -- sorry for the spam
(This used to be commit 6e0e0cb8dd6f57de36c041e2ba4b82feeb357ce8)
With the old code, if more than VUID_CACHE_SIZE elements were used all new
entries ended up in slot 0. With this checkin we do cycle.
Jeremy, please revert if the old behaviour was intentional
(This used to be commit 50c891d3dfb75c9f607f7ad2a578aa3ba5d91988)
bugs in various places whilst doing this (places that assumed
BOOL == int). I also need to fix the Samba4 pidl generation
(next checkin).
Jeremy.
(This used to be commit f35a266b3cbb3e5fa6a86be60f34fe340a3ca71f)
since any SID/uid/gid translation calls will reset the struct when
popping the security ctx. This should fix the standalone server
configuration issues reported by David Rankin (thanks for the logs).
(This used to be commit 63cb25bad19d9600399a6ee2221497d71e805320)
acls code. I'm pretty sure this was safe, but become_root()
does other things to the token stack that become_root_uid_only()
does not, and as we're going into a vfs redirectred function
I decided it wasn't safe for now.
Jeremy.
(This used to be commit b3e0f45488595aa96c852dab8e1349631a85dded)
and the decision which token to use (conn or vuser) does not really belong
here, it is better done in the two places where this is called.
Volker
(This used to be commit 0a138888adf7a0f04a38cd911e797e1a379e908b)
to do the upper layer directories but this is what
everyone is waiting for....
Jeremy.
(This used to be commit 9dafb7f48ca3e7af956b0a7d1720c2546fc4cfb8)
by saving the UNIX token used to set a delete on close flag,
and using it when doing the delete. libsmbsharemodes.so still
needs updating to cope with this change.
Samba4 torture tests to follow.
Jeremy.
(This used to be commit 23f16cbc2e8cde97c486831e26bcafd4ab4a9654)
iterator functions so it can be used easily in a for loop.
Drops duplicated code from posix_acls.c
Jeremy.
(This used to be commit 81f30bf5985f5c6dc8399c4695dfa6f14140fde1)
security descriptor, allow read access. The code failed in this case.
Jeremy, could you please cross-check this? The way I understood your code it
could only work if smb.conf and secdesc said the same. This made the use of
srvmgr a bit difficult.... What was your intention on how to use the
share_info.tdb?
The current code might check the secdesc twice, but I don't see any decent way
around it that does not completely clutter the code.
Volker
(This used to be commit 7c673bd910e1fcbbf07198f38ceddd81e9064c11)
