IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO GET AN ACCOUNT, please write an
email to Administrator. User accounts are meant only to access repo
and report issues and/or generate pull requests.
This is a purpose-specific Git hosting for
BaseALT
projects. Thank you for your understanding!
Только зарегистрированные пользователи имеют доступ к сервису!
Для получения аккаунта, обратитесь к администратору.
It's basically the same as free_sdb_entry(), but the next
step will make free_sdb_entry() private.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Even if the msDS-KeyVersionNumber of the main krbtgt
account if larger than 65535, we need to have
the 16 upper bits all zero in order to avoid
mixing the keys with an RODC.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14951
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Accounts in the Protected Users group acting as clients lack support for
the RC4 encryption type. TGTs issued to such accounts have a lifetime
restricted to four hours, and are unable to be proxied or forwarded.
To determine at lookup time whether a client account is a member of
Protected Users, we now also create an auth_user_info_dc structure when
creating the database entry for an AS-REQ, rather than only when
creating a PAC for a TGT, or when recreating the PAC from an RODC-issued
TGT.
This means that the user's groups are now expanded even for AS-REQs that
result in an error (such as a PREAUTH_REQUIRED error), but this is
required to be able to correctly determine the account's available
encryption types, which are needed soon after fetching the user account.
Currently, the TGT lifetime may exceed four hours (for Heimdal
specifically). This may happen if PKINIT is used, and either the
pkinit_max_life_from_cert_extension option is TRUE and
pkinit_max_life_bound is greater than four hours, or
pkinit_max_life_from_cert is greater than four hours.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
The resulting user_info_dc is kept in the 'samba_kdc_entry' structure,
so it can be reused between calls.
This allows us to simplify samba_kdc_get_pac_blobs(), as it no longer
need to return a user_info_dc structure.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
CID 1502873: Control flow issues (NO_EFFECT)
>>> This greater-than-or-equal-to-zero comparison of an unsigned value is always
true. "el->num_values >= 0U".
This is probably just a paranoia check as num_values should be set to at least
1 if the we have an LDAP entry.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
The ret variable is just used to set the error message for logging.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Allow delegation to any target if we have delegations set up, but the target is
not specified.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This allows us to return the supported enctypes to the client as
PA-SUPPORTED-ENCTYPES padata.
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Note Windows uses the string "MICROSOFT" as cookie,
so it's wrong to have a per DC cookie, but we need to
adjust the Heimdal logic to support that.
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This is needed to give hdb_samba4 the full control over the returned
principal, rather than the new code in the Heimdal KDC.
Including changes selected from code by Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
in his Heimdal upgrade branch.
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Including updates to hook into the improved hdb_auth_status
by Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> from his Heimdal
upgrade branch.
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON'T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Dec 7 04:54:35 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
See also
ac8865a221
Pair-Programmed-With: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Nov 29 09:32:26 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
Looking up the DB twice is subject to a race and is a poor
use of resources, so instead just pass in the record we
already got when trying to confirm that the server in
S4U2Self is the same as the requesting client.
The client record has already been bound to the the
original client by the SID check in the PAC.
Likewise by looking up server only once we ensure
that the keys looked up originally are in the record
we confirm the SID for here.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14686
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
lib/util/safe_string.h is similar to source3/include/safe_string.h, but
the former has fewer checks. It is missing bcopy, strcasecmp, and
strncasecmp.
Add the missing elements to lib/util/safe_string.h remove the other
safe_string.h which is in the source3-specific path. To accomodate
existing uses of str(n?)casecmp, add #undef lines to source files where
they are used.
Signed-off-by: Matthew DeVore <matvore@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Mulder <dmulder@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Aug 28 02:18:40 UTC 2020 on sn-devel-184
Currently we only ignore KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP for
Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys, but not for Primary:Kerberos.
If a service account has msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes: 31
and DES keys stored in Primary:Kerberos, we'll pass the
DES key to smb_krb5_keyblock_init_contents(), but may get
KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14354
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jul 28 14:04:26 UTC 2020 on sn-devel-184
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14233
Match Windows behavior and allow the forwardable flag to be
set in cross-realm tickets. We used to allow forwardable to
any server, but now that we apply disallow-forwardable policy
in heimdal we need to explicitly allow in the corss-realm case
(and remove the workaround we have for it the MIT plugin).
Signed-off-by: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Jun 12 22:10:34 UTC 2020 on sn-devel-184
In Heimdal KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH is an enum, so we tried to double-free
mem_ctx.
This was introduced in 9a0263a7c3 for the
MIT KDC effort.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13628
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Sep 5 16:17:59 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
This can later be used for sid filtering and similar things.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13300
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
We don't support selective authentication yet,
so we shouldn't silently allow domain wide authentication
for such a trust.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13299
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Feb 28 19:45:13 CET 2018 on sn-devel-144
Add kdc kerberos settings to gpo.tdb, then retrieve those settings in
lpcfg_default_kdc_policy.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: David Mulder <dmulder@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
When you have an RODC, this will force the fetch of secrets if not found here
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We now pass on the original client name and the client address to allow
consistent audit logging in Samba across multiple protocols.
