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It went wrong in 366f8cf090
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Jan 26 12:39:52 UTC 2022 on sn-devel-184
As we want to reduce use of 'classic domain controller' role but FreeIPA
relies on it internally, add a separate role to mark FreeIPA domain
controller role.
It means that role won't result in ROLE_STANDALONE.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14801
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is not strictly needed, but makes it easier to audit
that we don't miss important places.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We need to make sure that temporary failures don't trigger a fallback
to the local SAM that silently ignores the domain name part for users.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14556
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
auth_unix was in the source4/auth/ntlm for two reasons:
- inherited from earlier Samba before the Samba4 fork
- To support the ejs-backed SWAT (web administration tool)
Neither of these are good reasons to keep this unused code
around, there is very unlikely to be a need to support
plaintext PAM authentication in this part of the code in the
future.
See b16362fab6 for some
context on the historical use case.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Apr 19 07:07:01 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
Remove complexity in the data structures, and pushes the async-ness
one level down.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is a simpler approach to really just wrap the code.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Fix a ubsan detected integer overflow.
../../source4/auth/ntlm/auth_sam.c:445:56: runtime error:
signed integer overflow: 60 * 600000000
cannot be represented in type 'int'
In practice this meant that the default for the smb.conf parameter
"old password allowed period" was approximately 16 seconds, rather than
the intended 60 minutes. Similarly the value used would be 22.5 times
less than the value specified in smd.conf.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Jan 13 23:52:38 UTC 2021 on sn-devel-184
Will fix a typo next
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
lib/util/safe_string.h is similar to source3/include/safe_string.h, but
the former has fewer checks. It is missing bcopy, strcasecmp, and
strncasecmp.
Add the missing elements to lib/util/safe_string.h remove the other
safe_string.h which is in the source3-specific path. To accomodate
existing uses of str(n?)casecmp, add #undef lines to source files where
they are used.
Signed-off-by: Matthew DeVore <matvore@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Mulder <dmulder@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Aug 28 02:18:40 UTC 2020 on sn-devel-184
LDAP Simple BIND authentications have already been mapped to a
DOMAIN\username pair and should not be mapped twice.
This appears to be a regression in 09e24ce40f
included in Samba 4.7.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13598
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Isaac Boukris <iboukris@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Feb 14 17:13:33 UTC 2020 on sn-devel-184
Commit dc5788056b removed crypt library from replace. This breaks the
build on fedora 30 ppc64.
[2439/3956] Linking bin/default/source4/auth/ntlm/libauth4-samba4.so
/usr/bin/ld: source4/auth/ntlm/auth_unix.c.5.o: in function `password_check':
auth_unix.c:(.text+0x7e0): undefined reference to `crypt'
crypt library is required to build ntlm auth_unix.c.
Signed-off-by: Amitay Isaacs <amitay@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Amitay Isaacs <amitay@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Nov 19 04:47:47 UTC 2019 on sn-devel-184
This became unused after eba8799514 in 2012
Found by callcatcher
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Generate a random logon_id and pass it in the SamLogon calls.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Fold the two 32 bit values logon_id_high and logon_id_low into a single
64 bit logon_id in netr_identity_info. This will be used to tie
together winbind and SamLogon requests in audit logging.
Summary of the of the Query and Response from Microsoft on it's usage.
[REG:119013019612095] [MS-NRPC]: NETLOGON_LOGON_IDENTITY_INFO: Does
the Reserved field have LogonId meaning?
Questions:
In NetrLogonSamLogonEx does the Reserved field
(of NETLOGON_LOGON_IDENTITY_INFO) have LogonId meaning?
What is a valid LogonID, and does have any audit usage?
Samba is sending a constant "deadbeef" in hex and would like to
understand any usage of this field.
Response:
The NRPC spec is accurate in defining the field as Reserved, and without
protocol significance. In the header file in our source code, it is
defined as LogonId and commented as such, but it’s effectively not used.
This is probably why the API structure has that field name. It may have
been intended as such but it’s not used.
Samba will send a random value in this field.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is not a general purpose profiling solution, but these JSON logs are already being
generated and stored, so this is worth adding.
Some administrators are very keen to know how long authentication
takes, particularly due to long replication transactions in other
processes.
This complements a similar patch set to log the transaction duration.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
There's no need to do a crack_name_to_nt4_name(), as the authentication
already provides the nt4 domain and account names.
This should only happen on an RODC, that we use the winbind auth module
for local users. So we should make sure we only try to reset
the badPwdCount for users of our own domain.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13300
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
It turns out that an empty domain name maps to the local SAM.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13206
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Feb 23 04:08:26 CET 2018 on sn-devel-144
This is no longer useful as it doesn't support async requests.
It could be readded using pthreadpool_tevent_job_send()
and wbcCtxAuthenticateUserEx() if required.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is no longer useful as the 'winbind' backend also
handles the rodc case now.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This adds support for trusted domains to the auth stack on AD DCs.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This adds authentication support for trusted domains to the
netlogon server.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This prepares real async handling in the backends.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jun 27 21:09:08 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144
This prepares real async handling in the backends.
Check with git show -w.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This prepares the conversion to winbind_check_password_send/recv()
where the internal state is called 'winbind_check_password_state'
as 'state'.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
The previous commit removed the condition from the block. No change in
behaviour, best viewed with git show -w.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
We need to handle every error instead of just NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER,
the callers also doesn't require NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED anymore.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
There's no point in creating a temporary ldb_context as
the only callers already have a valid struct ldb_context for
the local sam.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
There's no point in creating a temporary ldb_context as
all direct callers already have a valid struct ldb_context for
the local sam.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This allows you to forward bad password count resets to 0. Currently,
there is a missing access check for the RODC to ensure it only applies
to cached users (msDS-Allowed-Password-Replication-Group).
