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Remove knownfail.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15419
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jul 27 10:52:50 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
This was broken by commit 1f3f6e20dc because when
calling srv_init_signing() very early after accepting the connection in
smbd_add_connection(), conn->protocol is still PROTOCOL_NONE.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15397
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jule Anger <janger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Jul 21 13:03:09 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=9612
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Jul 19 02:41:25 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON’T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
When PK-INIT is performed, check that the buffer is as expected and
contains the correct NT hash.
The PK-INIT tests now pass against Windows Server 2019.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14985
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
To run these tests standalone, you will need the certificate and private
key of the Certificate Authority. These can be specified together in the
same file with the environment variable CA_CERT, or the private key may
be specified in its own file with CA_PRIVATE_KEY.
If either of these files are encrypted, you can specify the password in
the environment variable CA_PASS.
These tests create a new certificate for the user account, signed with
the private key of the Certificate Authority. We negotiate the reply key
with either of the public-key and Diffie-Hellman PK-INIT variants, and
use the reply key to decrypt the enc-part in the response. We also check
that the KDC’s signatures are valid.
Most of the failures with the Heimdal KDC are due to the wrong nonce
being returned in the reply compared to Windows, which issue is simple
enough to correct.
An example command line for manual testing against Windows:
SMB_CONF_PATH=ad_dc.conf KRB5_CONFIG=krb5.conf SERVICE_USERNAME=win2k19-dc.example.com ADMIN_USERNAME=Administrator ADMIN_PASSWORD=locDCpass ADMIN_KVNO=1 FOR_USER=Administrator USERNAME=Administrator PASSWORD=locDCpass DC_SERVER=win2k19-dc.example.com SERVER=win2k19-dc.example.com DOMAIN=example REALM=example.com PYTHONPATH=bin/python STRICT_CHECKING=1 FAST_SUPPORT=1 CLAIMS_SUPPORT=1 COMPOUND_ID_SUPPORT=1 TKT_SIG_SUPPORT=1 FULL_SIG_SUPPORT=1 GNUTLS_PBKDF2_SUPPORT=1 EXPECT_PAC=1 EXPECT_EXTRA_PAC_BUFFERS=1 CHECK_CNAME=1 CHECK_PADATA=1 KADMIN_IS_TGS=0 FORCED_RC4=1 DEFAULT_ETYPES=36 CA_CERT=./win2k19-ca.pfx CA_PASS=1234 python3 python/samba/tests/krb5/pkinit_tests.py
To set up windows for this I first installed an Certificate Authority with an Enterprise CA.
Then I exported the private key and certificate of the CA:
1. go into the Certification Authority snap-in for the relevant computer,
2. right-clicking the CA
3. clicking ‘All Tasks’ → ‘Back up CA...’
4. and exporting the private key and CA certificate.
(I downloaded the resulting file via smbclient).
After setting up an Enterprise CA, I also needed to edit the domain
controller GPO to enable auto-enrollment, otherwise Windows would
refuse to accept as legitimate any certificates provided by the client.
That can be done by first enabling the policy:
‘Computer Configuration/Policies/Windows Settings/Security Settings/Public Key Policies/Certificate Services Client — Auto-Enrollment’,
and then ticking both ‘Renew expired certificates…’ and ‘Update certificates…’)
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is important as Windows clients with KB5028166 seem to
call netr_LogonGetCapabilities with query_level=2 after
a call with query_level=1.
An unpatched Windows Server returns DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG
for query_level values other than 1.
While Samba tries to return NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED, but
later fails to marshall the response, which results
in DCERPC_FAULT_BAD_STUB_DATA instead.
Because we don't have any documentation for level 2 yet,
we just try to behave like an unpatched server and
generate DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG instead of
DCERPC_FAULT_BAD_STUB_DATA.