We use config->db[0] to find the first database to record incorrect
users.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The logic in samdb_result_force_password_change() is incomplete
and the correct logic is already available via the constructed
"msDS-UserPasswordExpiryTimeComputed" attribute.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11441
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Guenther
Pair-Programmed-With: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jul 30 13:29:27 CEST 2015 on sn-devel-104
dsdb_trust_search_tdo() is almost the same as sam_get_results_trust(),
so we can remove sam_get_results_trust() later.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We lookup the principal against our trust routing table
and return HDB_ERR_WRONG_REALM and the realm of the next trust hoop.
Routing within our own forest is not supported yet.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We should always return the principal from the values stored in the database.
This also means we need to ignore a missing HDB_F_CANON.
This was demonstrated by running some new tests against windows.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
If no kvno is specified we should return the keys with the lowest value.
For the initial value this means we return the current key with kvno 0 (NULL on
the wire). Later we return the previous key with kvno current - 1.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We should fallback to the current password if the trusted KDC used a wrong kvno.
After commit 6f8b868a29, we always have the
previous password filled. With the trust creation we typically don't
have a TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION in the current nor in the previous array.
This means current_kvno is 0. And now previous_kvno is 255.
A FreeIPA/MIT KDC uses kvno=1 in the referral ticket, which triggered
the 'Request for unknown kvno 1 - current kvno is 0' case.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This should be translated to computer$@EXAMPLE.COM.
Note the behavior differs between client and server lookup.
In samba_kdc_lookup_client() we need to fallback in case of
NO_SUCH_USER. samba_kdc_lookup_server() needs to do a single search
and only use the result if it's unique.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11130
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We need to free enterprise_principal if generated.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
smbclient //w2012r2-183.w2012r2-l4.base/netlogon -c 'ls' -k yes -Uadministrator@S4XDOM.BASE%A1b2C3d4
worked while
smbclient //w2012r2-183.w2012r2-l4.base/netlogon -c 'ls' -k yes -Uadministrator@s4xdom.base
failed, if aes keys are used across the trust.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Mar 27 04:02:05 CET 2015 on sn-devel-104
This is a regression introduced in commit
8dd37327b0.
Now we change 'realm' before calling
ret = krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
as before commit 8dd37327b0.
Without this we'd set entry_ex->entry.principal to
krbtgt/DOMA.EXAMPLE.COM@DOMA.EXAMPLE.COM instead
of krbtgt/DOMA.EXAMPLE.COM@DOMB.EXAMPLE.COM,
while we use krbtgt/DOMA.EXAMPLE.COM@DOMB.EXAMPLE.COM as
salt for the keys.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Mar 18 18:56:51 CET 2015 on sn-devel-104
This is now handled properly by samba_kdc_lookup_server() and this wrapper actually
breaks things.
Andrew Bartlett
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This also reverts 51b94ab3fd as our
testing shows Windows 2012R2 does not have this behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
This needs to vary depending on if the client requested the canonicalize flag
This was found by our new krb5.kdc test
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Pair-programmed-with: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Pair-programmed-with: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
If we are set to canonicalize, we get back the fixed UPPER
case realm, and the real username (ie matching LDAP
samAccountName)
Otherwise, if we are set to enterprise, we
get back the whole principal as-sent
Finally, if we are not set to canonicalize, we get back the
fixed UPPER case realm, but the as-sent username
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Pair-programmed-with: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Based on a patch by Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@zentyal.com>
This ensures we write the correct (implict, samAccountName) based UPN into
the ticket, rather than the userPrincipalName, which will have a different
realm.
Pair-programmed-with: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
This avoids writing invalid memory, because num_keys was calculated
in a wrong way...
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Guenther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
We have a look at "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes" and >= DS_DOMAIN_FUNCTION_2008
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Deschner <gd@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Dec 19 15:39:40 CET 2014 on sn-devel-104
This new helper function will also be used by pdb_samba_dsdb.
Change-Id: I008af94a0822012c211cfcc6108a8b1285f4d7c7
Pair-programmed-with: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Change-Id: I27280d7dd139c6c65dddac611dbdcd7e518ee536
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This only changes the log output, the same error is still returned
Change-Id: Id3c13e9373140c276783e5bd288f29de2bf4a45d
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
In samba_kdc_firstkey() routine, krb5_get_default_realm() allocates
memory for "realm" but never used afterwards. Free() the leaked memory.
CID: 1107223
Signed-off-by: Santosh Kumar Pradhan <spradhan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This was used in only 2 places, db-glue.c and the lsa server.
