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commit 8782fb61cc848364e1e1599d76d3c9dd58a1cc06 upstream.
The mmap lock protects the page walker from changes to the page tables
during the walk. However a read lock is insufficient to protect those
areas which don't have a VMA as munmap() detaches the VMAs before
downgrading to a read lock and actually tearing down PTEs/page tables.
For users of walk_page_range() the solution is to simply call pte_hole()
immediately without checking the actual page tables when a VMA is not
present. We now never call __walk_page_range() without a valid vma.
For walk_page_range_novma() the locking requirements are tightened to
require the mmap write lock to be taken, and then walking the pgd
directly with 'no_vma' set.
This in turn means that all page walkers either have a valid vma, or
it's that special 'novma' case for page table debugging. As a result,
all the odd '(!walk->vma && !walk->no_vma)' tests can be removed.
Fixes: dd2283f2605e ("mm: mmap: zap pages with read mmap_sem in munmap")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[manually backported. backport note: walk_page_range_novma() does not exist in
5.4, so I'm omitting it from the backport]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2120635108b35ecad9c59c8b44f6cbdf4f98214e upstream.
We enable -Wcast-function-type globally in the kernel to warn about
mismatching types in function pointer casts. Compilers currently
warn only about ABI incompability with this flag, but Clang 16 will
enable a stricter version of the check by default that checks for an
exact type match. This will be very noisy in the kernel, so disable
-Wcast-function-type-strict without W=1 until the new warnings have
been addressed.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://reviews.llvm.org/D134831
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1724
Suggested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220930203310.4010564-1-samitolvanen@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts commit c89849ecfd2e10838b31c519c2a6607266b58f02 which is
commit 66f99628eb24409cb8feb5061f78283c8b65f820 upstream.
It is reported to cause problems on 5.4.y so it should be reverted for
now.
Reported-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7af02bc3-c0f2-7326-e467-02549e88c9ce@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Hamza Mahfooz <hamza.mahfooz@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b3531f5fc16d4df2b12567bce48cd9f3ab5f9131 upstream.
fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c: In function 'xfs_itruncate_extents_flags':
fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c:1523:8: warning: unused variable 'done' [-Wunused-variable]
commit 4bbb04abb4ee ("xfs: truncate should remove
all blocks, not just to the end of the page cache")
left behind this, so remove it.
Fixes: 4bbb04abb4ee ("xfs: truncate should remove all blocks, not just to the end of the page cache")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandan.babu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 54027a49938bbee1af62fad191139b14d4ee5cd2 upstream.
Dan Carpenter pointed out that error is uninitialized. While there
never should be an attr leaf block with zero entries, let's not leave
that logic bomb there.
Fixes: 0bb9d159bd01 ("xfs: streamline xfs_attr3_leaf_inactive")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Collins <allison.henderson@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandan.babu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0bb9d159bd018b271e783d3b2d3bc82fa0727321 upstream.
Now that we know we don't have to take a transaction to stale the incore
buffers for a remote value, get rid of the unnecessary memory allocation
in the leaf walker and call the rmt_stale function directly. Flatten
the loop while we're at it.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandan.babu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a39f089a25e75c3d17b955d8eb8bc781f23364f3 upstream.
Move the abstract in-memory version of various btree block headers
out of xfs_da_format.h as they aren't on-disk formats.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandan.babu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e8db2aafcedb7d88320ab83f1000f1606b26d4d7 upstream.
[Replaced XFS_IS_CORRUPT() calls with ASSERT() for 5.4.y backport]
While running generic/103, I observed what looks like memory corruption
and (with slub debugging turned on) a slub redzone warning on i386 when
inactivating an inode with a 64k remote attr value.
On a v5 filesystem, maximally sized remote attr values require one block
more than 64k worth of space to hold both the remote attribute value
header (64 bytes). On a 4k block filesystem this results in a 68k
buffer; on a 64k block filesystem, this would be a 128k buffer. Note
that even though we'll never use more than 65,600 bytes of this buffer,
XFS_MAX_BLOCKSIZE is 64k.
This is a problem because the definition of struct xfs_buf_log_format
allows for XFS_MAX_BLOCKSIZE worth of dirty bitmap (64k). On i386 when we
invalidate a remote attribute, xfs_trans_binval zeroes all 68k worth of
the dirty map, writing right off the end of the log item and corrupting
memory. We've gotten away with this on x86_64 for years because the
compiler inserts a u32 padding on the end of struct xfs_buf_log_format.
