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[ Upstream commit eef034ac6690118c88f357b00e2b3239c9d8575d ]
When aops->write_begin() does not initialize fsdata, KMSAN may report
an error passing the latter to aops->write_end().
Fix this by unconditionally initializing fsdata.
Fixes: f2b6a16eb8f5 ("fs: affs convert to new aops")
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 30b2b2196d6e4cc24cbec633535a2404f258ce69 upstream.
On async reads, page data is allocated before sending. When the
response is received but it has no data to fill (e.g.
STATUS_END_OF_FILE), __calc_signature() will still include the pages in
its computation, leading to an invalid signature check.
This patch fixes this by not setting the async read smb_rqst page data
(zeroed by default) if its got_bytes is 0.
This can be reproduced/verified with xfstests generic/465.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b7adbf9ada3513d2092362c8eac5cddc5b651f5c upstream.
If we have one task trying to start the quota rescan worker while another
one is trying to disable quotas, we can end up hitting a race that results
in the quota rescan worker doing a NULL pointer dereference. The steps for
this are the following:
1) Quotas are enabled;
2) Task A calls the quota rescan ioctl and enters btrfs_qgroup_rescan().
It calls qgroup_rescan_init() which returns 0 (success) and then joins a
transaction and commits it;
3) Task B calls the quota disable ioctl and enters btrfs_quota_disable().
It clears the bit BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED from fs_info->flags and calls
btrfs_qgroup_wait_for_completion(), which returns immediately since the
rescan worker is not yet running.
Then it starts a transaction and locks fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock;
4) Task A queues the rescan worker, by calling btrfs_queue_work();
5) The rescan worker starts, and calls rescan_should_stop() at the start
of its while loop, which results in 0 iterations of the loop, since
the flag BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED was cleared from fs_info->flags by
task B at step 3);
6) Task B sets fs_info->quota_root to NULL;
7) The rescan worker tries to start a transaction and uses
fs_info->quota_root as the root argument for btrfs_start_transaction().
This results in a NULL pointer dereference down the call chain of
btrfs_start_transaction(). The stack trace is something like the one
reported in Link tag below:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000041: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000208-0x000000000000020f]
CPU: 1 PID: 34 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 6.1.0-syzkaller-13872-gb6bb9676f216 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
Workqueue: btrfs-qgroup-rescan btrfs_work_helper
RIP: 0010:start_transaction+0x48/0x10f0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:564
Code: 48 89 fb 48 (...)
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000ab7ab0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000041 RBX: 0000000000000208 RCX: ffff88801779ba80
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff52000156f5d
R10: fffff52000156f5d R11: 1ffff92000156f5c R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000003
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f2bea75b718 CR3: 000000001d0cc000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0x3bb/0x6a0 fs/btrfs/qgroup.c:3402
btrfs_work_helper+0x312/0x850 fs/btrfs/async-thread.c:280
process_one_work+0x877/0xdb0 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
worker_thread+0xb14/0x1330 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
kthread+0x266/0x300 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
So fix this by having the rescan worker function not attempt to start a
transaction if it didn't do any rescan work.
Reported-by: syzbot+96977faa68092ad382c4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/000000000000e5454b05f065a803@google.com/
Fixes: e804861bd4e6 ("btrfs: fix deadlock between quota disable and qgroup rescan worker")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7633355e5c7f29c049a9048e461427d1d8ed3051 upstream.
If nilfs2 reads a corrupted disk image and tries to reads a b-tree node
block by calling __nilfs_btree_get_block() against an invalid virtual
block address, it returns -ENOENT because conversion of the virtual block
address to a disk block address fails. However, this return value is the
same as the internal code that b-tree lookup routines return to indicate
that the block being searched does not exist, so functions that operate on
that b-tree may misbehave.
When nilfs_btree_insert() receives this spurious 'not found' code from
nilfs_btree_do_lookup(), it misunderstands that the 'not found' check was
successful and continues the insert operation using incomplete lookup path
data, causing the following crash:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f]
...
