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This is done by adding a new API that avoids the problems of
ldb_dn_copy() and makes it clear that a struct ldb_context *
pointer will be stored in the new copy.
Signed-off-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
In configurations where vfs_acl_xattr is used with 'ignore system acls'
option we encounter NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED while trying to open an
already existing test_dir in smb2.delete-on-close-perms.READONLY. Due
to missing SEC_STD_DELETE permission from the list of allowed ACEs it
couldn't be removed via previous call to smb2_deltree(). Thus as seen
with other tests we now call set_dir_delete_perms() so that subsequent
attempt to remove it can succeed.
Signed-off-by: Anoop C S <anoopcs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jun 10 13:17:58 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
In shares where acl_xattr vfs module is loaded with 'ignore system acls'
set, smb2.delete-on-close-perms.FIND_and_set_DOC fails to open test_dir
due to NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED as it lacks few permissions for owner
when created using create_dir(). Test case aims to set delete-on-close
for which delete permission is necessary in first place. Therefore we
now perform the creation and subsequent opening of directory using
torture_smb2_testdir() so that the open handle comes with SEC_STD_DELETE
permission.
Signed-off-by: Anoop C S <anoopcs@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This flexiblity in the tests avoids requiring Samba/Heimdal to omit an NTSTATUS error
return and just be consistent between the different authentication paths.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jun 10 05:32:54 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
This makes sense as otherwise the user would suddenly not know their password
for use when they do not use their smartcard.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
We do this by telling the Domain Functional Level upgrade code that
this is a new install.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This assures us that the new provision sets the value by default.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This is a measure to avoid multiple servers rotating the password
but means that the maximum password age really must be set to
twice the TGT lifetime, eg a default of 20 hours. The internet
suggestions of 1 day for this feature should work fine.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This is to gracefully deal with races and to avoid additional password
rollover in situations where the TGT lifetime is longer than the
maximum password lifetime. This is not a sensible combination, so
we just avoid the extra DB write, and update it only once per AS-REQ
in this case.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This ensures that before the KDC starts to process the entry
we check if it is expired and rotate it. As an account with
UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED simply can not expire unless
msDS-ExpirePasswordsOnSmartCardOnlyAccounts is set and
the Domain Functional Level is >= 2016 we do not need
to do configuration checks here.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Pair-programmed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This makes the time during authentication stay consistent in the KDC
and follows the fake time when we are testing gMSA accounts. By having
the account expiry follow exactly the same clock as the password expiry
we can hope for less supprises.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
The MIT KDC has a fallback to a consistent time per fetch call, and
both implementations then follow the time in each 'struct
samba_kdc_entry'.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This will ensure that the time which will be is passed in an opaque is
not used by other parts of Samba
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
ldb_wrap is a caching mechansim, and it should probably be removed
but for now provide a way to avoid it in specific cases where we
know it is harmful.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Instead, make this query after we open the DB in common with the MIT code.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
We do this by allowing the password change control to indicate
that the password is to be randomised, bypassing the quality
checks (as true random passwords often fail these) and
re-randomising with the same code as is used for the KDC.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This both allows the time to be overriden in some future unit tests
(which is incredibly helpful in testing) and gets a full NTTIME
rather than just a time_t based time, so we do not need to wait
an extra second for the NTTIME to change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
While the passwords are random and rolled on the server, we can tell
about the expiry by setting pwdLastSet to 0.
Samba now honours the password expiry.
This is only enabled for domain functional level 2016 and when
msDS-ExpirePasswordsOnSmartCardOnlyAccounts is set to TRUE.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This allows us to have tests, which pass on Windows, that
use a very short maxPwdAge.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This is because the smartcard reset now generates all the keys
on Windows, so we want to match Windows 2022 as at April 2024
behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
The tests of passwords that will expire in the TGT lifetime fail against
windows, we do not see the rotation in that case.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This allows Windows behaviour with clock skew to be allowed for.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This will allow other parts of the testsuite to use this helpful function.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This demonstrates behaviour against a server presumed to be in FL 2016
what the impact of the msDS-ExpirePasswordsOnSmartCardOnlyAccounts
attribute is.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Windows 2022 at April 2024 has change and now includes the
AES keys for accounts with UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED, so revert
part of the change in b2fe1ea1c6.
(This is an improvement to Windows security).
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
We have had confirmed from MS that this behaviour is both deliberate
and required. Possession of the credential is (by the returned PAC
containing the NT hash) possession of the password, and it must be
possible to change the password to a known value otherwise DPAPI
(local keychain) secured by this value can fail on the client.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15045
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This centralises the check rather than checking the time in
multiple spots.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Other functions in this file are TALLOC_CTX, struct ldb_context *, not
the other way around.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jo Sutton <josutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Grant owner sid to check for owner rights.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15648
Signed-off-by: MikeLiu <mikeliu@qnap.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Jun 7 18:30:34 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jun 6 21:32:53 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
This is not used anywhere in that functions or the functions we are
calling. It was replaced by command line cli credentials stored in
c->creds. This fixes a memory leak.
Direct leak of 12 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
#0 0x7f17fdaf5830 in strdup ../../../../libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:578
#1 0x7f17fc7e7339 in smb_xstrdup ../../lib/util/util.c:752
#2 0x55f079bf0723 in rpc_trustdom_establish ../../source3/utils/net_rpc.c:6591
#3 0x55f079c529af in net_run_function ../../source3/utils/net_util.c:464
#4 0x55f079bdbecf in rpc_trustdom ../../source3/utils/net_rpc.c:7483
#5 0x55f079c529af in net_run_function ../../source3/utils/net_util.c:464
#6 0x55f079bfe7de in net_rpc ../../source3/utils/net_rpc.c:8413
#7 0x55f079c529af in net_run_function ../../source3/utils/net_util.c:464
#8 0x55f079baa0a8 in main ../../source3/utils/net.c:1436
#9 0x7f17f8a2a1ef in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This allows to verify the backup tarball contents with:
sha256sum -c SHA256SUM
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We also have ldapi, other sockets or pipes around, we don't want to
add. This will be relevant for adding checksums later.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Otherwise we don't get the correct header include paths and krb5.h in
a non default location won't be found.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
If the client does not have permissions to update the record,
but the record already has the data the update tries to apply,
it's a no-op that should result in success instead of failing.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13019
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jun 6 03:18:16 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
This means we no longer generate strange errors/warnings
in the Windows event log nor in the nsupdate -g output.
Note: this is a only difference between gss-tsig and
the legacy gss.microsoft.com algorithms.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13019
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
