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There will likely be none, hence don't bother.
This fixes an issue in systemd-gpt-auto-generator where we'll try to
wait for the udev db for the partitions even though though udev might
simplynot be around and via the DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_UDEV flag were
explicitly told not to bother.
Fixes: #19377
Without this parameter, we would allow user@ to start if the user
has no password (i.e. the password is "locked"). But when the user does have a password,
and it is marked as expired, we would refuse to start the service.
There are other authentication mechanisms and we should not tie this service to
the password state.
The documented way to disable an *account* is to call 'chage -E0'. With a disabled
account, user@.service will still refuse to start:
systemd[16598]: PAM failed: User account has expired
systemd[16598]: PAM failed: User account has expired
systemd[16598]: user@1005.service: Failed to set up PAM session: Operation not permitted
systemd[16598]: user@1005.service: Failed at step PAM spawning /usr/lib/systemd/systemd: Operation not permitted
systemd[1]: user@1005.service: Main process exited, code=exited, status=224/PAM
systemd[1]: user@1005.service: Failed with result 'exit-code'.
systemd[1]: Failed to start user@1005.service.
systemd[1]: Stopping user-runtime-dir@1005.service...
Fixes https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1961746.
Note that this means EFI-systems with a manually added TPM device won't
be supported automatically, but given that the TPM2 trust model kinda
requires firmware support I doubt it matters supporting this. And in all
other cases it speeds things up a bit.
No need to benchmark pbkdf when asking for minimal values
anyway.
1000 iterations count is minimum for both LUKS1 and LUKS2
pbkdf2 keyslot parameters according to NIST SP 800-132, ch. 5.2.
Iterations count can not be lower than recommended minimum
when benchmark is disabled. The time_ms member is ignored with
benchmark disabled.
Code using libcryptsetup already sets the global log function if it uses
dlopen_cryptsetup(). Make sure we do the same for the three programs
that explicitly link against libcryptsetup and hence to not use
dlopen_cryptsetup().
So far we only set the per-crypt_device log functions, but some
libcryptsetup calls we invoke without a crypt_device objects, and we
want those to redirect to our infra too.
We want user records to be extensible, hence we shouldn't complain about
fields we can't parse. In particular we want them to be extensible for
our own future extensions.
Some code already turned the permissive flag when parsing the JSON data,
but most did not. Fix that. A few select cases remain where the bit is
not set: where we just gnerated the JSON data ourselves, and thus can be
reasonably sure that if we can't parse it it's our immediate programming
error and not just us processing a user record from some other tool or a
newer version of ourselves.
This catches up homed's FIDO2 support with cryptsetup's: we'll now store
the uv/up/clientPin configuration at enrollment in the user record JSON
data, and use it when authenticating with it.
This also adds explicit "uv" support: we'll only allow it to happen when
the client explicity said it's OK. This is then used by clients to print
a nice message suggesting "uv" has to take place before retrying
allowing it this time. This is modelled after the existing handling for
"up".
Giving --echo to systemd-ask-password allows to echo the user input.
There's nothing secret, so do not show a lock and key emoji by default.
The behavior can be controlled with --emoji=yes|no|auto. The default is
auto, which defaults to yes, unless --echo is given.
In https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=34803, we fail with:
Assertion 'IN_SET(r, -ENOMEM, -EMFILE, -ENFILE)' failed at src/journal-remote/fuzz-journal-remote.c:69,
function int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *, size_t)(). Aborting.
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
Let's try to print the error, so maybe we can see what is going on.
With the previous commit we shouldn't print out anything.
Those are unexpected, so a user-visible message seems appropriate.
But they are not our errors, and to some extent we can recover from
them, so "warning" seems more appropriate than "error".
When fuzzing, the following happens:
- we parse 'data' and produce an argv array,
- one of the items in argv is assigned to arg_host,
- the argv array is subsequently freed by strv_freep(), and arg_host has a dangling symlink.
In normal use, argv is static, so arg_host can never become a dangling pointer.
In fuzz-systemctl-parse-argv, if we repeatedly parse the same array, we
have some dangling pointers while we're in the middle of parsing. If we parse
the same array a second time, at the end all the dangling pointers will have been
replaced again. But for a short time, if parsing one of the arguments uses another
argument, we would use a dangling pointer.
Such a case occurs when we have --host=… --boot-loader-entry=help. The latter calls
acquire_bus() which uses arg_host.
I'm not particularly happy with making the code more complicated just for
fuzzing, but I think it's better to resolve this, even if the issue cannot
occur in normal invocations, than to deal with fuzzer reports.
Should fix https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=31714.
This line is so long, that the end is usually not visible on
the terminal. The dot looks out of place, and dropping it saves one
column for more interesting content.
When looking at logs from a boot with an encrypted device, I see
(with unrelevant messages snipped):
[ 2.751692] systemd[1]: Started Dispatch Password Requests to Console.
[ 7.929199] systemd-cryptsetup[258]: Set cipher aes, mode xts-plain64, key size 512 bits for device /dev/disk/by-uuid/2d9b648a-15b1-4204-988b-ec085089f8ce.
[ 9.499483] systemd[1]: Finished Cryptography Setup for luks-2d9b648a-15b1-4204-988b-ec085089f8ce.
There is a hug gap in timing without any explanatory message. If I didn't type
in the password, there would be no way to figure out why things blocked from
this log, so let's log something to the log too.
0cf8469387 added --console.
6af621248f added an optional argument, but didn't
update the help texts.
Note that there is no ambiguity with the optional argument because no positional
arguments are allowed.
Let's show the touch emoji whenever the user is likely going to have to
interact with the security token. We had this at many but not all such
messages. Let's add it everywhere.
Also, upgrade all messages where the user is supposed to do something to
LOG_NOTICE. Previously some where at LOG_NOTICE and others at LOG_INFO.
These messages are more than informational after all, they require user
action, hence deserve the higher prio, in particular as that formats
them bold with our usual log coloring.
Always use the word "test" in log messages, instead of "check".
Finally, always use the same wording: "confirm presence on security
token" for "up" and "verify user on security token" for "uv"
Let's improve compatibility with systemd 248 enrollments of FIDO2 keys:
if we have no information about the up/uv/pin settings, let's try to
determine them automatically, i.e. use up and pin if needed.
This only has an effect on LUKS2 volumes where a FIDO2 key was enrolled
with systemd 248 and thus the JSON data lacks the up/uv/pin fields. It
also matters if the user configured FIDO2 parameters explicitly via
crypttab options, so that the JSON data is not used.
For newer enrollments we'll stick to the explicit settings, as that's
generally much safer and robust.
We need really need to trust the feature set, since we are about to set
it in stone storing the result in JSON, hence react a bit more allergic
about token that misadvertise the feature.
Note that I added this to be defensive, I am not aware any token that
actually misadvertises this. hence it should be safe to make this fatal,
and should this not work we can always revisit things.
Let's try to handle keys gracefully that do not implement all features
we ask for: simply turn the feature off, and continue.
This is in particular relevant since we enroll with PIN and UP by
default, and on devices that don't support that we should just work.
Replaces: #18509
