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This is the big switch to use samba-dcerpcd for the RPC services in
source3/. It is a pretty big and unordered patch, but I don't see a
good way to split this up into more manageable pieces without
sacrificing bisectability even more. Probably I could cut out a few
small ones, but a major architechtural switch like this will always be
messy.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Will be used later in client tools.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This will serve as a check to make sure that in particular a SAMR
client is really root. This is for example used in get_user_info_18()
handing out a machine password.
The unix domain sockets for NCACN_NP can only be contacted by root,
the "np\" subdirectory for those sockets is root/root 0700.
Connecting to such a socket is done in two situations: First, local
real root processes connecting and smbd on behalf of SMB clients
connecting to \\pipe\name, smbd does become_root() there. Via the
named_pipe_auth_req_info4 smbd hands over the SMB session information
that the RPC server blindly trusts. The session information (i.e. the
NT token) is heavily influenced by external sources like the KDC. It
is highly unlikely that we get a system token via SMB, but who knows,
this is information not fully controlled by smbd.
This is where this additional field in named_pipe_auth_req_info5 makes
a difference: This field is set to NCACN_NP by smbd's code, not
directly controlled by the clients. Other clients directly connecting
to a socket in "np\" is root anyway (only smbd can do become_root())
and can set this field to NCALRPC.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
In samba3 it is possible to run some services externally, for example:
rpc_daemon:lsasd = fork
rpc_server:netlogon = disabled
rpc_server:samr = external
rpc_server:lsarpc = external
The external services running in separate processes have to use its own
dedicated ncalrpc endpoint, otherwise will race with main smbd serving the
embedded services to accept connections on ncalrpc default socket. If the
connection ends in an external process and the client tries to bind to an
interface not registered there (like winreg for example) the bind will fail.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Sep 21 11:00:01 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
state->call should not be talloc'ed off a long-lived context
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14675
CI: https://gitlab.com/samba-team/samba/-/merge_requests/1861
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Mar 31 12:14:01 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
This structure just grew from 3 to 6 pointers, avoid making a copy of
this. All callers of dcesrv_init_context() have this as a static
struct in the C object, so a pointer to that won't change.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Not used right now, but we should never have callbacks without a
"private_data" pointer. Some of the callbacks could even today benefit
from this.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
All callers manually dissected the syntax id for this API.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
We only need this function once, so that we need to fix bugs only once...
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14551
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Craft core structures to dispatch local calls in the same way as remote
ones, removing the special handling in the autogenerated code.
This is also necessary to drop s3 rpc handles implementation.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Apr 8 22:23:05 UTC 2020 on sn-devel-184
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Mar 20 17:11:28 UTC 2020 on sn-devel-184
This commit finally switches the RPC server implementation.
At the same we have to do other related changes to keep code compiling
and test environments running.
First avoid moving the session_info into the allocated pipes_struct memory
context as it is owned now by the core RPC server, and the s3compat pidl
compiler will update the pipes_struct session_info before dispatching
the call with dcesrv_call->auth_state->session_info.
Also, fix a segfault in the endpoint mapper daemon when it tries to delete
the endpoints previously registered over a NCALRPC connection.
If we have:
rpc_server : epmapper = external
rpc_server : lsarpc = external
rpc_daemon : epmd = fork
rpc_daemon : lsasd = fork
The sequence is:
* The endpoint mapper starts (start_epmd in source3/smbd/server.c)
* The lsarpc daemon starts (start_lsasd in source3/smbd/server.c)
* The lsarpc daemon creates the sockets and registers its endpoints
(rpc_ep_register in source3/rpc_server/lsasd.c)
* The endpoint registration code opens a NCALRPC connection to the
endpoint mapper daemon (ep_register in source3/librpc/rpc/dcerpc_ep.c)
and keeps it open to re-register if the endpoint mapper daemon dies
(rpc_ep_register_loop in source3/rpc_server/rpc_ep_register.c)
* When the endpoint mapper daemon accepts a NCALRPC connection it sets a
termination function (srv_epmapper_delete_endpoints)
* Suppose the lsarpc daemon exits. The NCALRPC connection termination
function is called.
* The termination function tries to delete all endpoints registered by that
connection by calling _epm_Delete
* _epm_Delete calls is_privileged_pipe which access to
pipes_struct->session_info.
As the call to _epm_Delete occurs outside of the PIDL generated code,
the pipes_stuct->session_info is NULL. This commit also sets
pipes_struct->session_info from the dcerpc_connection before calling
_epm_Delete. As the core rpc server supports security context multiplexing we
need to pass the dcesrv_connection to the termination function and let the
implementation pick a auth context. In the case of the endpoint mapper
the termination function has to pick one of type NCALRPC_AS_SYSTEM to
check if the connection is privileged and delete the endpoints
registered by the connection being closed.
Finally, the samba.tests.dcerpc.raw_protocol testsuite passes against
the ad_member environment.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Get the dcesrv_context from parent context and use it to search the
endpoint serving the named pipe. Once we have the endpoint pass it to
the make_internal_rpc_pipe_socketpair function.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This function and struct is not used outside rpc_ncacn_np.c
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
These functions are used by endpoint mapper to delete the endpoints
when a NCALRPC connection from an external daemon is lost and by
preforked childs to accept the next client as soon as the current
connection terminates. We can use the same function for both purposes.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Also make it static as it is not used outside rpc_ncacn_np.c
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Now NCACN_NP connections run the same loop as NCACN_IP_TCP and NCALRPC
connections.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Make it clear that we talloc_steal by NULLing out the caller's
session_info
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
The rest of the code uses remote before local, and this
often causes bugs
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Pair-Programmed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
This brings the callers of named_pipe_auth in line with that subsystem.
Much of Samba uses remote_address and local_address, and this difference
has hidden bugs
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Pair-Programmed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
This ensures that gensec, and then the NTLM auth subsystem under it, always gets the
remote and local address pointers for potential logging.
The local address allows us to know which interface an authentication is on
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Pair-Programmed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Chris Lamb <chris@chris-lamb.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
This is better than using hardcoded values.
We need to use the value the client used in the BIND request.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11344
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
With this option turned off we only allow DCERPC_AUTH_LEVEL_{NONE,INTEGRITY,PRIVACY},
this means the reject any request with AUTH_LEVEL_CONNECT with ACCESS_DENIED.
We sadly need to keep this enabled by default for now.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11616
Pair-Programmed-With: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Change-Id: I240d58fdf71bbab42d1ffb63bb52b9650fd4bd85
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