Which allows patched Windows clients to keep working
against a Samba DC.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15418
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jul 17 07:35:09 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
This is important as Windows clients with KB5028166 seem to
call netr_LogonGetCapabilities with query_level=2 after
a call with query_level=1.
An unpatched Windows Server returns DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG
for query_level values other than 1.
While Samba tries to return NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED, but
later fails to marshall the response, which results
in DCERPC_FAULT_BAD_STUB_DATA instead.
Because we don't have any documentation for level 2 yet,
we just try to behave like an unpatched server and
generate DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG instead of
DCERPC_FAULT_BAD_STUB_DATA.
Which allows patched Windows clients to keep working
against a Samba DC.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15418
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The important change it that we expect DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG
for unsupported query_levels, we allow it to work with servers
with or without support for query_level=2.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15418
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15400
Signed-off-by: Pavel Filipenský <pfilipensky@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Jul 5 20:24:35 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
With 7bb8af3f74 we already had to tune the error_inject VFS object to filter
out the openat-calls coming from filename_convert_dirfsp&friends. With
the next patch openat() will be called from even more places, and I
don't really see a good way to properly deal with EINTR in all the
places where it can happen. The real case where EINTR is something we
need to handle properly I guess is with kernel oplocks active: open()
waits for another process to give up its kernel oplock, which opens
the window for EINTR to become a valid case to properly take care
of. For all other opens I would be willing to live with the fact that
we just return an error message that might be different from Windows.
To detect that kernel oplock case properly, with O_PATH we have to
look at the /proc/self/fd/<n> reopen or the O_EMPTY_PATH FreeBSD
flavor from inside the error_inject module I guess. But then, the
second time we come around the corner we have to let it pass.
Difficult to properly test, disable the test for now.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This is consistent with the behaviour of the existing function
_authn_policy_access_check() and of Windows.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
For a constrained delegation request, we need to pass ‘delegated_proxy’
(and the delegated proxy PAC, if one was provided) into
samba_kdc_update_pac() so that we can verify that the delegating server
is allowed to authenticate to the target server.
The ‘const’ is entirely unnecessary in a function declaration, but we
add it just to be consistent.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
NOTE: THIS COMMIT WON’T COMPILE/WORK ON ITS OWN!
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
This shows us that the client’s access is checked prior to passwords
being checked.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
For each test, we check the authentication logs and ensure the messages
are as we expect.
We only test AS-REQs and TGS-REQs with the Heimdal KDC at the moment,
assuming that MIT doesn’t support logging for those cases.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The domain_auth tests are also prefixed with domain, it matches the
cli command "samba-tool domain claim".
Signed-off-by: Rob van der Linde <rob@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Rob van der Linde <rob@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
It means that using the old or older password no longer
changes badPwdCount for Kerberos authentication.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14054
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Sat Jun 24 07:18:03 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
This demonstrates the pre-authentication failures with passwords from
the password history don't incremend badPwdCount, similar to the
NTLMSSP and simple bind cases. But it's still an interactive logon,
which doesn't use 'old password allowed period'.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14054
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
All that uses the FAST cookie is the gss-preauth authentication
mechanism, which is untested in Samba, and disabled by default.
Disabling the FAST cookie code (and sending a dummy string instead)
relieves us of the maintenance and testing burden of this untested code.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Jun 21 13:19:17 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
The cookie produced by Windows differs depending on whether FAST was
used.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
If a client was authorized, we would ignore the Kerberos error code and
just log the return value of authsam_logon_success_accounting().
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
These authentications are actually failing (due to RESPONSE_TOO_BIG
errors), but our authentication logging infrastructure hides this.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This allows the backup/restore process to pass once the DC startup
code confirms what DC level the domain functional level in the DB
is expecting.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This is important in order to run /usr/bin/kpasswd from MIT...
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
cli_list_trans_recv() can be called multiple times. When it's done, it
return NT_STATUS_OK and set *finfo to NULL. cli_list_old_recv() did
not do the NULL part, so smbclient would endlessly loop.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15382
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Jun 1 21:54:42 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
Otherwise, punt to winbindd to see if another DC has this capability.