RIP: 0010:nilfs_btree_get_nonroot_node fs/nilfs2/btree.c:418 [inline]
RIP: 0010:nilfs_btree_prepare_insert fs/nilfs2/btree.c:1077 [inline]
RIP: 0010:nilfs_btree_insert+0x6d3/0x1c10 fs/nilfs2/btree.c:1238
Code: bc 24 80 00 00 00 4c 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 28 00 74 08 4c 89
ff e8 4b 02 92 fe 4d 8b 3f 49 83 c7 28 4c 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 80 3c
28 00 74 08 4c 89 ff e8 2e 02 92 fe 4d 8b 3f 49 83 c7 02
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
nilfs_bmap_do_insert fs/nilfs2/bmap.c:121 [inline]
nilfs_bmap_insert+0x20d/0x360 fs/nilfs2/bmap.c:147
nilfs_get_block+0x414/0x8d0 fs/nilfs2/inode.c:101
__block_write_begin_int+0x54c/0x1a80 fs/buffer.c:1991
__block_write_begin fs/buffer.c:2041 [inline]
block_write_begin+0x93/0x1e0 fs/buffer.c:2102
nilfs_write_begin+0x9c/0x110 fs/nilfs2/inode.c:261
generic_perform_write+0x2e4/0x5e0 mm/filemap.c:3772
__generic_file_write_iter+0x176/0x400 mm/filemap.c:3900
generic_file_write_iter+0xab/0x310 mm/filemap.c:3932
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2186 [inline]
new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]
vfs_write+0x7dc/0xc50 fs/read_write.c:584
ksys_write+0x177/0x2a0 fs/read_write.c:637
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
...
</TASK>
This patch fixes the root cause of this problem by replacing the error
code that __nilfs_btree_get_block() returns on block address conversion
failure from -ENOENT to another internal code -EINVAL which means that the
b-tree metadata is corrupted.
By returning -EINVAL, it propagates without glitches, and for all relevant
b-tree operations, functions in the upper bmap layer output an error
message indicating corrupted b-tree metadata via
nilfs_bmap_convert_error(), and code -EIO will be eventually returned as
it should be.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/000000000000bd89e205f0e38355@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230105055356.8811-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+ede796cecd5296353515@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a608da3bd730d718f2d3ebec1c26f9865f8f17ce upstream.
Using REQ_OP_ZONE_APPEND operations for synchronous writes to sequential
files succeeds regardless of the zone write pointer position, as long as
the target zone is not full. This means that if an external (buggy)
application writes to the zone of a sequential file underneath the file
system, subsequent file write() operation will succeed but the file size
will not be correct and the file will contain invalid data written by
another application.
Modify zonefs_file_dio_append() to check the written sector of an append
write (returned in bio->bi_iter.bi_sector) and return -EIO if there is a
mismatch with the file zone wp offset field. This change triggers a call
to zonefs_io_error() and a zone check. Modify zonefs_io_error_cb() to
not expose the unexpected data after the current inode size when the
errors=remount-ro mode is used. Other error modes are correctly handled
already.
Fixes: 02ef12a663c7 ("zonefs: use REQ_OP_ZONE_APPEND for sync DIO")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 39f501d68ec1ed5cd5c66ac6ec2a7131c517bb92 ]
Currently we have a btrfs_debug() for run_one_delayed_ref() failure, but
if end users hit such problem, there will be no chance that
btrfs_debug() is enabled. This can lead to very little useful info for
debugging.
This patch will:
- Add extra info for error reporting
Including:
* logical bytenr
* num_bytes
* type
* action
* ref_mod
- Replace the btrfs_debug() with btrfs_err()
- Move the error reporting into run_one_delayed_ref()
This is to avoid use-after-free, the @node can be freed in the caller.
This error should only be triggered at most once.
As if run_one_delayed_ref() failed, we trigger the error message, then
causing the call chain to error out:
btrfs_run_delayed_refs()
`- btrfs_run_delayed_refs()
`- btrfs_run_delayed_refs_for_head()
`- run_one_delayed_ref()
And we will abort the current transaction in btrfs_run_delayed_refs().
If we have to run delayed refs for the abort transaction,
run_one_delayed_ref() will just cleanup the refs and do nothing, thus no
new error messages would be output.
