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Fixes:
source4/auth/kerberos/kerberos_util.c:645:3: warning: Value stored to 'code' is never read <--[clang]
code = 0;
^ ~
1 warning generated.
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Fixes:
source4/auth/kerberos/kerberos_pac.c:116:2: warning: Value stored to 'ret' is never read <--[clang]
ret = smb_krb5_make_pac_checksum(mem_ctx,
^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
1 warning generated.
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Joining a Windows domain can throw an error if the HasMasterNCs
attribute occurs before msDS-HasMasterNCs. This patch changes the
attribute order so that msDS-HasMasterNCs is always first.
Previously on python2, the dictionary hash order was arbitrary but
constant. By luck, msDS-HasMasterNCs was always before HasMasterNCs, so
we never noticed any problem. With python3, the dictionary hash order
now changes everytime you run the command, so the order is
unpredictable.
To enforce a order, we can change to use an OrderedDict, which will
return the keys in the order they're added.
I've asked Microsoft to clarify the protocol requirement here WRT
attribute order. However, in the meantime we may as well fix the problem
for users.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14046
RN: When trying to join a Windows domain (with functional level 2008R2)
as an AD domain controller, the 'samba-tool domain join' command could
throw a python exception: 'RuntimeError ("DsAddEntry failed")'. When
this problem occurred, you would also see the message "DsAddEntry failed
with status WERR_ACCESS_DENIED info (8363, 'WERR_DS_NO_CROSSREF_FOR_NC')"
in the command output. This issue has now been resolved. Note that this
problem would only occur on Samba v4.10 when using the Python3 packages.
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Jul 24 04:18:21 UTC 2019 on sn-devel-184
When generating LDAP search traffic, a full DB scan can be very costly.
Avoiding full-scan LDAP searches means that we can run traffic_replay
against a 100K user DB and get some sane results.
Because the traffic_learner doesn't record the LDAP search filter at all,
the traffic_replay LDAP searches default to being full scans.
Doing full scans meant that the LDAP search was usually the first packet
type to exceed the max latency and fail the test. It could also skew
results for the other packet types by creating big demands on memory/CPU/
DB-lock-time.
It's hard to know for sure exactly what real-world LDAP searches will
look like, but let's assume full scan searches will be fairly rare.
In traffic-model files we've collected previously, some of the
attributes are fairly unique (e.g. pKIExtendedKeyUsage), and as there
are some LDAP queries specified in MS specs (such as MS-GPOL and
MS-WCCE), it allows us to infer what the search filter might be.
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Ensure that the total_conversations and instance_id attributes are
assigned a value in the replay contexts passed to test cases.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Store the traffic runner instance id in the replay context. Will be
used in subsequent commits.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is useful info to know, and will be used in subsequent commits.
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Instead of having a local buffer for the stat data, update the one kept
in the fsp. With this change the local stat buffer and the helper
function smbacl4_fGetFileOwner are no longer needed and can be removed.
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jul 23 19:45:05 UTC 2019 on sn-devel-184
All tutorials i could find that configure Samba with NFSv4 ACLs set this
parameter to "merge". As this seems to be the main usecase, make this
setting the default.
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
The default setting for nfs4:acedup is "dontcare". The only
recommendation i could find is setting this to "merge". The setting of
"ignore" is dangerous as it would silently drop ACEs. "reject" also
seems less useful as it would disallow setting of ACLs that can easily
be stored.
Report "ignore" and "reject" as deprecated. Maybe these can be removed
in the future to simplify the code.
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
nfs4:mode special has been deprecated. Switch the example to "simple" to
avoid the deprecated setting in the example.
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
The documentation states this has been deprecated for years. Add logging
a warning when this is set. Maybe this can be removed in the future.
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
The function always returned true and the return code was never checked,
so simply change to void.
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
In GPFS, it is not possible to deny ACL or attribute access through a
SPECIAL_OWNER entry. The best that can be done is mapping this to a
named user entry, as this one can at least be stored in an ACL. The same
cannot be done for inheriting SPECIAL_OWNER entries, as these represent
CREATOR OWNER entries, and the limitation of not being able to deny
owner access to ACL or attributes remains.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This is not functional change. It cleans up the code a bit and makes
expanding this codepath in a later patch easier.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
All supported GPFS versions now support setting WRITE and APPEND in the
ACLs independently. Remove this now unused parameter to simplify the
code.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
After a chown, the cached stat data is obviously no longer valid. The
code in smb_set_nt_acl_nfs4 checked the file correctly, but did only use
a local buffer for the stat data. So later checks of the stat buffer
under the fsp->fsp_name->st would still see the old information.
Fix this by removing the local stat buffer and always update the one
under fsp->fsp_name->st.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
The previous patch introduced merging of duplicates on the mapping path
from NFS4 ACL entries to DACL entries. Add a testcase to verify the
expected behavior of this codepath.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
The previous patch added an additional entry for IDMAP_TYPE_BOTH. When
mapping back to a DACL, there should be no additional entry. Add a loop
that will check and remove entries that are exact duplicates.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
As this function now maps the ACE and also adds it to the NFSv4 ACE,
change the name to better describe its behavior.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
With IDMAP_TYPE_BOTH, all entries have to be mapped to group entries.
