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g_lock_trylock() always incremented the counter 'i', even after cleaning a stale
entry at position 'i', which means it skipped checking for a conflict against
the new entry at position 'i'.
As result a process could get a write lock, while there're still
some read lock holders. Once we get into that problem, also more than
one write lock are possible.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13195
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Dec 20 20:31:48 CET 2017 on sn-devel-144
This patch removes setting of NSS_WRAPPER and RESOLV_WRAPPER variables globally
in Samba3.pm (because setting them persistently/globally can create hidden
ordering dependencies). Instead, they are set on subprocesses as required, which
appears to be the following two places (aside from those places where they are
already set explicitly):
* calls to createuser in provision
* calls to wbinfo --ping-dc in wait_for_start
Signed-off-by: Jamie McClymont <jamiemcclymont@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Dec 20 08:50:26 CET 2017 on sn-devel-144
Currently, Samba3.pm returns a value for NSS_WRAPPER_HOSTNAME in provision, but
selftest.pl does not apply it, so Samba3.pm /also/ sets it in its own
environment. This breaks a command like this:
make test TESTS="samba3.blackbox.smbclient_ntlm.plain samba3.rpc.samba3.netlogon"
... since samba3.blackbox.smbclient_ntlm.plain runs in an nt4_member env,
thereby setting ENV{NSS_WRAPPER_HOSTNAME} to the value for a member, and
samba3.rpc.samba3.netlogon depended on NSS_WRAPPER_HOSTNAME as a username (until
previous commit).
Signed-off-by: Jamie McClymont <jamiemcclymont@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
samba3.rpc.samba3.netlogon is using get_myname to find a username with which to
perform a join. This means that the test tries to join with the existing
localnt4dc2 user, which happens to work if get_myname is working
correctly (which it isn't -- see next commit about NSS_WRAPPER_HOSTNAME!)
This commit fixes a test run with, for example:
TESTS="samba3.blackbox.smbclient_ntlm.plain samba3.rpc.samba3.netlogon"
(given samba3.blackbox.smbclient_ntlm.plain is in the nt4_member env)
...which previously failed due to the combination of this and the
NSS_WRAPPER_HOSTNAME bug.
Signed-off-by: Jamie McClymont <jamiemcclymont@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This helps ensure we do not have to scan all objects at this level
which could be very many (one per DNS zone entry).
However, due to the O(n*m) behaviour in list_intersect() for older
databases, we only do this in the GUID index mode, leaving the behaviour
unchanged for existing callers that do not specify the GUID index mode.
NOTE WELL: the behaviour of disallowDNFilter is enforced
in the index code, so this fixes SCOPE_ONELEVEL to also
honour disallowDNFilter, hence the additional tests.
The change to select the SUBTREE index in the absense of
the ONELEVEL index enforces this.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13191
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
This accidentially worked with SCOPE_ONELEVEL against Samba but dn= filters are
not valid in AD.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
For samba and nmbd we need to wait till a network interface is up or
they wont be operational.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13184
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Dec 20 04:21:51 CET 2017 on sn-devel-144
Commit 8736013dc42c5755b75bbb2e843a290bcd545909 got the (confusing) sense of opt_fork
wrong.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13129
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Dec 19 11:24:29 CET 2017 on sn-devel-144
The wildcard lookup is SCOPE_ONELEVEL combined with an index on the name
attribute. This is not as efficient as a base DN lookup, so we try for
that first.
A not-found and wildcard response will still fall back to the ONELEVEL
index.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13191
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
This query is made for every record returned via BIND9 DLZ.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13191
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
(the RDN, being 'dc' in this use case, does not have an index in
the AD schema).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13191
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Dec 19 07:18:58 CET 2017 on sn-devel-144
The comparison result has been ignored, which is not good. Also remove
the "ldbsearch" command in the error branch which has not much sense.
The scripts needs to be run through test-tdb.sh, test-ldap.sh or
test-sqlite3.sh which I didn't realise before. Hence less changes are needed
and this is a reduced version of the patch published on the mailing list.
Signed-off-by: Matthias Dieter Wallnöfer <mdw@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Matthias Dieter Wallnöfer <mdw@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Dec 19 03:09:12 CET 2017 on sn-devel-144
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Dec 18 13:32:00 CET 2017 on sn-devel-144
Set SOCKET_CLOEXEC on the sockets returned by accept. This ensures that
the socket is unavailable to any child process created by system().