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a6b9d2fa0024e7e399c26facd0fb466b7396e2b9 ]
When there is a single DS no striping constraints need to be placed on
the IO. When such constraint is applied then buffered reads don't
coalesce to the DS's rsize.
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit a152d05ae4a71d802d50cf9177dba34e8bb09f68 upstream.
If smb311 posix is enabled, we send the intended mode for file
creation in the posix create context. Instead of using what's there on
the stack, create the mfsymlink file with 0644.
Fixes: ce558b0e17f8a ("smb3: Add posix create context for smb3.11 posix mounts")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4c0d5778385cb3618ff26a561ce41de2b7d9de70 upstream.
Commit a80f7fcf1867 ("ext4: fixup ext4_fc_track_* functions' signature")
extended the scope of the transaction in ext4_unlink() too far, making
it include the call to ext4_find_entry(). However, ext4_find_entry()
can deadlock when called from within a transaction because it may need
to set up the directory's encryption key.
Fix this by restoring the transaction to its original scope.
Reported-by: syzbot+1a748d0007eeac3ab079@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: a80f7fcf1867 ("ext4: fixup ext4_fc_track_* functions' signature")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221106224841.279231-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0fbcb5251fc81b58969b272c4fb7374a7b922e3e upstream.
fast-commit of create, link, and unlink operations in encrypted
directories is completely broken because the unencrypted filenames are
being written to the fast-commit journal instead of the encrypted
filenames. These operations can't be replayed, as encryption keys
aren't present at journal replay time. It is also an information leak.
Until if/when we can get this working properly, make encrypted directory
operations ineligible for fast-commit.
Note that fast-commit operations on encrypted regular files continue to
be allowed, as they seem to work.
Fixes: aa75f4d3daae ("ext4: main fast-commit commit path")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221106224841.279231-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5fc4cbd9fde5d4630494fd6ffc884148fb618087 upstream.
Commit 307af6c87937 ("mbcache: automatically delete entries from cache
on freeing") started nesting cache->c_list_lock under the bit locks
protecting hash buckets of the mbcache hash table in
mb_cache_entry_create(). This causes problems for real-time kernels
because there spinlocks are sleeping locks while bitlocks stay atomic.
Luckily the nesting is easy to avoid by holding entry reference until
the entry is added to the LRU list. This makes sure we cannot race with
entry deletion.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 307af6c87937 ("mbcache: automatically delete entries from cache on freeing")
Reported-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220908091032.10513-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit cb7a95af78d29442b8294683eca4897544b8ef46 upstream.
Commit 55d1cbbbb29e ("hfs/hfsplus: use WARN_ON for sanity check") fixed
a build warning by turning a comment into a WARN_ON(), but it turns out
that syzbot then complains because it can trigger said warning with a
corrupted hfs image.
The warning actually does warn about a bad situation, but we are much
better off just handling it as the error it is. So rather than warn
about us doing bad things, stop doing the bad things and return -EIO.
While at it, also fix a memory leak that was introduced by an earlier
fix for a similar syzbot warning situation, and add a check for one case
that historically wasn't handled at all (ie neither comment nor
subsequent WARN_ON).
Reported-by: syzbot+7bb7cd3595533513a9e7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 55d1cbbbb29e ("hfs/hfsplus: use WARN_ON for sanity check")
Fixes: 8d824e69d9f3 ("hfs: fix OOB Read in __hfs_brec_find")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/000000000000dbce4e05f170f289@google.com/
Tested-by: Michael Schmitz <schmitzmic@gmail.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 55d1cbbbb29e6656c662ee8f73ba1fc4777532eb upstream.