In order to have the file system reflect the owner permissions in the
POSIX modebits, create a second entry for the user. This will be mapped
to the "special owner" entry.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
The previous patch introduced a pointer to a local variable to reduce
the amount of lines changed. Remove that pointer and adjust all usage
accordingly.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Logging flags in case they do not match seems unnecessary. Other log
messages should show the flags as well.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This static function will be called earlier in later patches.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This is only used for logging of a rejected ACL, but does not provide
additional useful information. Remove it to simplify the function a bit.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This avoids some code duplication. Do not make this static, as it will
be used in a later patch.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmit <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
uid and gid are members of the same union so this makes no difference,
but for type correctness and readability use the gid to check for
ownerGID.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This is the newer API to lookup id mappings and will make it easier to
add to the IDMAP_TYPE_BOTH case.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
When id mappings use IDMAP_TYPE_BOTH, the NFSv4 ACL mapping code is not
aware whether a particular entry is for a user or a group. The
underlying assumption then is that is should not matter, as both the ACL
mapping maps everything to NFSv4 ACL group entries and the user's token
will contain gid entries for the groups.
Add a testcase to verify that when mapping from DACLS to NFSv4 ACL
entries with IDMAP_TYPE_BOTH, all entries are mapped as expected.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
When id mappings use IDMAP_TYPE_BOTH, the NFSv4 ACL mapping code is not
aware whether a particular entry is for a user or a group. The
underlying assumption then is that is should not matter, as both the ACL
mapping maps everything to NFSv4 ACL group entries and the user's token
will contain gid entries for the groups.
Add a testcase to verify that when mapping from NFSv4 ACL entries to
DACLs with IDMAP_TYPE_BOTH, all entries are mapped as expected.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
The mapping code between NFSv4 ACLs and security descriptors still has
the deprecated config setting "nfs4:mode = special". This should not be
used as it has security problems: All entries matching owner or group
are mapped to "special owner" or "special group", which can change its
meaning when being inherited to a new file or directory with different
owner and owning group.
This mode should eventually be removed, but as long as it still exists
add testcases to verify the expected behavior. This patch adds the
testcase for "nfs4:mode = special" when mapping from the NFS4 ACL to the
DACL in the security descriptor.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
The mapping code between NFSv4 ACLs and security descriptors still has
the deprecated config setting "nfs4:mode = special". This should not be
used as it has security problems: All entries matching owner or group
are mapped to "special owner" or "special group", which can change its
meaning when being inherited to a new file or directory with different
owner and owning group.
This mode should eventually be removed, but as long as it still exists
add testcases to verify the expected behavior. This patch adds the
testcase for "nfs4:mode = special" when mapping from the DACL in the
security descriptor to the NFSv4 ACL.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
The NFSv4 mapping code has a config option nfs4:acedup for the mapping
path from DACLs to NFSv4 ACLs. Part of this codepath is detecting
duplicate ACL entries. Add a testcase with different ACL entries and
verify that only exactly matching entries are detected as duplicates and
treated accordingly.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
The NFSv4 ACL mapping code has a setting nfs4:acedup. Depending on the
setting, when mapping from DACLs to NFSv4 ACLs, duplicate ACL entries
are either merged, ignored or rejected. Add a testcase that has
duplicate ACL entries and verify the expected behavior for all possible
settings of the nfs4:acedup option.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
"map full control" when enabled adds the DELETE_CHILD permission, when
all other permissions are present. This allows Windows clients to
display the "FULL CONTROL" permissions.
Add a testcase that verifies this mapping when mapping from NFSv4 ACL to
the DACL in the security descriptor. Also verify that switching the
option off disables this behavior.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Add testcase for mapping from NFSv4 ACL entries for "special owner" and
"special group" to DACL entries in the security descriptor. Each NFSv4
entry here with INHERIT_ONLY maps directly to a CREATOR OWNER or CREATOR
GROUP entry in the DACL. Entries without INHERIT_ONLY map to the CREATOR
entry and an additional explicit entry granting permission on the
current object.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Add testcase for mapping DACL entries CREATOR OWNER and CREATOR GROUP
with inheritance flag in the security descriptor to NFSv4 "special
owner" and "special group" entries. This is the correct mapping for
these entries as inheriting "special owner" and "special group" grants
permissions to the actual owner and owning group of the new file or
directory, similar to what CREATOR entries do.
The other side is that CREATOR entries without any inheritance flags do
not make sense, so these are not mapped to NFSv4 ACL entries.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Add testcase for mapping from entries in the DACL security descriptor to
"special" entries in the NFSv4 ACL. Verify that the WORLD well-known SID
maps to "everyone" in the NFSv4 ACL. Verify that the "Unix NFS" SID is
ignored, as there is no meaningful mapping for this entry. Verify that
SID entries matching the owner or group are mapped to "special owner"
or "special group", but only if no inheritance flags are used. "special
owner" and "special group" with inheritance flags have the meaning of
CREATOR OWNER and CREATOR GROUP and will be tested in another testcase.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
In addition to entries for users and groups, NFSv4 ACLs have the concept
of entries for "special" entries. Only the "owner", "group" and
"everyone" entries are currently used in the ACL mapping.
Add a testcase that verifies the mapping from NFSv4 "special" entries to
the DACL in the security descriptor. Verify that only "owner", "group"
and "everyone" are mapped and all other "special" entries are ignored.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14032
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <cs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
