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This allows to differentiate between the two database models.
ctdb_db_persistent() - replicated and permanent
ctdb_db_volatile() - distributed and temporary
Signed-off-by: Amitay Isaacs <amitay@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin Schwenke <martin@meltin.net>
The test uses NetrServerPasswordSet2 to change a password, this tests
the end to end encryption. The original call to NetrServerPasswordSet2
was not utf-16 encoding the new password. However the call to
netr_DsrEnumerateDomainTrusts was using cached credentials and not
using the new password, so this was not detected.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Garming Sam <garming@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jun 29 06:50:32 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jun 29 02:33:48 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144
This removes important entries winbindd created during startup!
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12868
Pair-Programmed-With: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This removes *IMPORTANT* entries from the gencache winbindd creates on
startup.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12868
Pair-Programmed-With: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This prepares real async handling in the backends.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jun 27 21:09:08 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144
This prepares real async handling in the backends.
Check with git show -w.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This prepares the conversion to winbind_check_password_send/recv()
where the internal state is called 'winbind_check_password_state'
as 'state'.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
The previous commit removed the condition from the block. No change in
behaviour, best viewed with git show -w.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
We need to handle every error instead of just NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER,
the callers also doesn't require NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED anymore.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
There's no point in running it twice with the old ccache.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This reverts commit 4eb29ce326.
This will be passed by the caller in a following commit.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This will make it possible to test with -mNT1 as well as -mSMB3
in a following patch.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This makes sure only the "creating a bad symlink and deleting it"
is failing with -mSMB3.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
On interactive sessions we print the following instead now:
Try "help" do get a list of possible commands.
smb: >
The reason for this is that we don't get these information via SMB2
and the we only get the domain name via some layering violations
from the NTLMSSP state.
It's better to remove this consitently for all SMB and auth
protocol combinations.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
As the caller ("smbd_smb2_request_process_create()") already sets the callback,
the first time, it's not safe to reuse the tevent_req structure.
The typical 'tevent_req_nterror(); return tevent_req_post()' will
crash as the tevent_req_nterror() already triggered the former callback,
which calls smbd_smb2_create_recv(), were tevent_req_received() invalidates
the tevent_req structure, so that tevent_req_post() will crash.
We just remember the required values from the old state
and move them to the new state.
We tried to write reproducers for this, but sadly weren't able to trigger
the backtrace we had from a create a customer (using recent code)
with commit 6beba782f1
included. And this patch fixed the situation for the
customer.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12832
Pair-Programmed-With: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Here we check that we get 'REDACTED SECRET VALUES' printed, in order
to avoid regression on the non '-f' behavior.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12782
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
We use secrets_{prepare,failed,defer,finish}_password_change() to make
the process more robust.
Even if we just just verified the current password with the DC
it can still happen that the remote password change will fail.
If a server has the RefusePasswordChange=1 under
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\Parameters,
it will reject NetrServerPasswordSet2() with NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD.
This results in a successful local change, but a failing remote change,
which means the domain membership is broken (as we don't fallback to
the previous password for ntlmssp nor kerberos yet).
An (at least Samba) RODC will also reject a password change,
see https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12773.
Even with this change we still have open problems, e.g. if the password was
changed, but we didn't get the servers response. In order to fix that we need
to use only netlogon and lsa over unprotected transports, just using schannel
authentication (which supports the fallback to the old password).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12782
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
We now store various hashed keys at change time and maintain a lot of details
that will help debugging failed password changes.
We keep storing the legacy values:
SECRETS/SID/
SECRETS/DOMGUID/
SECRETS/MACHINE_LAST_CHANGE_TIME/
SECRETS/MACHINE_PASSWORD/
SECRETS/MACHINE_PASSWORD.PREV/
SECRETS/SALTING_PRINCIPAL/DES/
This allows downgrades to older Samba versions.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12782
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This blob will be store in secrets.tdb. It makes it possible to store much
more useful details about the workstation trust.
The key feature that that triggered this change is the ability
to store details for the next password change before doing
the remote change. This will allow us to recover from failures.
While being there I also thought about possible new features,
which we may implement in the near future.
We also store the raw UTF16 like cleartext buffer as well as derived
keys like the NTHASH (arcfour-hmac-md5 key) and other kerberos keys.
This will allow us to avoid recalculating the keys for an in memory
keytab in future.
I also added pointer to an optional lsa_ForestTrustInformation structure,
which might be useful to implement multi-tenancy in future.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12782
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
