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Add a generic identity mapping section that points out to the other
resources in Samba documentation about idmap modules and their
configuration.
This should help users to discover corresponding documentation easily.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrea Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Dec 13 00:14:04 CET 2016 on sn-devel-144
This prevents renaming a file over an existing one with SMB2
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12468
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
This exercises the dns_check_name case in the DNS server. Directly
attempting to add an invalid name with leading . or double .. cannot be
done due to ndr_pull_component forcing the check on the client side
(leading to a CNAME name of NUL and unexpected data of the actual name).
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Pair-programmed-with: Bob Campbell <bobcampbell@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Garming Sam <garming@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Dec 12 08:46:26 CET 2016 on sn-devel-144
Fills in the missing TODO. Note that this may also prevent deletion of
existing corrupted records, but should be resolvable through RPC, or at
worst LDAP.
Signed-off-by: Bob Campbell <bobcampbell@catalyst.net.nz>
Pair-programmed-with: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
These new tests concern collisions and lock in current Samba behaviour.
They do not pass against Windows Server 2012R2. See dnsserver.py tests
for the tests consistent with Windows behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Bob Campbell <bobcampbell@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Bob Campbell <bobcampbell@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This may also prevent deletion of existing corrupted records through
DNS, but should be resolvable through RPC, or at worst LDAP.
Signed-off-by: Bob Campbell <bobcampbell@catalyst.net.nz>
Pair-programmed-with: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
These tests discover that there are some discrepancies between Windows and Samba.
Although there are failures, they do not appear to be critical, however
some of the SD differences will be important for 2012 support.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Pair-programmed-with: Bob Campbell <bobcampbell@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Bob Campbell <bobcampbell@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Bob Campbell <bobcampbell@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Bob Campbell <bobcampbell@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Bob Campbell <bobcampbell@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Bob Campbell <bobcampbell@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The days of operating systems with a 255 file
descriptor limit on FILE (I'm looking at you
Solaris - Solaris 10 finally fixed this) are
long gone.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sun Dec 11 15:01:12 CET 2016 on sn-devel-144
Unfortunately this is a larger patch. Doing it in small pieces would
have been pretty difficult, as everybody calls everybody else.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Copy x_fgets_slash with conversion to stdio and talloc.
Probably I'd do this functionality a bit differently, but for simplicity I
chose to make it the same as what is there.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
This test passes against Win2K12 but fails against smbd
without the previous commit.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12466
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Dec 10 10:11:10 CET 2016 on sn-devel-144
Reported and proposed fix by Shilpa K <shilpa.krishnareddy@gmail.com>.
When processing DENY ACE entries for owner rights SIDs (S-1-3-4) the
code OR's in the deny access mask bits without taking into account if
they were being requested in the requested access mask.
E.g. The current logic has:
An ACL containining:
[0] SID: S-1-3-4
TYPE: DENY
MASK: WRITE_DATA
[1] SID: S-1-3-4
TYPE: ALLOW
MASK: ALLOW_ALL
prohibits an open request by the owner for READ_DATA - even though this
is explicitly allowed.
Furthermore a non-canonical ACL containing:
[0] SID: User SID 1-5-21-something
TYPE: ALLOW
MASK: READ_DATA
[1] SID: S-1-3-4
TYPE: DENY
MASK: READ_DATA
[2] SID: User SID 1-5-21-something
TYPE: ALLOW
MASK: WRITE_DATA
prohibits an open request by the owner for READ_DATA|WRITE_DATA - even
though READ_DATA is explicitly allowed in ACE no 0 and is thus already
filtered out of the "access-still-needed" mask when the deny ACE no 1 is
evaluated.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12466
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Bjoern Jacke <bj@sernet.de>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Björn Jacke <bj@sernet.de>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Dec 9 20:45:15 CET 2016 on sn-devel-144
There're no callers which try to pass a raw lm_response directly anymore.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Dec 9 13:09:37 CET 2016 on sn-devel-144
As we pass flags=0 to cli_connect_nb() all values can only be false,
so we can use false directly.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_KERBEROS is the only possible flag the
caller of smb_complete_connection() will pass, so we can avoid
use it directly instead of going via cli_start_connection()
to use cli->use_kerberos.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This can be used with a valid creds structure in order
to do a share level authentication or with NULL in the cases
we assume a modern server already.
Later we can change the ordering and implement
cli_tree_connect() on top of cli_tree_connect_creds().
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
smb_trans_enc_state is a talloc pointer now, so we can talloc_move()
the gensec_security to the correct talloc parent.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12408
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