Making it harder for malicious code to set up a command channel,
as seen in the exploit for CVE-2015-0240
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Dec 18 08:49:57 CET 2017 on sn-devel-144
Set SOCKET_CLOEXEC on the sockets returned by accept. This ensures that
the socket is unavailable to any child process created by system().
Making it harder for malicious code to set up a command channel,
as seen in the exploit for CVE-2015-0240
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Set SOCKET_CLOEXEC on the sockets returned by accept. This ensures that
the socket is unavailable to any child process created by system().
Making it harder for malicious code to set up a command channel,
as seen in the exploit for CVE-2015-0240
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Set SOCKET_CLOEXEC on the sockets returned by accept. This ensures that
the socket is unavailable to any child process created by system().
Making it harder for malicious code to set up a command channel,
as seen in the exploit for CVE-2015-0240
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Set SOCKET_CLOEXEC on the sockets returned by accept. This ensures that
the socket is unavailable to any child process created by system().
Making it harder for malicious code to set up a command channel,
as seen in the exploit for CVE-2015-0240
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Set SOCKET_CLOEXEC on the sockets returned by accept. This ensures that
the socket is unavailable to any child process created by system().
Making it harder for malicious code to set up a command channel,
as seen in the exploit for CVE-2015-0240
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Set SOCKET_CLOEXEC on the sockets returned by accept. This ensures that
the socket is unavailable to any child process created by system().
Making it harder for malicious code to set up a command channel,
as seen in the exploit for CVE-2015-0240
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Set SOCKET_CLOEXEC on the sockets returned by accept. This ensures that
the socket is unavailable to any child process created by system().
Making it harder for malicious code to set up a command channel,
as seen in the exploit for CVE-2015-0240
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Set SOCKET_CLOEXEC on the sockets returned by accept. This ensures that
the socket is unavailable to any child process created by system().
Making it harder for malicious code to set up a command channel,
as seen in the exploit for CVE-2015-0240
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Set SOCKET_CLOEXEC on the sockets returned by accept. This ensures that
the socket is unavailable to any child process created by system().
Making it harder for malicious code to set up a command channel,
as seen in the exploit for CVE-2015-0240
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Set SOCKET_CLOEXEC on the sockets returned by accept. This ensures that
the socket is unavailable to any child process created by system().
Making it harder for malicious code to set up a command channel,
as seen in the exploit for CVE-2015-0240
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Document the encrypted secrets feature in WHATSNEW.txt
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Dec 18 04:36:19 CET 2017 on sn-devel-144
Provision fl2000dc provision with --plaintext-secrets to test that the
--plaintext-secrets option functions correctly.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Changes to provision and join to create a database with
encrypted_secrets enabled and a key file generated.
Also adds the --plaintext-secrets option to join and provision commands
to allow the creation of unencrypted databases.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Encrypt the samba secret attributes on disk. This is intended to
mitigate the inadvertent disclosure of the sam.ldb file, and to mitigate
memory read attacks.
Currently the key file is stored in the same directory as sam.ldb but
this could be changed at a later date to use an HSM or similar mechanism
to protect the key.
Data is encrypted with AES 128 GCM. The encryption uses gnutls where
available and if it supports AES 128 GCM AEAD modes, otherwise nettle is
used.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Add tests to check that the encrypted_secrets module encrypts
secrets/sensitive attributes on disk.
This test also proves that the provision and join operations correctly
configure the encrypted_secrets module.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Adds a function to generate a random byte string using the samba random
routines.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
server_exit does an internal tree disconnect which requires a chdir to
the share directory. In case the file system encountered a problem and
the chdir call returns an error, this triggers a SERVER_EXIT_ABNORMAL
which in turn results in a panic and a coredump. As the log already
indicates the problem (chdir returned an error), avoid the
SERVER_EXIT_ABNORMAL in this case and not trigger a coredump.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13189
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Dec 16 01:56:06 CET 2017 on sn-devel-144
This module allow injecting errors in vfs calls. It only implements one
case (return ESTALE from chdir), but the idea is to extend this to more
vfs functions and more errors when needed.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13189
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Otherwise we overwrite the original value,
leaving the setting tattooed on unapplied
Signed-off-by: David Mulder <dmulder@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
The apply log wasn't being saved, apparently the pointers to elements
of the tree were getting lost.
Signed-off-by: David Mulder <dmulder@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
We also reduce the scope of the import so that python-markdown is only
required if interacting with 2012 code.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Dec 14 12:34:04 CET 2017 on sn-devel-144
