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Only check processes that are CTDB clients.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13012
Signed-off-by: Amitay Isaacs <amitay@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin Schwenke <martin@meltin.net>
This was added in e6a5f11865 to adopt the
NFSv4 framework to follow ZFS permission rules. But this is the wrong
place, other filesystems like GPFS do not allow deletion when the user
has SEC_DIR_ADD_FILE.
This patch therefor moves the change from the NFS4 framework into the
ZFS module.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=6133
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Sep 9 04:59:51 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144
This is in preperation of moving SMB_ACE4_ADD_FILE /
SMB_ACE4_DELETE_CHILD mapping from the common NFSv4 framework into this
module excusively.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=6133
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Commit 99a74ff5e6 added special handling
of SMB_ACE4_SYNCHRONIZE, always setting it in the access_mask when
fabricating an ACL. While at the same time removing it from the
access_mask when setting an ACL, but this is done direclty in
vfs_zfsacl, not it the common code.
Forcing SMB_ACE4_SYNCHRONIZE to be always set is only needed on ZFS, the
other VFS modules using the common NFSv4 infrastructure should not be
made victims of the special ZFS behaviour.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=7909
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Justin Maggard <jmaggard@netgear.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Sep 8 06:26:52 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144
EROFS is incorrectly mapped to NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED. This should
instead be mapped to NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED.
This change has already been done for the client in
unix_nt_errmap in libcli/util/errmap_unix.c
commit 9d055846f2 ("r3278: - rewrote the client side rpc...)")
SMB1 specs for SMB_COM_DELETE also specifies this mapping for EROFS
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee441772.aspx
RH bz: 1171705
This problem was reported by Red Hat glusterfs QE who encountered
different errors when performing the same operation on a fuse mount and
on a cifs mount of the same underlying gluster filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gunther Deschner <gdeschne@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Surabhi Bhalothia <sbhaloth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Sep 7 10:43:33 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144
This message shows up a lot (every packet) at level 6 for the succesful case
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This message shows up a lot at level 6 for no particularly good reason
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This can be sensitive even with the passwords still encrypted.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13017
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This is used in the client and in the server
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This means that the default print binding string qualifier will now go via this debug class
as will explicit calls to ndr_print_debug() and ndr_print_union_debug().
Calls to ndr_print_debugc() are not changed.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This re-work of our LDIF printing avoids some of the privacy issue from
printing the full LDIF at level 4, while showing the entry that actually fails.
Instead, we print the DN only at level 4, then the full message at 8.
While all of the DRS replication data is potentially sensitive
the passwords are most sensitive, and are now not printed unencrypted.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This avoids printing un-encrypted secret values in logs, and while links are not likely
secret, this avoids a future copy and paste using ldb_ldif_message_string() again.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This avoids printing un-encrypted secret values in logs
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
* Bug #13017: Add ldb_ldif_message_redacted_string() to allow debug
of redacted log messages, avoiding showing secret values
* Bug #13015: Allow re-index of newer databases with binary GUID TDB keys
(this officially removes support for re-index of the original
pack format 0, rather than simply segfaulting).
* Avoid memory allocation and so make modify of records in ldb_tdb faster
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This is designed to be a drop in replacement for
ldb_ldif_message_string() while better protecting privacy.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13017
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
These are not found on any AD DC, and would segfault previous LDB
versions.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13015
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
If backported, this allows old ldb versions to full-search and re-index newer databases
and in current code allows the transition to and from a GUID or incrementing ID based index
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13016
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
We want to rename the objects, then scan looking for the index values.
This avoids a DB modify during the index scan traverse (the index values
are actually added to an in-memory TDB, written in prepare_commit()).
This allows us to remove the "this might already exist" case in the
index handling, we now know that the entry did not exist in the index
before we add it.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13015
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
The keys may not always be a null terminated string, they could well
be a binary GUID in a future revision, for efficiency..
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13016
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
By allowing 41 or 42 days, we still test the expiry but are less sensitive to the
current time.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Describes --accel-aes configure time option.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13008
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Add --accel-aes=[none|intelaesni] to select.
Default is none.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13008
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Causes:
AES_set_encrypt_key()
AES_set_decrypt_key()
AES_encrypt()
AES_decrypt()
to probe for the Intel AES instructions at runtime (only once)
and then call the hardware implementations if so, otherwise
fall back to the software implementations.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13008
Based on original work by Justin Maggard <jmaggard@netgear.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Rename the old struct aes_key as an intermediate struct aes_key_rj
and wrap it in a union so we can chose an alternate aes_key struct
when using Intel AES hardware.
Rename the original software implementations of:
AES_set_encrypt_key()
AES_set_decrypt_key()
AES_encrypt()
AES_decrypt()
by adding an _rj on the end, and call them via a wrapper
function.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13008
Based on original work by Justin Maggard <jmaggard@netgear.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Minor modifications to code to allow building as a Samba
shared library.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13008
Based on original work by Justin Maggard <jmaggard@netgear.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This commit takes the Linux kernel AES-NI code, and puts it into a
third_party private library. The Linux kernel code is under GPLv2+
so is compatible with Samba.
This can result in massive speed improvements (up to 200% on some
platforms), by using Intel AES-NI instructions.
These are the pristine check-ins of Linux kernel files for Intel AESNI crypto.
git show 8691ccd764f9ecc69a6812dfe76214c86ac9ba06:arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S
git show 2baad6121e2b2fa3428ee6cb2298107be11ab23a:arch/x86/include/asm/inst.h
Show the exact Linux kernel git refspecs we have imported.
These files are not yet used.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13008
Based on original work by Justin Maggard <jmaggard@netgear.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Sep 6 15:29:58 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12957
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlet <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Sep 6 03:54:19 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144
This provisions the bind_dlz files in the 'binddns dir'. If you want to
migrate to the new files strcuture you can run samba_upgradedns!
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12957
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlet <abartlet@samba.org>
The code makes sure we are backwards compatible. It will first check if
we still have files in the private directory, if yes it will use those.
If the the file is not in the private directory it will try the binddns
dir.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlet <abartlet@samba.org>
This allows to us to have restricted access to the directory by the group
'named' which bind is a member of.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12957
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlet <abartlet@samba.org>
This is the wrong place, it will just prepare the ldif. The file is not
created here.
The code is corrently changing the group in:
python/samba/provision/__init__.py
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlet <abartlet@samba.org>
