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Add a hook, acl_redact_msg_for_filter(), in the aclread module, that
marks inaccessible any message elements used by an LDAP search filter
that the user has no right to access. Make the various ldb_match_*()
functions check whether message elements are accessible, and refuse to
match any that are not. Remaining message elements, not mentioned in the
search filter, are checked in aclread_callback(), and any inaccessible
elements are removed at this point.
Certain attributes, namely objectClass, distinguishedName, name, and
objectGUID, are always present, and hence the presence of said
attributes is always allowed to be checked in a search filter. This
corresponds with the behaviour of Windows.
Further, we unconditionally allow the attributes isDeleted and
isRecycled in a check for presence or equality. Windows is not known to
make this special exception, but it seems mostly harmless, and should
mitigate the performance impact on searches made by the show_deleted
module.
As a result of all these changes, our behaviour regarding confidential
attributes happens to match Windows more closely. For the test in
confidential_attr.py, we can now model our attribute handling with
DC_MODE_RETURN_ALL, which corresponds to the behaviour exhibited by
Windows.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15270
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
[abartlet@samba.org adapted due to Samba 4.17 and lower
not having the patches for CVE-2020-25720 and 4.16 and lower
not having the patches for CVE-2022-32743 ]
Currently all fsctls we implement need the base fsp, not
an alternate data stream fsp. We may revisit this later
if we implement fsctls that operate on an ADS.
Remove knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15236
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Walker <awalker@ixsystems.com>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Nov 14 18:13:31 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
(cherry picked from commit fa4eba131b)
After s3 and s4 rpc servers merge we can avoid duplicated code.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 25300d354c)
Instead of using the generic deprecated option use the specific
server require schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT = no in order to allow
legacy tests for pass.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3cd18690f8)
Async read and write go synchronous in the same case,
so do the same here.
Remove knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15172
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Nov 17 05:55:42 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
(cherry picked from commit 26adf33443)
Shows we fail sending an SMB2_OP_FLUSH + SMB2_OP_FLUSH
compound if we immediately close the file afterward.
Internally the flushes go async and we free the req, then
we process the close. When the flushes complete they try to access
already freed data.
Extra test which will allow me to test when the final
component (flush) of the compound goes async and returns
NT_STATUS_PENDING.
Add knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15172
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6f149dfd9d)
Shows we fail sending an SMB2_OP_FLUSH + SMB2_OP_CLOSE
compound. Internally the flush goes async and
we free the req, then we process the close.
When the flush completes it tries to access
already freed data.
Found using the Apple MacOSX client at SNIA SDC 2022.
Add knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15172
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(back-ported from commit 17a110c1b5)
Remove knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14808
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: David Mulder <dmulder@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Nov 1 18:31:22 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
(cherry picked from commit bdbb38d16c)
Add torture test to show smbc_getxattr() should return -1 on
failure, 0 on success.
Add knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14808
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: David Mulder <dmulder@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 74636dfe24)
This fixes a regression in commit f03665bb7e
The use of reload_services() has a lot of side effects, e.g. reopen of
log files and other things, which are only useful in smbd, but not in rpcd_classic.
It was also unloading the user and registry shares we loaded a few lines
above.
We need to do all (re-)loading as root, otherwise we won't be able
to read root only smb.conf files, access registry shares, ...
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15243
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15266
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Walker <awalker@ixsystems.com>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Dec 29 21:14:02 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
(cherry picked from commit f28553105b)
We need to take the value from the msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes
attribute and only take the default if there's no value or
if the value is 0.
For krbtgt and DC accounts we need to force support for
ARCFOUR-HMAC-MD5 and AES encryption types and add the related bits
in addtition. (Note for krbtgt msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes is
completely ignored the hardcoded value is the default, so there's
no AES256-SK for krbtgt).
For UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY on the account we reset
the value to 0, these accounts are in fact disabled completely,
as they always result in KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP.
Then we try to get all encryption keys marked in
supported_enctypes, and the available_enctypes
is a reduced set depending on what keys are
actually stored in the database.
