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Samba*::setup_*() may return the string "UNKNOWN".
```
$ ./configure --with-ads ...
...
$ make
...
$ make test
...
Can't use string ("UNKNOWN") as a HASH ref while "strict refs" in use at /.../samba-4.18.2/selftest/target/Samba.pm line 131.
```
Signed-off-by: SATOH Fumiyasu <fumiyas@osstech.co.jp>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
The ticket returned by kdc_request_get_ticket() is the main TGT
presented in a TGS-REQ. If we’re verifying a FAST armor ticket or a
user-to-user ticket, make sure we check the lifetime of that ticket
instead. To do this we need to pass the appropriate ticket into the
plugin function.
NOTE: This commit finally works again!
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu May 18 05:49:31 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
With the Heimdal KDC, we erroneously accept short-lived FAST and
user-to-user tickets.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
If an NTSTATUS code has been set in the KDC request structure, encode it
as KERB-ERROR-DATA and add it to the KDC reply.
hdb_samba4_set_ntstatus() adds the NTSTATUS code to the request
structure.
hdb_samba4_get_ntstatus() gets that status code back from the request
structure.
hdb_samba4_set_edata_from_ntstatus() encodes the status code and adds it
to the reply.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu May 18 01:58:24 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
This is not yet supported in full, but this makes ad_dc match our full set of available features.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
The $$$$$$$ is removed as it does not do what you think it does.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
The change to make this independent in fc9845da69
was incorrect, as no distinct name was specified so this would conflict with
the ad_dc_ntvfs environment over the IP and name "localdc".
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This will allow fl008dc to become an alias of ad_dc_ntvfs again.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15366
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue May 9 02:58:45 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
prior to this patch rights matching "FA", "FR", "FW", "FX" were
outputted as the hex string representing the bit value.
While outputting the hex string is perfectly fine, it makes it harder
to compare icacls output (which always uses the special string values)
Additionally adjust various tests to deal with use of shortcut access masks
as sddl format now uses FA, FR, FW & FX strings (like icalcs does) instead
of hex representation of the bit mask.
adjust
samba4.blackbox.samba-tool_ntacl
samba3.blackbox.large_acl
samba.tests.samba_tool.ntacl
samba.tests.ntacls
samba.tests.posixacl
so various string comparisons of the sddl format now pass
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
[abartlet@samba.org Adapted to new stricter SDDL behaviour around leading zeros in hex
numbers, eg 0x001]
value for FA should be 0x001f01ff (instead of 0x00001ff)
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
The "FA" flag should map to 0x1f01ff, and 0x1f01ff should be converted
back into "FA".
This will be fixed over the next couple of commits.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
The tests that were in SddlWindowsFlagsAreDifferent have the behaviour
we want, and as we aim for Samba flags no longer being different, we
shift them to SddlNonCanonical. The tests in SddlSambaDoesItsOwnThing
are removed because they showed Samba's old behaviour around FA.
This will create knownfails, which will be fixed by the commit fixing the
value of "FA".
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
By normal GUID, I mean ones like f30e3bbf-9ff0-11d1-b603-0000f80367c1,
with four hyphens and no curly braces.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
It turns out that in accesss flags Windows will allow leading spaces
and spaces separating flags but not trailing spaces.
We choose to follow this in part because we found it happening in the
wild in our tests for upgradeprovision until a few commits ago.
Windows will also allow spaces in some parts of SIDs.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
sddl_decode_sid() will stop at the first non-SID character. Windows
doesn't allow white space here, and nor do we.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Before we just ignored things like negative numbers, because they'd
end up being seen as not-numbers, so treated as flags, then as
not-flags.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Windows converts hex numbers into flags differently, and has different
ideas of what constitutes "FA", and possibly others.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
These ones we might want to match. They are understandable behaviours,
like matching lowercase flags and coping with whitespace in some
places. These tests are set up to document the differences without
overwhelming the knownfails.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This of course allows for fine-grained knownfails.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The examples in the canonical list are already in the form that
Windows and Samba will use for that SD. We check the round trip.
The examples in the non-canonical list will change in a round trip, so
we also give the string we think they should end up as. These have
been checked on Windows.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The test will fail right now because it makes round trip assertions.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is because in ceetain places we compare strings rather than security
descriptors.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We don't see this happening on Windows.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
These occur canonically when the indentifier authority is > 2^32, but
also are accepted by Windows for any number.
There is a tricky case with an "O:" or "G:" SID that is immediately
followed by a "D:" dacl, because the "D" looks like a hex digit. When
we detect this we need to subtract one from the length.
We also need to do look out for trailing garbage. This was not an
issue before because any string caught by the strspn(...,
"-0123456789") would be either rejected or fully comsumed by
dom_sid_parse_talloc(), but with hex digits, a string like
"S-1-1-2x0xabcxxx-X" would be successfully parsed as "S-1-1-2", and
the "x0xabcxxx-X" would be skipped over. That's why we switch to using
dom_sid_parse_endp(), so we can compare the consumed length to the
expected length.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
previously a string could have anything in it, so long as every second
character was ':'.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Following Windows, the numbers that would be octal (e.g. "0123") are
converted to decimal by skipping over the zeros.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
By using an ldb.Dn as an intermediary, we get to see which SIDs
Samba thinks are OK but Windows thinks are bad.
It is things like "S-0-5-32-579".
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
As a way of testing the interpretation of a SID string in a remote
server, we search on the base DN "<SID=x>" where x is a non-existent
or malformed SID.
On Windows some or all malformed SIDs are detected before the search
begins, resulting in a complaint about DN syntax rather than one about
missing objects.
From this we can get a picture of what Windows considers to be
a proper SID in this context.
Samba does not make a distinction here, always returning NO_SUCH_OBJECT.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The Samba side is aspirational -- what we actually do is generally
worse. However the Windows behaviour in these cases seems more
surprising still, and seems to be neither documented nor used.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The reason the existing tests send the SID over the wire as SDDL for
defaultSecurityDescriptor is it is one of the few ways to force the
server to reckon with a SID-string as a SID. At least, that's the case
with Windows. In Samba we make no effort to decode the SDDL until it
comes to the time of creating an object, at which point we don't notice
the difference between bad SDDL and missing SDDL.
So here we add a set of dynamic tests that push the strings through our
SDDL parsing code. This doesn't tell us very much more, but it is very
quick and sort of confirms that the other tests are on the right track.
To run against Windows without also running the internal Samba tests,
add `SAMBA_SID_STRINGS_SKIP_LOCAL=1` to your environment variables.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We are mostly testing edge cases around the handling of numeric
limits.
These tests are based on ground truth established by running them
against Windows.
Many fail against Samba, because the defaulSecurityDescriptor
attribute is not validated at the time it is set while on Windows it
is.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We don't care about the exact time of the test, just that we
disambiguate between different runs (each run leaves an immutable scar
on the target server).
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