gcc warns about a couple of instances in which a sanity check exists but
the author wasn't sure how to react to it failing, which makes it look
like a possible bug:
fs/hfsplus/inode.c: In function 'hfsplus_cat_read_inode':
fs/hfsplus/inode.c:503:37: error: suggest braces around empty body in an 'if' statement [-Werror=empty-body]
503 | /* panic? */;
| ^
fs/hfsplus/inode.c:524:37: error: suggest braces around empty body in an 'if' statement [-Werror=empty-body]
524 | /* panic? */;
| ^
fs/hfsplus/inode.c: In function 'hfsplus_cat_write_inode':
fs/hfsplus/inode.c:582:37: error: suggest braces around empty body in an 'if' statement [-Werror=empty-body]
582 | /* panic? */;
| ^
fs/hfsplus/inode.c:608:37: error: suggest braces around empty body in an 'if' statement [-Werror=empty-body]
608 | /* panic? */;
| ^
fs/hfs/inode.c: In function 'hfs_write_inode':
fs/hfs/inode.c:464:37: error: suggest braces around empty body in an 'if' statement [-Werror=empty-body]
464 | /* panic? */;
| ^
fs/hfs/inode.c:485:37: error: suggest braces around empty body in an 'if' statement [-Werror=empty-body]
485 | /* panic? */;
| ^
panic() is probably not the correct choice here, but a WARN_ON
seems appropriate and avoids the compile-time warning.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210927102149.1809384-1-arnd@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210322223249.2632268-1-arnd@kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 105c78e12468413e426625831faa7db4284e1fec upstream.
Mounting a filesystem whose journal inode has the encrypt flag causes a
NULL dereference in fscrypt_limit_io_blocks() when the 'inlinecrypt'
mount option is used.
The problem is that when jbd2_journal_init_inode() calls bmap(), it
eventually finds its way into ext4_iomap_begin(), which calls
fscrypt_limit_io_blocks(). fscrypt_limit_io_blocks() requires that if
the inode is encrypted, then its encryption key must already be set up.
That's not the case here, since the journal inode is never "opened" like
a normal file would be. Hence the crash.
A reproducer is:
mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/vdb
debugfs -w /dev/vdb -R "set_inode_field <8> flags 0x80808"
mount /dev/vdb /mnt -o inlinecrypt
To fix this, make ext4 consider journal inodes with the encrypt flag to
be invalid. (Note, maybe other flags should be rejected on the journal
inode too. For now, this is just the minimal fix for the above issue.)
I've marked this as fixing the commit that introduced the call to
fscrypt_limit_io_blocks(), since that's what made an actual crash start
being possible. But this fix could be applied to any version of ext4
that supports the encrypt feature.
Reported-by: syzbot+ba9dac45bc76c490b7c3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 38ea50daa7a4 ("ext4: support direct I/O with fscrypt using blk-crypto")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221102053312.189962-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit cad853374d85fe678d721512cecfabd7636e51f3 upstream.
If v4 READDIR operation hits a mountpoint and gets back an error,
then it will include that entry in the reply and set RDATTR_ERROR for it
to the error.
That's fine for "normal" exported filesystems, but on the v4root, we
need to be more careful to only expose the existence of dentries that
lead to exports.
If the mountd upcall times out while checking to see whether a
mountpoint on the v4root is exported, then we have no recourse other
than to fail the whole operation.
Cc: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=216777
Reported-by: JianHong Yin <yin-jianhong@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 83c7423d1eb6806d13c521d1002cc1a012111719 ]
When extending the last extent in the file within the last block, we
wrongly computed the length of the last extent. This is mostly a
cosmetical problem since the extent does not contain any data and the
length will be fixed up by following operations but still.
Fixes: 1f3868f06855 ("udf: Fix extending file within last block")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 461ab10ef7e6ea9b41a0571a7fc6a72af9549a3c ]
For the POSIX locks they are using the same owner, which is the
thread id. And multiple POSIX locks could be merged into single one,
so when checking whether the 'file' has locks may fail.
For a file where some openers use locking and others don't is a
really odd usage pattern though. Locks are like stoplights -- they
only work if everyone pays attention to them.
Just switch ceph_get_caps() to check whether any locks are set on
the inode. If there are POSIX/OFD/FLOCK locks on the file at the
time, we should set CHECK_FILELOCK, regardless of what fd was used
to set the lock.
Fixes: ff5d913dfc71 ("ceph: return -EIO if read/write against filp that lost file locks")
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ab1ddef98a715eddb65309ffa83267e4e84a571e ]
Ceph has a need to know whether a particular inode has any locks set on
it. It's currently tracking that by a num_locks field in its
filp->private_data, but that's problematic as it tries to decrement this
field when releasing locks and that can race with the file being torn
down.