We select the supported session key enctypes by the available
keys and in addition based on AES256-SK as well as the
"kdc force enable rc4 weak session keys" option.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13135
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit fde745ec34)
[jsutton@samba.org Adapted to older KDC code]
This tests work out the difference between
- msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes value or it's default
- software defined extra flags for DC accounts
- accounts with only an nt hash being stored
- the resulting value in the KRB5_PADATA_SUPPORTED_ETYPES announcement
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13135
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1dfa91682e)
ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK is a flag introduced for by Microsoft in this
CVE to indicate that additionally, AES session keys are available. We
set the etypes available for session keys depending on the encryption
types that are supported by the principal.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15219
Pair-Programmed-With: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
(similar to commit 975e43fc45)
[jsutton@samba.org Fixed knownfail conflicts]
[jsutton@samba.org Adapted to older KDC code; fixed knownfail conflicts]
This shows that changes around RC4 encryption types do not break older
functional levels where only RC4 keys are available.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 44802c46b1)
[jsutton@samba.org Fixed import conflict]
ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256_SK is a flag introduced for by Microsoft in this CVE
to indicate that additionally, AES session keys are available.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
(similar to commit 371d7e63fc)
[jsutton@samba.org Removed unneeded fast_tests.py change, added
non_etype_bits in raw_testcase.py, fixed conflicts in knownfails and
tests.py]
[jsutton@samba.org Fixed conflicts in tests and knownfails]
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15231
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
(similar to commit a50a2be622)
[jsutton@samba.org Fixed conflicts in krb5pac.idl and raw_testcase.py]
[jsutton@samba.org Fixed conflicts in kdc_base_test.py, raw_testcase.py,
knownfails, tests.py. Adapted KDC PAC changes to older function.]
We need to select server, not client, to compare client etypes against.
(It is not useful to compare the client-supplied encryption types with
the client's own long-term keys.)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
(similar to commit 538315a2aa)
[jsutton@samba.org Fixed knownfail conflicts]
[jsutton@samba.org Fixed knownfail conflicts]
The KDC should leave the choice of ticket encryption type up to the
target service, and admit no influence from the client.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15237
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(similar to commit 177334c042)
[jsutton@samba.org Fixed conflicts in usage.py, knownfails, tests.py]
[jsutton@samba.org Fixed knownfail conflicts]
By default we'll now require schannel connections with
privacy/sealing/encryption.
But we allow exceptions for specific computer/trust accounts.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit b3ed90a054)
Instead of using the generic deprecated option use the specific
allow nt4 crypto:COMPUTERACCOUNT = yes and
server reject md5 schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT = no
in order to allow legacy tests for pass.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7ae3735810)
AES is supported by Windows Server >= 2008R2, Windows (Client) >= 7 and Samba >= 4.0,
so there's no reason to allow md5 clients by default.
However some third party domain members may need it.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit c8e53394b9)
Instead of using the generic deprecated option use the specific
server require schannel:COMPUTERACCOUNT = no in order to allow
legacy tests for pass.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15240
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 63c96ea6c0)
By compiling the knownfail lists ahead of time we change a 20min test
into a 90sec test.
This could be improved further by combining this into a single regular expression,
but this is enough for now. The 'reason' is thankfully not used.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15258
Pair-programmed-with: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 22128c718c)
Cf MS-FSA 2.1.5.14.2
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15252
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Nov 28 10:14:12 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
(cherry picked from commit 535a08dfc4)
Autobuild-User(v4-16-test): Jule Anger <janger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-16-test): Mon Dec 5 11:03:30 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
There were some reports that strace output an LDAP server socket is in
CLOSE_WAIT state, returning EAGAIN for writev over and over (after a call to
epoll() each time).
In the tstream_bsd code the problem happens when we have a pending
writev_send, while there's no readv_send pending. In that case
we still ask for TEVENT_FD_READ in order to notice connection errors
early, so we try to call writev even if the socket doesn't report TEVENT_FD_WRITE.
And there are situations where we do that over and over again.
It happens like this with a Linux kernel:
tcp_fin() has this:
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
inet_csk_schedule_ack(sk);
sk->sk_shutdown |= RCV_SHUTDOWN;
sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE);
switch (sk->sk_state) {
case TCP_SYN_RECV:
case TCP_ESTABLISHED:
/* Move to CLOSE_WAIT */
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_CLOSE_WAIT);
inet_csk_enter_pingpong_mode(sk);
break;
It means RCV_SHUTDOWN gets set as well as TCP_CLOSE_WAIT, but
sk->sk_err is not changed to indicate an error.
tcp_sendmsg_locked has this:
...