Fortunately for us, remote attribute values are written to disk with
xfs_bwrite(), which is to say that they are not logged. Fix the problem
by removing all places where we could end up creating a buffer log item
for a remote attribute value and leave a note explaining why. Next,
replace the open-coded buffer invalidation with a call to the helper we
created in the previous patch that does better checking for bad metadata
before marking the buffer stale.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandan.babu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8edbb26b06023de31ad7d4c9b984d99f66577929 upstream.
[Replaced XFS_IS_CORRUPT() calls with ASSERT() for 5.4.y backport]
Hoist the code that invalidates remote extended attribute value buffers
into a separate helper function. This prepares us for a memory
corruption fix in the next patch.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandan.babu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7b53b868a1812a9a6ab5e69249394bd37f29ce2c upstream.
Direct I/O reads can also be used with RWF_NOWAIT & co. Fix the inode
locking in xfs_file_dio_aio_read to take IOCB_NOWAIT into account.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandan.babu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 932befe39ddea29cf47f4f1dc080d3dba668f0ca upstream.
I observed a hang in generic/308 while running fstests on a i686 kernel.
The hang occurred when trying to purge the pagecache on a large sparse
file that had a page created past MAX_LFS_FILESIZE, which caused an
integer overflow in the pagecache xarray and resulted in an infinite
loop.
I then noticed that Linus changed the definition of MAX_LFS_FILESIZE in
commit 0cc3b0ec23ce ("Clarify (and fix) MAX_LFS_FILESIZE macros") so
that it is now one page short of the maximum page index on 32-bit
kernels. Because the XFS function to compute max offset open-codes the
2005-era MAX_LFS_FILESIZE computation and neither the vfs nor mm perform
any sanity checking of s_maxbytes, the code in generic/308 can create a
page above the pagecache's limit and kaboom.
Fix all this by setting s_maxbytes to MAX_LFS_FILESIZE directly and
aborting the mount with a warning if our assumptions ever break. I have
no answer for why this seems to have been broken for years and nobody
noticed.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandan.babu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4bbb04abb4ee2e1f7d65e52557ba1c4038ea43ed upstream.
xfs_itruncate_extents_flags() is supposed to unmap every block in a file
from EOF onwards. Oddly, it uses s_maxbytes as the upper limit to the
bunmapi range, even though s_maxbytes reflects the highest offset the
pagecache can support, not the highest offset that XFS supports.
The result of this confusion is that if you create a 20T file on a
64-bit machine, mount the filesystem on a 32-bit machine, and remove the
file, we leak everything above 16T. Fix this by capping the bunmapi
request at the maximum possible block offset, not s_maxbytes.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandan.babu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a5084865524dee1fe8ea1fee17c60b4369ad4f5e upstream.
Introduce a new #define for the maximum supported file block offset.
We'll use this in the next patch to make it more obvious that we're
doing some operation for all possible inode fork mappings after a given
offset. We can't use ULLONG_MAX here because bunmapi uses that to
detect when it's done.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandan.babu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 780d29057781d986cd87dbbe232cd02876ad430f upstream.
XFS_ATTR_INCOMPLETE is a flag in the on-disk attribute format, and thus
in a different namespace as the ATTR_* flags in xfs_da_args.flags.
Switch to using a XFS_DA_OP_INCOMPLETE flag in op_flags instead. Without
this users might be able to inject this flag into operations using the
attr by handle ioctl.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandan.babu@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2b1299322016731d56807aa49254a5ea3080b6b3 upstream.
tl;dr: The Enhanced IBRS mitigation for Spectre v2 does not work as
documented for RET instructions after VM exits. Mitigate it with a new
one-entry RSB stuffing mechanism and a new LFENCE.
== Background ==
Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS) was designed to help
mitigate Branch Target Injection and Speculative Store Bypass, i.e.
Spectre, attacks. IBRS prevents software run in less privileged modes
from affecting branch prediction in more privileged modes. IBRS requires
the MSR to be written on every privilege level change.
To overcome some of the performance issues of IBRS, Enhanced IBRS was
introduced. eIBRS is an "always on" IBRS, in other words, just turn
it on once instead of writing the MSR on every privilege level change.
When eIBRS is enabled, more privileged modes should be protected from
less privileged modes, including protecting VMMs from guests.