Add a new vfs_inode_has_locks helper that just returns whether any locks
are currently held on the inode.
Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 461ab10ef7e6 ("ceph: switch to vfs_inode_has_locks() to fix file lock bug")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 789e1e10f214c00ca18fc6610824c5b9876ba5f2 ]
Currently, we shut down the filecache before trying to clean up the
stateids that depend on it. This leads to the kernel trying to free an
nfsd_file twice, and a refcount overput on the nf_mark.
Change the shutdown procedure to tear down all of the stateids prior
to shutting down the filecache.
Reported-and-tested-by: Wang Yugui <wangyugui@e16-tech.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Fixes: 5e113224c17e ("nfsd: nfsd_file cache entries should be per net namespace")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a44e84a9b7764c72896f7241a0ec9ac7e7ef38dd ]
When manipulating xattr blocks, we can deadlock infinitely looping
inside ext4_xattr_block_set() where we constantly keep finding xattr
block for reuse in mbcache but we are unable to reuse it because its
reference count is too big. This happens because cache entry for the
xattr block is marked as reusable (e_reusable set) although its
reference count is too big. When this inconsistency happens, this
inconsistent state is kept indefinitely and so ext4_xattr_block_set()
keeps retrying indefinitely.
The inconsistent state is caused by non-atomic update of e_reusable bit.
e_reusable is part of a bitfield and e_reusable update can race with
update of e_referenced bit in the same bitfield resulting in loss of one
of the updates. Fix the problem by using atomic bitops instead.
This bug has been around for many years, but it became *much* easier
to hit after commit 65f8b80053a1 ("ext4: fix race when reusing xattr
blocks").
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 6048c64b2609 ("mbcache: add reusable flag to cache entries")
Fixes: 65f8b80053a1 ("ext4: fix race when reusing xattr blocks")
Reported-and-tested-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
Reported-by: Thilo Fromm <t-lo@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c77bf00f-4618-7149-56f1-b8d1664b9d07@linux.microsoft.com/
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221123193950.16758-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 307af6c879377c1c63e71cbdd978201f9c7ee8df ]
Use the fact that entries with elevated refcount are not removed from
the hash and just move removal of the entry from the hash to the entry
freeing time. When doing this we also change the generic code to hold
one reference to the cache entry, not two of them, which makes code
somewhat more obvious.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220712105436.32204-10-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Stable-dep-of: a44e84a9b776 ("ext4: fix deadlock due to mbcache entry corruption")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 65f8b80053a1b2fd602daa6814e62d6fa90e5e9b ]
When ext4_xattr_block_set() decides to remove xattr block the following
race can happen:
CPU1 CPU2
ext4_xattr_block_set() ext4_xattr_release_block()
new_bh = ext4_xattr_block_cache_find()
lock_buffer(bh);
ref = le32_to_cpu(BHDR(bh)->h_refcount);
if (ref == 1) {
...
mb_cache_entry_delete();
unlock_buffer(bh);
ext4_free_blocks();
...
ext4_forget(..., bh, ...);
jbd2_journal_revoke(..., bh);
ext4_journal_get_write_access(..., new_bh, ...)
do_get_write_access()
jbd2_journal_cancel_revoke(..., new_bh);
Later the code in ext4_xattr_block_set() finds out the block got freed
and cancels reusal of the block but the revoke stays canceled and so in
case of block reuse and journal replay the filesystem can get corrupted.
If the race works out slightly differently, we can also hit assertions
in the jbd2 code.
Fix the problem by making sure that once matching mbcache entry is
found, code dropping the last xattr block reference (or trying to modify
xattr block in place) waits until the mbcache entry reference is
dropped. This way code trying to reuse xattr block is protected from
someone trying to drop the last reference to xattr block.