This allows a FL2008-emulating DC to forward a request to a
2012R2-emlating DC, particularly in another domain.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed May 31 04:59:01 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
This will allow us to require that the target DC has FL 2008,
2012, 2012R2 or 2016.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
We do this by checking what the underlying CLDAP netlogon call returns.
This also validates that behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
We need to confirm this both for forwarded requests, and also for requests
direct to the possible DC.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon May 29 23:29:50 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
It can take two or three calls to msg_ctx.loop_once() before a message
comes in. Make sure we get all of the messages.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
These log messages come from setUp(), and the fact that we are getting
them is merely a side-effect of the unreliability of discardMessages().
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Not specifying FILE_SHARE_DELETE wasn't done intentionally. Not setting the flag
triggers the following problem:
* client sends a CREATE with delete access
* this triggers a call to open_streams_for_delete() where we check for
conflicting opens on any of the streams of the file or directory
* if the file (or directory) has a stream like ":com.apple.quarantine" the
stream is opened with DELETE_ACCESS and kept open when the next step might:
* if the file (or directory) has a Mac specific :AFP_AfpInfo stream, the
ad_convert() routine in fruit_create_file() is triggered
* ad_convert() checks if the file (or ...) has a sidecar ._ AppleDouble file, if
it has:
* in ad_convert_xattr() we unpack any set of xattrs encoded in the AppleDouble
file and recreate them as streams with the VFS. Now, if any of these xattrs
happens to be converted to a stream that we still have open in
open_streams_for_delete() (see above) we get a NT_STATUS_SHARING_VIOLATION
This error gets passed up the stack back to open_streams_for_delete() so the
client CREATE request fails and the client is unhappy.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15378
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Avoid returning an uninitialized st.cached_dos_attributes.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15375
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Now we get the error “environment [...] is unknown” rather than “samba
can't start up known environment”.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Samba*::setup_*() may return the string "UNKNOWN".
```
$ ./configure --with-ads ...
...
$ make
...
$ make test
...
Can't use string ("UNKNOWN") as a HASH ref while "strict refs" in use at /.../samba-4.18.2/selftest/target/Samba.pm line 131.
```
Signed-off-by: SATOH Fumiyasu <fumiyas@osstech.co.jp>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
The ticket returned by kdc_request_get_ticket() is the main TGT
presented in a TGS-REQ. If we’re verifying a FAST armor ticket or a
user-to-user ticket, make sure we check the lifetime of that ticket
instead. To do this we need to pass the appropriate ticket into the
plugin function.
NOTE: This commit finally works again!
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu May 18 05:49:31 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
With the Heimdal KDC, we erroneously accept short-lived FAST and
user-to-user tickets.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
If an NTSTATUS code has been set in the KDC request structure, encode it
as KERB-ERROR-DATA and add it to the KDC reply.
hdb_samba4_set_ntstatus() adds the NTSTATUS code to the request
structure.
hdb_samba4_get_ntstatus() gets that status code back from the request
structure.
hdb_samba4_set_edata_from_ntstatus() encodes the status code and adds it
to the reply.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu May 18 01:58:24 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
This is not yet supported in full, but this makes ad_dc match our full set of available features.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
The $$$$$$$ is removed as it does not do what you think it does.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
The change to make this independent in fc9845da69
was incorrect, as no distinct name was specified so this would conflict with
the ad_dc_ntvfs environment over the IP and name "localdc".
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This will allow fl008dc to become an alias of ad_dc_ntvfs again.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15366
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue May 9 02:58:45 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
prior to this patch rights matching "FA", "FR", "FW", "FX" were
outputted as the hex string representing the bit value.
