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This fills in the unix portions of the token needed by smbd and the pysmbd bindings
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Pair-programmed-with: Joe Guo <joeg@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Joe Guo <joeg@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
This is not a general purpose profiling solution, but these JSON logs are already being
generated and stored, so this is worth adding.
Some administrators are very keen to know how long authentication
takes, particularly due to long replication transactions in other
processes.
This complements a similar patch set to log the transaction duration.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
In a typical user login query, the code tries to work out the PSO 2-3
times - once for the msDS-ResultantPSO attribute, and then again for the
msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed & msDS-UserPasswordExpiryTimeComputed
constructed attributes.
The PSO calculation is reasonably expensive, mostly due to the nested
groups calculation. If we've already constructed the msDS-ResultantPSO
attribute, then we can save ourselves extra work by just re-fetching the
result directly, rather than expanding the nested groups again from
scratch.
The previous patch improves efficiency when there are no PSOs in the
system. This should improve the case where there are PSOs that apply to
the users. (Unfortunately, it won't help where there are some PSOs in
the system, but no PSO applies to the user being queried).
Also updated sam.c so the msDS-ResultantPSO gets calculated first,
before the other constructed attributes.
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Autobuild-User(master): Garming Sam <garming@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Wed May 23 10:09:11 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
If a PSO applies to a user, use its lockOutThreshold/Duration settings
instead of the domain setting. When we lookup a user, we now include the
msDS-ResultantPSO attribute. If the attribute is present for a user,
then we lookup the corresponding PSO object to get the lockOutThreshold/
Duration settings.
Note: This is not quite enough to make the PSO lockout tests pass, as
msDS-User-Account-Control-Computed is still constructed based on the
domain lockoutDuration setting rather than the PSO.
Updating the password_hash.c code properly will be done in a subsequent
commit.
Signed-off-by: Tim Beale <timbeale@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue May 22 02:42:32 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
chgtdcpass should add a new DC password and delete the old ones but the bug
exposed by this test causes the tool to remove only a single record from
the old entries, leaving the old passwords functional. Since the tool is
used by administrators who may have disclosed their domain join password and
want to invalidate it, this is a security concern.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13415
Signed-off-by: Aaron Haslett <aaronhaslett@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue May 15 15:45:08 CEST 2018 on sn-devel-144
chgtdcpass should add a new DC password and delete the old ones but the bug
exposed by this test causes the tool to remove only a single record from
the old entries, leaving the old passwords functional. Since the tool is
used by administrators who may have disclosed their domain join password and
want to invalidate it, this is a security concern.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13415
Signed-off-by: Aaron Haslett <aaronhaslett@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Generate a GUID for each successful authorization, this will allow the
tying of events in the logs back to a specific session.
Signed-off-by: Gary Lockyer <gary@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
With the changes to make samba python code Py2/Py3 compatible there
now are many instances where string content is decoded.
Decoded string variables in Py2 are returned as the unicode type. Many
Py2 c-module functions that take string arguments only check for the
string type. However now it's quite possibe the content formally passed
as a string argument is now passed as unicode after being decoded,
such arguments are rejected and code can fail subtly. This only affects
places where the type is directly checked e.g. via PyStr_Check etc.
arguments that are parsed by ParseTuple* functions generally already
accept both string and unicode (if 's', 'z', 's*' format specifiers
are used)
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.power@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
There's no need to do a crack_name_to_nt4_name(), as the authentication
already provides the nt4 domain and account names.
This should only happen on an RODC, that we use the winbind auth module
for local users. So we should make sure we only try to reset
the badPwdCount for users of our own domain.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13300
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
Every caller did a talloc_steal() after socket_create(). Just pass in the
correct memory context.
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
It turns out that an empty domain name maps to the local SAM.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13206
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Feb 23 04:08:26 CET 2018 on sn-devel-144
This is no longer useful as it doesn't support async requests.
It could be readded using pthreadpool_tevent_job_send()
and wbcCtxAuthenticateUserEx() if required.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is no longer useful as the 'winbind' backend also
handles the rodc case now.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This adds support for trusted domains to the auth stack on AD DCs.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This adds authentication support for trusted domains to the
netlogon server.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@samba.org>
This prepares real async handling in the backends.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Jun 27 21:09:08 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144
This prepares real async handling in the backends.
Check with git show -w.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
This prepares the conversion to winbind_check_password_send/recv()
where the internal state is called 'winbind_check_password_state'
as 'state'.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
The previous commit removed the condition from the block. No change in
behaviour, best viewed with git show -w.
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
We need to handle every error instead of just NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER,
the callers also doesn't require NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED anymore.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
There's no point in creating a temporary ldb_context as
the only callers already have a valid struct ldb_context for
the local sam.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
There's no point in creating a temporary ldb_context as
all direct callers already have a valid struct ldb_context for
the local sam.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This is important to allow the 'new_spnego' with mech_list protection to work
for a SMB session setup.
This is not strictly needed as we always announce GENSEC_FEATURE_SESSION_KEY
in gensec_gssapi_have_feature(), but it's better to send GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG
over the wire.
This may prevent a ticket from a Samba client to an SMB server
(particularly a DC) being misused to connect to the LDAP server on that
DC, as the LDAP server will require GSSAPI signing of the connection.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This matches logic of samba_server_gensec_start() and avoids warnings like this:
WARNING: talloc_steal with references at ../source4/auth/samba_server_gensec.c:150
reference at ../auth/gensec/gensec_start.c:586
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This allows you to forward bad password count resets to 0. Currently,
there is a missing access check for the RODC to ensure it only applies
to cached users (msDS-Allowed-Password-Replication-Group).
(further patches still need to address forcing a RWDC contact)
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
This requires as a pre-requisite that the auth stack is not run twice.
We remove the knownfail introduced in the earlier patch.
Signed-off-by: Garming Sam <garming@catalyst.net.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