Reported-and-tested-by: Ritesh Harjani <ritesh.list@gmail.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 82939d7999df ("ext4: convert to mbcache2")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220712105436.32204-5-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Stable-dep-of: a44e84a9b776 ("ext4: fix deadlock due to mbcache entry corruption")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit fd48e9acdf26d0cbd80051de07d4a735d05d29b2 ]
Remove unnecessary else (and thus indentation level) from a code block
in ext4_xattr_block_set(). It will also make following code changes
easier. No functional changes.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 82939d7999df ("ext4: convert to mbcache2")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220712105436.32204-4-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Stable-dep-of: a44e84a9b776 ("ext4: fix deadlock due to mbcache entry corruption")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6bc0d63dad7f9f54d381925ee855b402f652fa39 ]
Currently we remove EA inode from mbcache as soon as its xattr refcount
drops to zero. However there can be pending attempts to reuse the inode
and thus refcount handling code has to handle the situation when
refcount increases from zero anyway. So save some work and just keep EA
inode in mbcache until it is getting evicted. At that moment we are sure
following iget() of EA inode will fail anyway (or wait for eviction to
finish and load things from the disk again) and so removing mbcache
entry at that moment is fine and simplifies the code a bit.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 82939d7999df ("ext4: convert to mbcache2")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220712105436.32204-3-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Stable-dep-of: a44e84a9b776 ("ext4: fix deadlock due to mbcache entry corruption")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 3dc96bba65f53daa217f0a8f43edad145286a8f5 ]
Add function mb_cache_entry_delete_or_get() to delete mbcache entry if
it is unused and also add a function to wait for entry to become unused
- mb_cache_entry_wait_unused(). We do not share code between the two
deleting function as one of them will go away soon.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 82939d7999df ("ext4: convert to mbcache2")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220712105436.32204-2-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Stable-dep-of: a44e84a9b776 ("ext4: fix deadlock due to mbcache entry corruption")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 58318914186c157477b978b1739dfe2f1b9dc0fe ]
Do not reclaim entries that are currently used by somebody from a
shrinker. Firstly, these entries are likely useful. Secondly, we will
need to keep such entries to protect pending increment of xattr block
refcount.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 82939d7999df ("ext4: convert to mbcache2")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220712105436.32204-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Stable-dep-of: a44e84a9b776 ("ext4: fix deadlock due to mbcache entry corruption")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 594bc43b410316d70bb42aeff168837888d96810 ]
When space at the end of fast-commit journal blocks is unused, make sure
to zero it out so that uninitialized memory is not leaked to disk.
Fixes: aa75f4d3daae ("ext4: main fast-commit commit path")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.10+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221106224841.279231-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 02a7780e4d2fcf438ac6773bc469e7ada2af56be ]
We convert errno's to ext4 on-disk format error codes in
save_error_info(). Add a function and a bit of macro magic to make this
simpler.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127113405.26867-7-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4067662388f97d0f360e568820d9d5bac6a3c9fa ]
Just move error info related functions in super.c close to
ext4_handle_error(). We'll want to combine save_error_info() with
ext4_handle_error() and this makes change more obvious and saves a
forward declaration as well. No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201127113405.26867-6-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 89481b5fa8c0640e62ba84c6020cee895f7ac643 ]
When we used the journal_async_commit mounting option in nojournal mode,
the kernel told me that "can't mount with journal_checksum", was very
confusing. I find that when we mount with journal_async_commit, both the
JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT and EXPLICIT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM flags are set. However,
in the error branch, CHECKSUM is checked before ASYNC_COMMIT. As a result,
the above inconsistency occurs, and the ASYNC_COMMIT branch becomes dead
code that cannot be executed. Therefore, we exchange the positions of the
two judgments to make the error msg more accurate.
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221109074343.4184862-1-libaokun1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 43bd6f1b49b61f43de4d4e33661b8dbe8c911f14 ]
Before these two branches neither loaded the journal nor created the
xattr cache. So the right label to goto is 'failed_mount3a'. Although
this did not cause any issues because the error handler validated if the
pointer is null. However this still made me confused when reading
the code. So it's still worth to modify to goto the right label.
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <ritesh.list@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220916141527.1012715-2-yanaijie@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Stable-dep-of: 89481b5fa8c0 ("ext4: correct inconsistent error msg in nojournal mode")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 63d5429f68a3d4c4aa27e65a05196c17f86c41d6 ]
Using strncpy() on NUL-terminated strings are deprecated. To avoid
possible forming of non-terminated string strscpy() should be used.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+
Signed-off-by: Artem Chernyshev <artem.chernyshev@red-soft.ru>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit cc12a6f25e07ed05d5825a1664b67a970842b2ca upstream.