== Problem ==
Here's a simplification of how guests are run on Linux' KVM:
void run_kvm_guest(void)
{
// Prepare to run guest
VMRESUME();
// Clean up after guest runs
}
The execution flow for that would look something like this to the
processor:
1. Host-side: call run_kvm_guest()
2. Host-side: VMRESUME
3. Guest runs, does "CALL guest_function"
4. VM exit, host runs again
5. Host might make some "cleanup" function calls
6. Host-side: RET from run_kvm_guest()
Now, when back on the host, there are a couple of possible scenarios of
post-guest activity the host needs to do before executing host code:
* on pre-eIBRS hardware (legacy IBRS, or nothing at all), the RSB is not
touched and Linux has to do a 32-entry stuffing.
* on eIBRS hardware, VM exit with IBRS enabled, or restoring the host
IBRS=1 shortly after VM exit, has a documented side effect of flushing
the RSB except in this PBRSB situation where the software needs to stuff
the last RSB entry "by hand".
IOW, with eIBRS supported, host RET instructions should no longer be
influenced by guest behavior after the host retires a single CALL
instruction.
However, if the RET instructions are "unbalanced" with CALLs after a VM
exit as is the RET in #6, it might speculatively use the address for the
instruction after the CALL in #3 as an RSB prediction. This is a problem
since the (untrusted) guest controls this address.
Balanced CALL/RET instruction pairs such as in step #5 are not affected.
== Solution ==
The PBRSB issue affects a wide variety of Intel processors which
support eIBRS. But not all of them need mitigation. Today,
X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT triggers an RSB filling sequence that mitigates
PBRSB. Systems setting RSB_VMEXIT need no further mitigation - i.e.,
eIBRS systems which enable legacy IBRS explicitly.
However, such systems (X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) do not set RSB_VMEXIT
and most of them need a new mitigation.
Therefore, introduce a new feature flag X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE
which triggers a lighter-weight PBRSB mitigation versus RSB_VMEXIT.
The lighter-weight mitigation performs a CALL instruction which is
immediately followed by a speculative execution barrier (INT3). This
steers speculative execution to the barrier -- just like a retpoline
-- which ensures that speculation can never reach an unbalanced RET.
Then, ensure this CALL is retired before continuing execution with an
LFENCE.
In other words, the window of exposure is opened at VM exit where RET
behavior is troublesome. While the window is open, force RSB predictions
sampling for RET targets to a dead end at the INT3. Close the window
with the LFENCE.
There is a subset of eIBRS systems which are not vulnerable to PBRSB.
Add these systems to the cpu_vuln_whitelist[] as NO_EIBRS_PBRSB.
Future systems that aren't vulnerable will set ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO.
[ bp: Massage, incorporate review comments from Andy Cooper. ]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: no intra-function validation]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit eb23b5ef9131e6d65011de349a4d25ef1b3d4314 upstream.
IBRS mitigation for spectre_v2 forces write to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL at
every kernel entry/exit. On Enhanced IBRS parts setting
MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL[IBRS] only once at boot is sufficient. MSR writes at
every kernel entry/exit incur unnecessary performance loss.
When Enhanced IBRS feature is present, print a warning about this
unnecessary performance loss.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2a5eaf54583c2bfe0edc4fea64006656256cca17.1657814857.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4ad3278df6fe2b0852b00d5757fc2ccd8e92c26e upstream.
Some Intel processors may use alternate predictors for RETs on
RSB-underflow. This condition may be vulnerable to Branch History
Injection (BHI) and intramode-BTI.
Kernel earlier added spectre_v2 mitigation modes (eIBRS+Retpolines,
eIBRS+LFENCE, Retpolines) which protect indirect CALLs and JMPs against
such attacks. However, on RSB-underflow, RET target prediction may
fallback to alternate predictors. As a result, RET's predicted target
may get influenced by branch history.
A new MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL bit (RRSBA_DIS_S) controls this fallback
behavior when in kernel mode. When set, RETs will not take predictions
from alternate predictors, hence mitigating RETs as well. Support for
this is enumerated by CPUID.7.2.EDX[RRSBA_CTRL] (bit2).
For spectre v2 mitigation, when a user selects a mitigation that
protects indirect CALLs and JMPs against BHI and intramode-BTI, set
RRSBA_DIS_S also to protect RETs for RSB-underflow case.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: no tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f54d45372c6ac9c993451de5e51312485f7d10bc upstream.
Cannon lake is also affected by RETBleed, add it to the list.
Fixes: 6ad0ad2bf8a6 ("x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability")
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 26aae8ccbc1972233afd08fb3f368947c0314265 upstream.
BTC_NO indicates that hardware is not susceptible to Branch Type Confusion.
Zen3 CPUs don't suffer BTC.