err = -EPIPE;
if (sk->sk_err || (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN))
goto do_error;
while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
int copy = 0;
skb = tcp_write_queue_tail(sk);
if (skb)
copy = size_goal - skb->len;
if (copy <= 0 || !tcp_skb_can_collapse_to(skb)) {
bool first_skb;
new_segment:
if (!sk_stream_memory_free(sk))
goto wait_for_space;
...
wait_for_space:
set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
if (copied)
tcp_push(sk, flags & ~MSG_MORE, mss_now,
TCP_NAGLE_PUSH, size_goal);
err = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo);
if (err != 0)
goto do_error;
It means if (sk->sk_err || (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN)) doesn't
hit as we only have RCV_SHUTDOWN and sk_stream_wait_memory returns
-EAGAIN.
tcp_poll has this:
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM | EPOLLRDHUP;
So we'll get EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM | EPOLLRDHUP triggering
TEVENT_FD_READ and writev/sendmsg keeps getting EAGAIN.
So we need to always clear TEVENT_FD_READ if we don't
have readable handler in order to avoid burning cpu.
But we turn it on again after a timeout of 1 second
in order to monitor the error state of the connection.
And now that our tsocket_bsd_error() helper checks for POLLRDHUP,
we can check if the socket is in an error state before calling the
writable handler when TEVENT_FD_READ was reported.
Only on error we'll call the writable handler, which will pick
the error without calling writev().
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15202
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit e232ba946f)
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15202
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit f0fb8b9508)
We later subtract 8 when calculating the length of the output message
buffer. If padlength is excessively high, this calculation can underflow
and result in a very large positive value.
Now we properly constrain the value of padlength so underflow shouldn't
be possible.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15134
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
If len_len is equal to total_len - 1 (i.e. the input consists only of a
0x60 byte and a length), the expression 'total_len - 1 - len_len - 1',
used as the 'len' parameter to der_get_length(), will overflow to
SIZE_MAX. Then der_get_length() will proceed to read, unconstrained,
whatever data follows in memory. Add a check to ensure that doesn't
happen.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15134
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We should make sure that the result of 'total_len - mech_len' won't
overflow, and that we don't memcmp() past the end of the buffer.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15134
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
For type == ADOUBLE_META, fio->fake_fd is true so
writes are already synchronous, just call tevent_req_post().
For type == ADOUBLE_RSRC we know we are configured
with FRUIT_RSRC_ADFILE (because fruit_must_handle_aio_stream()
returned true), so we can just call SMB_VFS_NEXT_FSYNC_SEND()
after replacing fsp with fio->ad_fsp.
Remove knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15182
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 35c637f2e6)
This shows we currently hang when sending an SMB2_OP_FLUSH on
an AFP_Resource fork.
Adds knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15182
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1b8a873284)
Samba 4.5 and earlier will fail to do GET_ANC correctly and will not
replicate non-critical parents of objects with isCriticalSystemObject=TRUE
when DRSUAPI_DRS_CRITICAL_ONLY is set.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15189
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15189
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit bff2bc9c7d)
Autobuild-User(v4-16-test): Jule Anger <janger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(v4-16-test): Fri Oct 7 09:56:12 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
The chgdcpass server now emulates older verions of Samba that
fail to implement DRSUAPI_DRS_GET_ANC correctly and totally fails to support
DRSUAPI_DRS_GET_TGT.
We now show this is in effect by the fact that tests now fail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15189
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15189
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit b0bbc94d41)
The chgdcpass environment will emulate older verions of Samba
that fail to implement DRSUAPI_DRS_GET_ANC correctly and
totally fails to support DRSUAPI_DRS_GET_TGT.
This will allow testing of a client-side fallback, allowing migration
from sites that run very old Samba versions over DRSUAPI (currently
the only option is to attempt an in-place upgrade).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15189
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15189
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 62b426243f)
If the account has been locked out in the meantime (indicated by
NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT), we should return the appropriate error
code.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit bdfc9d96f8)
[jsutton@samba.org Fixed knownfail conflicts due to not having claims
tests]
[jsutton@samba.org Fixed knownfail conflicts]
We reread the account details inside the transaction in case the account
has been locked out in the meantime. If it has, we return the
appropriate error code.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit 96479747bd)
[jsutton@samba.org Fixed conflict due to lack of dbg_ret variable]
The error code may be NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT, which we use in
preference to NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit d8a862cb81)
These variables are not important to protect against a race with
and a double-read can easily be avoided by moving them up the file
a little.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14611
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
(cherry picked from commit b5f78b7b89)