Now, extended attribute value maximum length is 64K. The memory
requested here does not need continuous physical addresses, so it is
appropriate to use kvmalloc to request memory. At the same time, it
can also cope with the situation that the extended attribute will
become longer in the future.
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221208023233.1231330-3-yebin@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8994d11395f8165b3deca1971946f549f0822630 upstream.
When expanding inode space in ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea() we may need
to allocate external xattr block. If quota is not initialized for the
inode, the block allocation will not be accounted into quota usage. Make
sure the quota is initialized before we try to expand inode space.
Reported-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Y5BT+k6xWqthZc1P@xpf.sh.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221207115937.26601-2-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1485f726c6dec1a1f85438f2962feaa3d585526f upstream.
Make sure we initialize quotas before possibly expanding inode space
(and thus maybe needing to allocate external xattr block) in
ext4_ioctl_setproject(). This prevents not accounting the necessary
block allocation.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221207115937.26601-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e4db04f7d3dbbe16680e0ded27ea2a65b10f766a upstream.
There is issue as follows when do setxattr with inject fault:
[localhost]# fsck.ext4 -fn /dev/sda
e2fsck 1.46.6-rc1 (12-Sep-2022)
Pass 1: Checking inodes, blocks, and sizes
Pass 2: Checking directory structure
Pass 3: Checking directory connectivity
Pass 4: Checking reference counts
Unattached zero-length inode 15. Clear? no
Unattached inode 15
Connect to /lost+found? no
Pass 5: Checking group summary information
/dev/sda: ********** WARNING: Filesystem still has errors **********
/dev/sda: 15/655360 files (0.0% non-contiguous), 66755/2621440 blocks
This occurs in 'ext4_xattr_inode_create()'. If 'ext4_mark_inode_dirty()'
fails, dropping i_nlink of the inode is needed. Or will lead to inode leak.
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221208023233.1231330-5-yebin@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b40ebaf63851b3a401b0dc9263843538f64f5ce6 upstream.
Commit fb0a387dcdcd ("ext4: limit block allocations for indirect-block
files to < 2^32") added code to try to allocate xattr block with 32-bit
block number for indirect block based files on the grounds that these
files cannot use larger block numbers. It also added BUG_ON when
allocated block could not fit into 32 bits. This is however bogus
reasoning because xattr block is stored in inode->i_file_acl and
inode->i_file_acl_hi and as such even indirect block based files can
happily use full 48 bits for xattr block number. The proper handling
seems to be there basically since 64-bit block number support was added.
So remove the bogus limitation and BUG_ON.
Cc: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Fixes: fb0a387dcdcd ("ext4: limit block allocations for indirect-block files to < 2^32")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221121130929.32031-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 26d75a16af285a70863ba6a81f85d81e7e65da50 upstream.
If a block is out of range in ext4_get_branch(), -ENOMEM will be returned
to user-space. Obviously, this error code isn't really useful. This
patch fixes it by making sure the right error code (-EFSCORRUPTED) is
propagated to user-space. EUCLEAN is more informative than ENOMEM.
Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221109181445.17843-1-lhenriques@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0aeaa2559d6d53358fca3e3fce73807367adca74 upstream.
When a backup superblock is updated in update_backups(), the primary
superblock's offset in the group (that is, sbi->s_sbh->b_blocknr) is used
as the backup superblock's offset in its group. However, when the block
size is 1K and bigalloc is enabled, the two offsets are not equal. This
causes the backup group descriptors to be overwritten by the superblock
in update_backups(). Moreover, if meta_bg is enabled, the file system will
be corrupted because this feature uses backup group descriptors.
To solve this issue, we use a more accurate ext4_group_first_block_no() as
the offset of the backup superblock in its group.
Fixes: d77147ff443b ("ext4: add support for online resizing with bigalloc")
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117040341.1380702-4-libaokun1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 131294c35ed6f777bd4e79d42af13b5c41bf2775 upstream.