Hypervisors are expected to synthesise BTC_NO when it is appropriate
given the migration pool, to prevent kernels using heuristics.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7a05bc95ed1c5a59e47aaade9fb4083c27de9e62 upstream.
The whole MMIO/RETBLEED enumeration went overboard on steppings. Get
rid of all that and simply use ANY.
If a future stepping of these models would not be affected, it had
better set the relevant ARCH_CAP_$FOO_NO bit in
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9756bba28470722dacb79ffce554336dd1f6a6cd upstream.
Prevent RSB underflow/poisoning attacks with RSB. While at it, add a
bunch of comments to attempt to document the current state of tribal
knowledge about RSB attacks and what exactly is being mitigated.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bea7e31a5caccb6fe8ed989c065072354f0ecb52 upstream.
For legacy IBRS to work, the IBRS bit needs to be always re-written
after vmexit, even if it's already on.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fc02735b14fff8c6678b521d324ade27b1a3d4cf upstream.
On eIBRS systems, the returns in the vmexit return path from
__vmx_vcpu_run() to vmx_vcpu_run() are exposed to RSB poisoning attacks.
Fix that by moving the post-vmexit spec_ctrl handling to immediately
after the vmexit.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bb06650634d3552c0f8557e9d16aa1a408040e28 upstream.
Convert __vmx_vcpu_run()'s 'launched' argument to 'flags', in
preparation for doing SPEC_CTRL handling immediately after vmexit, which
will need another flag.
This is much easier than adding a fourth argument, because this code
supports both 32-bit and 64-bit, and the fourth argument on 32-bit would
have to be pushed on the stack.
Note that __vmx_vcpu_run_flags() is called outside of the noinstr
critical section because it will soon start calling potentially
traceable functions.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8bd200d23ec42d66ccd517a72dd0b9cc6132d2fd upstream.
Move the vmx_vm{enter,exit}() functionality into __vmx_vcpu_run(). This
will make it easier to do the spec_ctrl handling before the first RET.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: remove ENDBR]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[cascardo: no unwinding save/restore]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 150f17bfab37e981ba03b37440638138ff2aa9ec upstream.
Replace inline assembly in nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw
with a call to __vmx_vcpu_run. The function is not
performance critical, so (double) GPR save/restore
in __vmx_vcpu_run can be tolerated, as far as performance
effects are concerned.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
[sean: dropped versioning info from changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20201231002702.2223707-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[cascardo: small fixups]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6c44221b05236cc65d76cb5dc2463f738edff39d upstream.
Saves one byte in __vmx_vcpu_run for the same functionality.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20201029140457.126965-1-ubizjak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit acac5e98ef8d638a411cfa2ee676c87e1973f126 upstream.
This mask has been made redundant by kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(). And it
doesn't even work when MSR interception is disabled, as the guest can
just write to SPEC_CTRL directly.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bbb69e8bee1bd882784947095ffb2bfe0f7c9470 upstream.
There's no need to recalculate the host value for every entry/exit.
Just use the cached value in spec_ctrl_current().
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b2620facef4889fefcbf2e87284f34dcd4189bce upstream.
If a kernel is built with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n, but the user still wants
to mitigate Spectre v2 using IBRS or eIBRS, the RSB filling will be
silently disabled.
There's nothing retpoline-specific about RSB buffer filling. Remove the
CONFIG_RETPOLINE guards around it.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 089dd8e53126ebaf506e2dc0bf89d652c36bfc12 upstream.
Change FILL_RETURN_BUFFER so that objtool groks it and can generate
correct ORC unwind information.
- Since ORC is alternative invariant; that is, all alternatives
should have the same ORC entries, the __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER body
can not be part of an alternative.
Therefore, move it out of the alternative and keep the alternative
as a sort of jump_label around it.
- Use the ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL annotation to white-list
these 'funny' call instructions to nowhere.
- Use UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY to 'fill' the speculation traps, otherwise
objtool will consider them unreachable.
- Move the RSP adjustment into the loop, such that the loop has a
deterministic stack layout.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200428191700.032079304@infradead.org
[cascardo: fixup because of backport of ba6e31af2be96c4d0536f2152ed6f7b6c11bca47 ("x86/speculation: Add LFENCE to RSB fill sequence")]
[cascardo: no intra-function call validation support]
[cascardo: avoid UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY because of svm]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bf5835bcdb9635c97f85120dba9bfa21e111130f upstream.