(further patches still need to address forcing a RWDC contact)
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This requires as a pre-requisite that the auth stack is not run twice.
We remove the knownfail introduced in the earlier patch.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We rely on the other SAM modules to increment the badPwdCount locally,
but we must reset to 0 if the remote sends a success (to override our
failure).
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Use the talloc context passed into all modules.
Remove one more talloc_autofree_context().
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Not currently used - no logic changes inside.
This will make it possible to pass down a long-lived talloc
context from the loading function for modules to use instead
of having them internally all use talloc_autofree_context()
which is a hidden global.
Updated all known module interface numbers, and added a
WHATSNEW.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Apr 22 01:17:00 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144
The cracknames call is done in the "sam" backend now.
In order to support trusted domains correctly, the backends
need to get the raw values from the client.
This is the important change in order to no longer
silently map users from trusted domains to local users.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2976
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12709
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We need to check if the upn suffix is within our forest.
The check if it's within our domain is done in
authsam_check_password_internals() after calling
crack_name_to_nt4_name().
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2976
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12709
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
It's better to consistently fail authentications for users
of trusted domains (on a RWDC) with NT_STATUS_NO_TRUST_LSA_SECRET,
instead of silently mapping them to local users, by accident.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2976
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12709
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This fails the authentication for any known domain with
NT_STATUS_NO_TRUST_LSA_SECRET.
This will be used on an AD_DC to fail authentication
for users of trusted domains sanely, instead of silently
mapping them to local users.
This is just a temporary solution, until we have full
async support in the gensec/auth4.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2976
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12709
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This will allow tests to be written to confirm the correct events are triggered.
We pass in a messaging context from the callers
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We also log if a simple bind was over TLS, as this particular case matters to a lot of folks
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Existing comment is no longer relevant.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Pair-Programmed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Add a human readable authentication log line, to allow
verification that all required details are being passed.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Pair-Programmed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
This will allow the authentication log to indicate clearly how the password was
supplied to the server.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Pair-Programmed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
This function is only called for simple binds, and by moving the mapping into
the function call we allow the unmapped values to be included in the
user_info and so logged.
We also include the local address and the remote address of the client
for future logging
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Pair-Programmed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
We will soon have a much better replacement, but a note here may help some in the transition
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Pair-Programmed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
This might be used to explicitly configure the old auth methods list
from Samba 4.6 and older, if required:
"auth methods = anonymous sam_ignoredomain"
But this option will be removed again in future releases.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2976
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12709
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Currently we always map any incoming domain to our own domain
in map_user_info_cracknames(), so that the winbind module is never
used at all, e.g. we're DC of W4EDOM-L4.BASE with a forest trust to W2012R2-L4.BASE:
[2017/03/22 10:09:54.268472, 3, pid=4724, effective(0, 0), real(0, 0)] ../source4/auth/ntlm/auth.c:271(auth_check_password_send)
auth_check_password_send: Checking password for unmapped user [W2012R2-L4]\[administrator]@[UB1404-163]
[2017/03/22 10:09:54.268496, 5, pid=4724, effective(0, 0), real(0, 0)] ../source4/auth/ntlm/auth_util.c:57(map_user_info_cracknames)
map_user_info_cracknames: Mapping user [W2012R2-L4]\[administrator] from workstation [UB1404-163]
auth_check_password_send: mapped user is: [W4EDOM-L4]\[administrator]@[UB1404-163]
That means the only condition in which "sam_ignoredomain" returns
NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED is the RODC case.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2976
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12709
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is only active on a RODC.
The background for this is that we currently only ever
call the "winbind" module when we're an RODC,
otherwise everything is catched by "sam_ignoredomain" before.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2976
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12709
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
For now it's the same as auth_context_create(), but this will
change the in the next commits.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2976
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
DsCrackNameOneName on a member does not really have a big user database. We
should delegate as much responsibility as possible to our DC.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
DsCrackNameOneName directly fails for DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_NT4_ACCOUNT
if the name passed in does not contain a \. The only caller of
map_user_info_cracknames (auth_check_password_send) passes in
lpcfg_workgroup(), which does not contain a \. Add in the \ also for
the default_domain case.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This includes user_principal_name and dns_domain_name.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is required in order to support netr_SamInfo6 and PAC_UPN_DNS_INFO
correctly.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Found by clang compiler.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Jun 22 23:21:33 CEST 2016 on sn-devel-144
operator | has lower precedence than ?:
so add parens to have the expected result.
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Uri Simchoni <uri@samba.org>
lastLogon is supposed to be updated for every interactive or kerberos
login, and (according to testing against Windows2012r2) when the bad
password count is non-zero but the lockout time is zero. It is not
replicated.
lastLogonTimestamp is updated if the old value is more than 14 -
random.choice([0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5]) days old, and it is replicated. The
14 in this calculation is the default, stored as
"msDS-LogonTimeSyncInterval", which we offer no interface for
changing.
The authsam_zero_bad_pwd_count() function is a convenient place to
update these values, as it is called upon a successful logon however
that logon is performed. That makes the function's name inaccurate, so
we rename it authsam_logon_success_accounting(). It also needs to be
told whet5her the login is interactive.
The password_lockout tests are extended to test lastLogon and
lasLogonTimestamp.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