When converting files with inline data to extents, delayed allocations
made on a file system created with both the bigalloc and inline options
can result in invalid extent status cache content, incorrect reserved
cluster counts, kernel memory leaks, and potential kernel panics.
With bigalloc, the code that determines whether a block must be
delayed allocated searches the extent tree to see if that block maps
to a previously allocated cluster. If not, the block is delayed
allocated, and otherwise, it isn't. However, if the inline option is
also used, and if the file containing the block is marked as able to
store data inline, there isn't a valid extent tree associated with
the file. The current code in ext4_clu_mapped() calls
ext4_find_extent() to search the non-existent tree for a previously
allocated cluster anyway, which typically finds nothing, as desired.
However, a side effect of the search can be to cache invalid content
from the non-existent tree (garbage) in the extent status tree,
including bogus entries in the pending reservation tree.
To fix this, avoid searching the extent tree when allocating blocks
for bigalloc + inline files that are being converted from inline to
extent mapped.
Signed-off-by: Eric Whitney <enwlinux@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117152207.2424-1-enwlinux@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 991ed014de0840c5dc405b679168924afb2952ac upstream.
We got a issue as fllows:
==================================================================
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents_status.c:203!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 1 PID: 945 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.0.0-next-20221007-dirty #349
RIP: 0010:ext4_es_end.isra.0+0x34/0x42
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000143b768 EFLAGS: 00010203
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881769cd0b8 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8fc27cf7 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: ffff8881769cd0bc R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffc9000143b5f8
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8881769cd0a0
R13: ffff8881768e5668 R14: 00000000768e52f0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f359f7f05c0(0000)GS:ffff88842fd00000(0000)knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f359f5a2000 CR3: 000000017130c000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__es_tree_search.isra.0+0x6d/0xf5
ext4_es_cache_extent+0xfa/0x230
ext4_cache_extents+0xd2/0x110
ext4_find_extent+0x5d5/0x8c0
ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x9c/0x1d30
ext4_map_blocks+0x431/0xa50
ext4_mpage_readpages+0x48e/0xe40
ext4_readahead+0x47/0x50
read_pages+0x82/0x530
page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x199/0x2a0
do_page_cache_ra+0x47/0x70
page_cache_ra_order+0x242/0x400
ondemand_readahead+0x1e8/0x4b0
page_cache_sync_ra+0xf4/0x110
filemap_get_pages+0x131/0xb20
filemap_read+0xda/0x4b0
generic_file_read_iter+0x13a/0x250
ext4_file_read_iter+0x59/0x1d0
vfs_read+0x28f/0x460
ksys_read+0x73/0x160
__x64_sys_read+0x1e/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
</TASK>
==================================================================
In the above issue, ioctl invokes the swap_inode_boot_loader function to
swap inode<5> and inode<12>. However, inode<5> contain incorrect imode and
disordered extents, and i_nlink is set to 1. The extents check for inode in
the ext4_iget function can be bypassed bacause 5 is EXT4_BOOT_LOADER_INO.
While links_count is set to 1, the extents are not initialized in
swap_inode_boot_loader. After the ioctl command is executed successfully,
the extents are swapped to inode<12>, in this case, run the `cat` command
to view inode<12>. And Bug_ON is triggered due to the incorrect extents.
When the boot loader inode is not initialized, its imode can be one of the
following:
1) the imode is a bad type, which is marked as bad_inode in ext4_iget and
set to S_IFREG.
2) the imode is good type but not S_IFREG.
3) the imode is S_IFREG.
The BUG_ON may be triggered by bypassing the check in cases 1 and 2.
Therefore, when the boot loader inode is bad_inode or its imode is not
S_IFREG, initialize the inode to avoid triggering the BUG.
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221026042310.3839669-5-libaokun1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 318cdc822c63b6e2befcfdc2088378ae6fa18def upstream.
In ext4_evict_inode(), if we evicting an inode in the 'no_delete' path,
it cannot be raced by another mark_inode_dirty(). If it happens,
someone else may accidentally dirty it without holding inode refcount
and probably cause use-after-free issues in the writeback procedure.
It's indiscoverable and hard to debug, so add an WARN_ON_ONCE() to
check and detect this issue in advance.
Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220629112647.4141034-2-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