While outputting the hex string is perfectly fine, it makes it harder
to compare icacls output (which always uses the special string values)
Additionally adjust various tests to deal with use of shortcut access masks
as sddl format now uses FA, FR, FW & FX strings (like icalcs does) instead
of hex representation of the bit mask.
adjust
samba4.blackbox.samba-tool_ntacl
samba3.blackbox.large_acl
samba.tests.samba_tool.ntacl
samba.tests.ntacls
samba.tests.posixacl
so various string comparisons of the sddl format now pass
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
[abartlet@samba.org Adapted to new stricter SDDL behaviour around leading zeros in hex
numbers, eg 0x001]
value for FA should be 0x001f01ff (instead of 0x00001ff)
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
The "FA" flag should map to 0x1f01ff, and 0x1f01ff should be converted
back into "FA".
This will be fixed over the next couple of commits.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
The tests that were in SddlWindowsFlagsAreDifferent have the behaviour
we want, and as we aim for Samba flags no longer being different, we
shift them to SddlNonCanonical. The tests in SddlSambaDoesItsOwnThing
are removed because they showed Samba's old behaviour around FA.
This will create knownfails, which will be fixed by the commit fixing the
value of "FA".
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
By normal GUID, I mean ones like f30e3bbf-9ff0-11d1-b603-0000f80367c1,
with four hyphens and no curly braces.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
It turns out that in accesss flags Windows will allow leading spaces
and spaces separating flags but not trailing spaces.
We choose to follow this in part because we found it happening in the
wild in our tests for upgradeprovision until a few commits ago.
Windows will also allow spaces in some parts of SIDs.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
sddl_decode_sid() will stop at the first non-SID character. Windows
doesn't allow white space here, and nor do we.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Before we just ignored things like negative numbers, because they'd
end up being seen as not-numbers, so treated as flags, then as
not-flags.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Windows converts hex numbers into flags differently, and has different
ideas of what constitutes "FA", and possibly others.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
These ones we might want to match. They are understandable behaviours,
like matching lowercase flags and coping with whitespace in some
places. These tests are set up to document the differences without
overwhelming the knownfails.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This of course allows for fine-grained knownfails.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The examples in the canonical list are already in the form that
Windows and Samba will use for that SD. We check the round trip.
The examples in the non-canonical list will change in a round trip, so
we also give the string we think they should end up as. These have
been checked on Windows.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The test will fail right now because it makes round trip assertions.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is because in ceetain places we compare strings rather than security
descriptors.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We don't see this happening on Windows.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
These occur canonically when the indentifier authority is > 2^32, but
also are accepted by Windows for any number.
There is a tricky case with an "O:" or "G:" SID that is immediately
followed by a "D:" dacl, because the "D" looks like a hex digit. When
we detect this we need to subtract one from the length.
We also need to do look out for trailing garbage. This was not an
issue before because any string caught by the strspn(...,
"-0123456789") would be either rejected or fully comsumed by
dom_sid_parse_talloc(), but with hex digits, a string like
"S-1-1-2x0xabcxxx-X" would be successfully parsed as "S-1-1-2", and
the "x0xabcxxx-X" would be skipped over. That's why we switch to using
dom_sid_parse_endp(), so we can compare the consumed length to the
expected length.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
previously a string could have anything in it, so long as every second
character was ':'.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Following Windows, the numbers that would be octal (e.g. "0123") are
converted to decimal by skipping over the zeros.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
By using an ldb.Dn as an intermediary, we get to see which SIDs
Samba thinks are OK but Windows thinks are bad.
It is things like "S-0-5-32-579".
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
As a way of testing the interpretation of a SID string in a remote
server, we search on the base DN "<SID=x>" where x is a non-existent
or malformed SID.
On Windows some or all malformed SIDs are detected before the search
begins, resulting in a complaint about DN syntax rather than one about
missing objects.
From this we can get a picture of what Windows considers to be
a proper SID in this context.