In db-glue.c it is awkward though, as it forces to use an unconvenient lsa
structure and conversions from time_t to nt_time only to have nt_times
converted back to time_t for actual use. This is silly.
Also the kdc-policy file was a single funciton library, that's just ridiculous.
The loadparm helper is all we need to keep the values consistent, and if we
ever end up doing something with group policies we will care about it when it's
the time. the code would have to change quite a lot anyway.
Autobuild-User: Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Fri Apr 20 01:53:37 CEST 2012 on sn-devel-104
kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap is not used anywhere else, so just move it there and
make it static, one less dependency to worry about.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This sorts out the correct handling for the 'kvno=255'
problem. Windows will use the previous trust password for 1 hour after
a password set, and indicates that the previous password is being used
by sending current_kvno-1. That maps to 255 if the trust password has
not actually been changed, so the initial trust password is being
used.
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
the kdc should not be looking for users in GC partial replicas, as
these users do not have all of the attributes needed for the KDC to
operate
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
windows sometimes sends us a kvno of 255 for inter-domain trusts. We
don't yet know why it does this, but it seems that we need to treat
this as an unspecified kvno
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
the kdc doesn't want to find users who are in partialReplica
partitions, as they won't have the needed secret info for the kdc to
operate. We need to generate referrals instead
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
the exact value doesn't matter, as both Samba and windows check
against the latest password, but the old default of -1 caused ASN.1
parsing errors on windows, which prevented it answering TGS requests
thanks to Hongwei Sun for finding this from a ttt trace
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Windows seems to always canonicalize the principal in TGS replies.
metze
Autobuild-User: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Tue Jul 26 03:25:06 CEST 2011 on sn-devel-104
Bit shifting is non-trivial in C:-)
This
int32_t a = 0x12340000;
uint32_t b = (a >> 16);
results in 0x00001234, but this
int32_t a = 0xEDCB0000;
uint32_t b = (a >> 16);
results in 0xFFFFEDCB, while we expected 0x0000EDCB.
metze
We now no longer print tickets with a potentially infinite life, and
we report the same life over LSA as we use in the KDC. We should get
this from group policy, but for now it's parametric smb.conf options.
Andrew Bartlett
Thanks to Hongwei Sun for the clear description of the algorithim
involved. Importantly, it isn't possible to remove encryption types
from the list, only to add them over the defaults (DES and
arcfour-hmac-md5, and additional AES for DCs and RODCs).
This changes the behaviour for entries with
msDS-supportedEncryptionTypes: 0, which Angelos Oikonomopoulos
reported finding set by ADUC when attempting to store cleartext
passwords.
Andrew Bartlett
Autobuild-User: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Tue Nov 16 21:24:43 UTC 2010 on sn-devel-104
The KDC sets different flags for the AS-REQ (this is client-depenent)
and the TGS-REQ to determine if the realm should be forced to the
canonical value. If we do this always, or do this never, we get into
trouble, so it's much better to honour the flags we are given.
Andrew Bartlett
This means that when we are an RODC, and an account does not have the
password attributes, we can now indicate to the kdc code that it
should forward the request to a real DC.
(The proxy code itself is not in this commit).
Andrew Bartlett
This reverts commit 8a2ce5c47c.
Jelmer pointed out that these are also in use by other LDB databases - not only
SAMDB ones.
Autobuild-User: Matthias Dieter Wallnöfer <mdw@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Sun Oct 17 13:37:16 UTC 2010 on sn-devel-104
They're only in use by SAMDB code.
Autobuild-User: Matthias Dieter Wallnöfer <mdw@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date: Sun Oct 17 09:40:13 UTC 2010 on sn-devel-104
We should avoid using Kerberos or any other recursive auth mechanism
in ldb backends, but denying Kerberos here won't be enough, so
remove the special case. (Typcially we bind using a different password
space and DIGEST-MD5 or NTLM).
Andrew Bartlett
This includes rewriting the PAC if the original krbtgt isn't to be
trusted, and reading different entries from the DB for the krbtgt
depending on the krbtgt number.
Andrew Bartlett
This means we just set up the system_session etc in one place
and don't diverge between the MIT and Heimdal plugins.
We also now determine if we are an RODC and store some details
that we will need later.
Andrew Bartlett
this converts all callers that use the Samba4 loadparm lp_ calling
convention to use the lpcfg_ prefix.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This changes the calculation to apply the allowed enc types to all
uses of the key (no point allowing a weak kinit to a key the server
wanted strongly protected). It also ensures that all the non-DES keys
are available on the krbtgt in particular, even as it does not have a
msds-SupportedEncryptionTypes attributes.
Andrew Bartlett
Keep all heimdal related plugin code within hdb_samba4.c
Move interfaces needed by multiple plugins in db-glue.c
Move sequence context in main db context so that we do
not depend on db->hdb_dbc in the common code.
Remove unnecessary paremeters from function prototypes