Having IBRS enabled while the SMT sibling is idle unnecessarily slows
down the running sibling. OTOH, disabling IBRS around idle takes two
MSR writes, which will increase the idle latency.
Therefore, only disable IBRS around deeper idle states. Shallow idle
states are bounded by the tick in duration, since NOHZ is not allowed
for them by virtue of their short target residency.
Only do this for mwait-driven idle, since that keeps interrupts disabled
across idle, which makes disabling IBRS vs IRQ-entry a non-issue.
Note: C6 is a random threshold, most importantly C1 probably shouldn't
disable IBRS, benchmarking needed.
Suggested-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: no CPUIDLE_FLAG_IRQ_ENABLE]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[cascardo: context adjustments]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c779bc1a9002fa474175b80e72b85c9bf628abb0 upstream.
When changing SPEC_CTRL for user control, the WRMSR can be delayed
until return-to-user when KERNEL_IBRS has been enabled.
This avoids an MSR write during context switch.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2dbb887e875b1de3ca8f40ddf26bcfe55798c609 upstream.
Implement Kernel IBRS - currently the only known option to mitigate RSB
underflow speculation issues on Skylake hardware.
Note: since IBRS_ENTER requires fuller context established than
UNTRAIN_RET, it must be placed after it. However, since UNTRAIN_RET
itself implies a RET, it must come after IBRS_ENTER. This means
IBRS_ENTER needs to also move UNTRAIN_RET.
Note 2: KERNEL_IBRS is sub-optimal for XenPV.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: conflict at arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S, skip_r11rcx]
[cascardo: conflict at arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S]
[cascardo: conflict fixups, no ANNOTATE_NOENDBR]
[cascardo: entry fixups because of missing UNTRAIN_RET]
[cascardo: conflicts on fsgsbase]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1b331eeea7b8676fc5dbdf80d0a07e41be226177 upstream.
Yes, r11 and rcx have been restored previously, but since they're being
popped anyway (into rsi) might as well pop them into their own regs --
setting them to the value they already are.
Less magical code.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220506121631.365070674@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit caa0ff24d5d0e02abce5e65c3d2b7f20a6617be5 upstream.
Due to TIF_SSBD and TIF_SPEC_IB the actual IA32_SPEC_CTRL value can
differ from x86_spec_ctrl_base. As such, keep a per-CPU value
reflecting the current task's MSR content.
[jpoimboe: rename]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7fbf47c7ce50b38a64576b150e7011ae73d54669 upstream.
Add the "retbleed=<value>" boot parameter to select a mitigation for
RETBleed. Possible values are "off", "auto" and "unret"
(JMP2RET mitigation). The default value is "auto".
Currently, "retbleed=auto" will select the unret mitigation on
AMD and Hygon and no mitigation on Intel (JMP2RET is not effective on
Intel).
[peterz: rebase; add hygon]
[jpoimboe: cleanups]
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: this effectively remove the UNRET mitigation as an option, so it
has to be complemented by a later pick of the same commit later. This is
done in order to pick retbleed_select_mitigation]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a883d624aed463c84c22596006e5a96f5b44db31 upstream.
In order to extend the RETPOLINE features to 4, move them to word 11
where there is still room. This mostly keeps DISABLE_RETPOLINE
simple.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e9d7144597b10ff13ff2264c059f7d4a7fbc89ac upstream.
Intel uses the same family/model for several CPUs. Sometimes the
stepping must be checked to tell them apart.
On x86 there can be at most 16 steppings. Add a steppings bitmask to
x86_cpu_id and a X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAMILY_MODEL_STEPPING_FEATURE macro
and support for matching against family/model/stepping.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
[cascardo: have steppings be the last member as there are initializers
that don't use named members]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 20d437447c0089cda46c683db219d3b4e2cde40e upstream.
Finding all places which build x86_cpu_id match tables is tedious and the
logic is hidden in lots of differently named macro wrappers.
Most of these initializer macros use plain C89 initializers which rely on
the ordering of the struct members. So new members could only be added at
the end of the struct, but that's ugly as hell and C99 initializers are
really the right thing to use.
Provide a set of macros which:
- Have a proper naming scheme, starting with X86_MATCH_
- Use C99 initializers
The set of provided macros are all subsets of the base macro
X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE()
which allows to supply all possible selection criteria:
vendor, family, model, feature
The other macros shorten this to avoid typing all arguments when they are
not needed and would require one of the _ANY constants. They have been
created due to the requirements of the existing usage sites.
Also add a few model constants for Centaur CPUs and QUARK.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200320131508.826011988@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