Samba does not make a distinction here, always returning NO_SUCH_OBJECT.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The Samba side is aspirational -- what we actually do is generally
worse. However the Windows behaviour in these cases seems more
surprising still, and seems to be neither documented nor used.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The reason the existing tests send the SID over the wire as SDDL for
defaultSecurityDescriptor is it is one of the few ways to force the
server to reckon with a SID-string as a SID. At least, that's the case
with Windows. In Samba we make no effort to decode the SDDL until it
comes to the time of creating an object, at which point we don't notice
the difference between bad SDDL and missing SDDL.
So here we add a set of dynamic tests that push the strings through our
SDDL parsing code. This doesn't tell us very much more, but it is very
quick and sort of confirms that the other tests are on the right track.
To run against Windows without also running the internal Samba tests,
add `SAMBA_SID_STRINGS_SKIP_LOCAL=1` to your environment variables.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We are mostly testing edge cases around the handling of numeric
limits.
These tests are based on ground truth established by running them
against Windows.
Many fail against Samba, because the defaulSecurityDescriptor
attribute is not validated at the time it is set while on Windows it
is.
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We don't care about the exact time of the test, just that we
disambiguate between different runs (each run leaves an immutable scar
on the target server).
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This fixes setting veto files to '.*' to not list hidden files and
directories starting with a dot.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15360
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Apr 19 22:30:19 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
streams_depot hands us absolute paths with : filename components
instead of having set smb_fname_in->stream_name.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15358
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Apr 17 18:11:07 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
See the next patch, we assert in shadow_copy2_openat() over paths
passed in from shadow_copy2
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15358
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
The value of NSS_WRAPPER_HOSTNAME needs to match value
we put into the NSS_WRAPPER_HOSTS file.
We had a mismatch of
idmapridmember.samba.example.com
vs.
idmapridmember.addom.samba.example.com
This causes getaddrinfo() in nss_wrapper to fallback to
the libc version, which talks to a dns server.
It's not clear if recent glibc code will reach resolve/socket wrapper.
So it's not unlikely that idmapridmember.samba.example.com will
be passed via the internet, which causes delays up to 20 seconds.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15355
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Apr 12 20:29:05 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
Testsuites declared with functions such as plantestsuite() are not run
directly, but are piped through filter-subunit. The overall exit code of
the executed test command is that returned by the last command in the
pipeline (that is, filter-subunit), and thus the actual testsuite return
code is lost.
A real consequence of this is that an error in setUpClass() in a Python
testsuite causes the whole testsuite to be skipped silently.
The --fail-on-empty option partially addressed this, but didn't help if
the testsuite contained multiple test classes, only one of which
contained an error.
We now use bash with the pipefail option, which makes the return code of
the last failing command into the return code of the entire pipeline.
That means that we properly fail if a testsuite returns a non-zero exit
code, but doesn't otherwise exhibit any failures in its output.
This doesn't help for cases where a testsuite has other failing tests
that become xfails due to knownfail entries. In that case, the overall
'testsuite-failure' will be turned into 'testsuite-xfail' by
filter-subunit and the silent failures will remain unheeded. Still, this
is better than the existing situation.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed Apr 12 14:57:55 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
If a test fails an assertion, and later calls torture_skip() to skip
part of the test, the TORTURE_SKIP result will overwrite the
TORTURE_FAIL result, and the overall outcome will be successful.
To avoid this, we now arrange possible outcomes in order of priority,
and ensure we always keep the higher priority one.
This reveals some failing tests.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This is required for the samba3.blackbox.guest test to work. Without it,
the test fails to find a group map.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
The problem is when checking for vetoed names on the last path component in
openat_pathref_fsp_case_insensitive() we return
NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND. The in the caller
filename_convert_dirfsp_nosymlink() this is treated as the "file creation case"
causing filename_convert_dirfsp_nosymlink() to return NT_STATUS_OK.
