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We already synthesize records for both "root" and "nobody" in
nss-systemd. Let's do the same in our own NSS wrappers that are supposed
to bypass NSS if possible. Previously this was done for "root" only, but
let's clean this up, and do the same for "nobody" too, so that we
synthesize records the same way everywhere, regardless whether in NSS or
internally.
This adds uid_is_system() and gid_is_system(), similar in style to
uid_is_dynamic(). That a helper like this is useful is illustrated by
the fact that test-condition.c didn't get the check right so far, which
this patch fixes.
This adds a new flavour of strextend(), called
strextend_with_separator(), which takes an optional separator string. If
specified, the separator is inserted between each appended string, as
well as before the first one, but only if the original string was
non-empty.
This new call is particularly useful when appending new options to mount
option strings and suchlike, which need to be comma-separated, and
initially start out from an empty string.
Let's optimize things a bit, and instead of having to strip whitespace
first before decoding base64, let's do that implicitly while doing so.
Given that base64 was designed the way it was designed specifically to
be tolerant to whitespace changes, it's a good idea to do this
automatically and implicitly.
Now the function returns an empty string when given an empty string.
Not sure if this is the best option (maybe this should be an error?),
but at least the behaviour is well defined.
The kernel will reply with -ENOTDIR when we try to access a non-directory under
a name which ends with a slash. But our functions would strip the trailing slash
under various circumstances. Keep the trailing slash, so that
path_is_mount_point("/path/to/file/") return -ENOTDIR when /path/to/file/ is a file.
Tests are added for this change in behaviour.
Also, when called with a trailing slash, path_is_mount_point() would get
"" from basename(), and call name_to_handle_at(3, "", ...), and always
return -ENOENT. Now it'll return -ENOTDIR if the mount point is a file, and
true if it is a directory and a mount point.
v2:
- use strip_trailing_chars()
v3:
- instead of stripping trailing chars(), do the opposite — preserve them.
The code in install-printf.c and unit-printf.c for these is pretty much
the same and very generic. Let's move this all over to the generic
specifier.c, and share the implementations.
The test was written so far under the assumption that if two mounts are
placed onto the same location the "upper" mount is listed later in
/proc/self/mountinfo. This appears not to be guaranteed however, as
running the tests in a normal nspawn shows.
This patch fixes that: it reverses the hashmap of mounts we build:
instead of keying by path, we key by mnt_id, and if we notice that
path_get_mnt_id() doesn't match what a line in /proc/self/mountinfo
says, we use the returned ID to check if maybe another line agrees.
Fixes: #7431
This is a simple wrapper around name_to_handle_at_loop() and
fd_fdinfo_mnt_id() to query the mnt ID of a path. It uses
name_to_handle_at() where it can, and falls back to to
fd_fdinfo_mnt_id() where that doesn't work.
This is a best-effort thing of course, since neither name_to_handle_at()
nor the fdinfo logic work on all kernels.
First of all, let's rename it to read_etc_hostname(), to make clearer
what kind of configuration it actually reads: the file format defined in
/etc/hostname and nothing else.
Secondly: let's port this to use read_line(), i.e. the new way to read
lines from a file in a safe, bounded way.
Thirdly: let's strip leading/trailing whitespace from what we are
reading. Given that we are already pretty lenient what we read (comments
and empty lines), let's be permissive regarding whitespace too.
Fourthly: let's actually validate the hostname when reading it. So far
we tried to make it valid, but that's not always possible (for example,
we can't make an empty hostname valid, ever).
So far I avoided adding license headers to meson files, but they are pretty
big and important and should carry license headers like everything else.
I added my own copyright, even though other people modified those files too.
But this is mostly symbolic, so I hope that's OK.
All this function does is place some data in an in-memory read-only fd,
that may be read back to get the original data back.
Doing this in a way that works everywhere, given the different kernels
we support as well as different privilege levels is surprisingly
complex.
Linux doesn't have faccess(), hence let's emulate it. Linux has access()
and faccessat() but neither allows checking the access rights of an fd
passed in directly.
