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These show that MS-BKRP 3.1.4.1.1 BACKUPKEY_BACKUP_GUID is incorrect when it
states that the key must be the leading 64 bytes, it must be the whole 256 byte
buffer.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
This is done in both smbtoture and in our server
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
We implement both modes in BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID, as it may decrypt
both ServerWrap and ClientWrap data, and we implement
BACKUPKEY_RESTORE_GUID_WIN2K.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/attachment.cgi?bugid=11097
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
This happen on the RODC, a case that we try not to permit at all.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
The values we return here are client-provided passwords or other keys, that we decrypt for them.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
This makes it clear that this is the data stored on the LSA secrets store
and not the client-provided data to be encrypted.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Arvid Requate <requate@univention.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
(fixed cleanup of memory)
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
This adds some IDL structs for the ServerWrap subprotocol, allowing
parsing of the incoming RPC calls and returning WERR_NOT_SUPPORTED
instead of WERR_INVALID_PARAM.
Signed-off-by: Arvid Requate <requate@univention.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
[MS-BKRP] 3.1.4.1 specifies for BACKUPKEY_RETRIEVE_BACKUP_KEY_GUID that
the server must ignore the input data. This patch fixes
ndr_pull_error(11): Pull bytes 4 (../librpc/ndr/ndr_basic.c:148)
Signed-off-by: Arvid Requate <requate@univention.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
ndr_print_bkrp_data_in_blob requires the level to be set in the
proper ndr->switch_list context.
Signed-off-by: Arvid Requate <requate@univention.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
[MS-BKRP] 2.2.1 specifies "The Common Name field of the Subject name
field SHOULD contain the name of the DNS domain assigned to the server."
In fact Windows 7 clients don't seem to care. Also in certificates
generated by native AD the domain name (after CN=) is encoded as
UTF-16LE. Since hx509_parse_name only supports UTF-8 strings currently
we just leave the encoding as it is for now.
Signed-off-by: Arvid Requate <requate@univention.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
[MS-BKRP] 2.2.1 specifies that the serialnumber of the certificate
should be set identical to the subjectUniqueID. In fact certificates
generated by native AD have this field encoded in little-endian format.
See also
https://www.mail-archive.com/cifs-protocol@cifs.org/msg01364.html
Signed-off-by: Arvid Requate <requate@univention.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Check for talloc_memdup failure for uniqueid.data.
Signed-off-by: Arvid Requate <requate@univention.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
hx509_ca_tbs_set_notAfter_lifetime expects the lifetime value in
in seconds. The Windows 7 client didn't seem to care that the lifetime
was only 6'03''. Two other TODOs in this implementation:
* Since notBefore is not set explicietely to "now", the heimdal code
default of now-(24 hours) is applied.
* Server side validity checks and cert renewal are missing.
Signed-off-by: Arvid Requate <requate@univention.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
RSA_generate_key_ex doesn't always generate a modulus of requested
bit length. Tests with Windows 7 clients showed that they decline
x509 certificates (MS-BKRP 2.2.1) in cases where the modulus length
is smaller than the specified 2048 bits. For the user this resulted
in DPAPI failing to retrieve stored credentials after the user password
has been changed at least two times. On the server side log.samba showed
that the client also called the as yet unlimplemented ServerWrap sub-
protocol function BACKUPKEY_BACKUP_KEY_GUID after it had called the
ClientWarp function BACKUPKEY_RETRIEVE_BACKUP_KEY_GUID. After
enabling DPAPI auditing on the Windows Clients the Event Viewer showed
Event-ID 4692 failing with a FailureReason value of 0x7a in these cases.
Signed-off-by: Arvid Requate <requate@univention.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10980
In developer build, fail if uninitialized variable is found by GCC.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Feb 24 20:21:52 CET 2015 on sn-devel-104
When sending messages to clients, ctdb checks for EAGAIN error code and
schedules next write in the subsequent event loop. Using sys_write in
these places causes ctdb to loop hard till a client is able to read from
the socket. With real time scheduling, ctdb daemon spins consuming 100%
of CPU trying to write to the client sockets. This can be quite harmful
when running under VMs or machines with single CPU.
This regression was introduced when all read/write calls were replaced to
use sys_read/sys_write wrappers (c1558adeaa).
The existing code backs off in case of EAGAIN failures and waits for an
event loop to process the write again. This should give ctdb clients
a chance to get scheduled and to process the ctdb socket.
Signed-off-by: Amitay Isaacs <amitay@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin Schwenke <martin@meltin.net>
Autobuild-User(master): Martin Schwenke <martins@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Feb 24 12:29:30 CET 2015 on sn-devel-104
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Feb 24 01:01:10 CET 2015 on sn-devel-104
Even though the MS-SMB2 spec says so, Windows doesn't behave
like this.
This reverts commit 1cea6e5b6f.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: "Stefan (metze) Metzmacher" <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Adam <obnox@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Feb 23 22:31:22 CET 2015 on sn-devel-104