In order to correctly distinguish between the cases
1) file doesn't exist, we may be creating it, return
2) a vetoed a file
we need 2) to return a more specific error to
filename_convert_dirfsp_nosymlink(). I've chosen NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_INVALID
which gets mapped to the appropriate errror NT_STATUS_OBJECT_PATH_NOT_FOUND or
NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND depending on which path component was vetoed.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15143
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Apr 6 23:03:50 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
Some of the most difficult to debug issues in Samba development are around
timing, so this changes our default logging format in the selftest system
to include a high-resolution timestamp to help correlate bad events with
what else is going on at the same time.
This fits in well with the timestamps already logged into st/subunit
and may assist with correlation.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Apr 6 13:44:47 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
We get the realm we use for authentication needs to
the realm belonging to the username we use.
We derive the username from c->creds, so we need to
do the same for the realm.
Otherwise we try to authenticate as the wrong user.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15323
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This reproduces a regression with
'net ads search -P --server server.of.trusted.domain'
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15323
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Rob van der Linde <rob@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Thu Apr 6 01:33:05 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
This demonstrates that the server did not detect CVE-2023-0922
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Rob van der Linde <rob@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
This early return would mistakenly allow an unprivileged user to delete
the dNSHostName attribute by making an LDAP modify request with no
values. We should no longer allow this.
Add or replace operations with no values and no privileges are
disallowed.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15276
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15276
Signed-off-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Add a hook, acl_redact_msg_for_filter(), in the aclread module, that
marks inaccessible any message elements used by an LDAP search filter
that the user has no right to access. Make the various ldb_match_*()
functions check whether message elements are accessible, and refuse to
match any that are not. Remaining message elements, not mentioned in the
search filter, are checked in aclread_callback(), and any inaccessible
elements are removed at this point.
Certain attributes, namely objectClass, distinguishedName, name, and
objectGUID, are always present, and hence the presence of said
attributes is always allowed to be checked in a search filter. This
corresponds with the behaviour of Windows.
Further, we unconditionally allow the attributes isDeleted and
isRecycled in a check for presence or equality. Windows is not known to
make this special exception, but it seems mostly harmless, and should
mitigate the performance impact on searches made by the show_deleted
module.
As a result of all these changes, our behaviour regarding confidential
attributes happens to match Windows more closely. For the test in
confidential_attr.py, we can now model our attribute handling with
DC_MODE_RETURN_ALL, which corresponds to the behaviour exhibited by
Windows.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15270
Pair-Programmed-With: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
The smbget utility doesn't use the common command line parser, so it
doesn't support paring of DOMAIN/user or user@realm.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15345
Signed-off-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
We should not overwrite the "rc=1" initialization with the tdb_check
retval. This will lead to tdb_validate_child() returning 0 even when
validate_fn() found invalid entries.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14789
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Remove knownfail for posix path handling of case/reserved char
Signed-off-by: David Mulder <dmulder@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Mar 31 09:30:17 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
We now create a client claims blob and add it to the PAC.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
More of these tests now pass against Windows. They still don't quite all
pass, but that's something to fix for another day.
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Added delete protected test to known fail as Samba doesn't seem to enforce this yet.
Signed-off-by: Rob van der Linde <rob@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Remove knownfail on SMB1-DFS-SEARCH-PATHS, as we now
pass it with the new SMB1 remove DFS paths before pathname processing
changes.
Note, we still fail:
smb1.SMB1-DFS-PATHS.smbtorture\(fileserver_smb1\)
smb1.SMB1-DFS-OPERATIONS.smbtorture\(fileserver_smb1\)
even with the new SMB1 remove DFS paths before pathname
processing as those tests test *very* specific Windows behaviors. We now
pass many more of the individual internal tests, but
in order to pass them all completely I need to add
specific --with-sambaserver checks to avoid some
of the Windows DFS SMB1 insanity (error messages).
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Mar 31 06:07:01 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
