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/*
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Unix SMB / CIFS implementation .
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uid / user handling
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Copyright ( C ) Andrew Tridgell 1992 - 1998
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This program is free software ; you can redistribute it and / or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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the Free Software Foundation ; either version 3 of the License , or
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( at your option ) any later version .
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This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful ,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY ; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE . See the
GNU General Public License for more details .
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You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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along with this program . If not , see < http : //www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*/
# include "includes.h"
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# include "system/passwd.h"
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# include "smbd/smbd.h"
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# include "smbd/globals.h"
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# include "../librpc/gen_ndr/netlogon.h"
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# include "libcli/security/security.h"
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# include "passdb/lookup_sid.h"
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# include "auth.h"
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# include "../auth/auth_util.h"
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# include "source3/lib/substitute.h"
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/* what user is current? */
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extern struct current_user current_user ;
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/****************************************************************************
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Become the guest user without changing the security context stack .
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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bool change_to_guest ( void )
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{
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struct passwd * pass ;
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pass = Get_Pwnam_alloc ( talloc_tos ( ) , lp_guest_account ( ) ) ;
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if ( ! pass ) {
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return false ;
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}
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# ifdef AIX
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/* MWW: From AIX FAQ patch to WU-ftpd: call initgroups before
setting IDs */
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initgroups ( pass - > pw_name , pass - > pw_gid ) ;
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# endif
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set_sec_ctx ( pass - > pw_uid , pass - > pw_gid , 0 , NULL , NULL ) ;
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current_user . conn = NULL ;
current_user . vuid = UID_FIELD_INVALID ;
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TALLOC_FREE ( pass ) ;
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return true ;
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}
Fix bug #6315 smbd crashes doing vfs_full_audit on IPC$ close event.
The underlying problem
is that once SMBulogoff is called, all server_info contexts associated with the
vuid should become invalid, even if that's the context being currently used by
the connection struct (tid). When the SMBtdis comes in it doesn't need a valid
vuid value, but the code called inside vfs_full_audit always assumes that there
is one (and hence a valid conn->server_info pointer) available.
This is actually a bug inside the vfs_full_audit and other code inside Samba,
which should only indirect conn->server_info on calls which require AS_USER to
be set in our process table. I could fix all these issues, but there's no
guarentee that someone might not add more code that fails this assumption, as
it's a hard assumption to break (it's usually true).
So what I've done is to ensure that on SMBulogoff the previously used
conn->server_info struct is kept around to be used for print debugging purposes
(it won't be used to change to an invalid user context, as such calls need
AS_USER set). This isn't strictly correct, as there's no association with the
(now invalid) context being freed and the call that causes conn->server_info to
be indirected, but it's good enough for most cases.
The hard part was to ensure that once a valid context is used again (via new
sessionsetupX calls, or new calls on a still valid vuid on this tid) that we
don't leak memory by simply replacing the stored conn->server_info pointer. We
would never actually leak the memory (as all conn->server_info pointers are
talloc children of conn), but with the previous patch a malicious client could
cause many server_info structs to be talloced by the right combination of SMB
calls. This new patch introduces free_conn_server_info_if_unused(), which
protects against the above.
Jeremy.
2009-05-04 19:31:40 +04:00
/****************************************************************************
2011-02-21 12:25:52 +03:00
talloc free the conn - > session_info if not used in the vuid cache .
Fix bug #6315 smbd crashes doing vfs_full_audit on IPC$ close event.
The underlying problem
is that once SMBulogoff is called, all server_info contexts associated with the
vuid should become invalid, even if that's the context being currently used by
the connection struct (tid). When the SMBtdis comes in it doesn't need a valid
vuid value, but the code called inside vfs_full_audit always assumes that there
is one (and hence a valid conn->server_info pointer) available.
This is actually a bug inside the vfs_full_audit and other code inside Samba,
which should only indirect conn->server_info on calls which require AS_USER to
be set in our process table. I could fix all these issues, but there's no
guarentee that someone might not add more code that fails this assumption, as
it's a hard assumption to break (it's usually true).
So what I've done is to ensure that on SMBulogoff the previously used
conn->server_info struct is kept around to be used for print debugging purposes
(it won't be used to change to an invalid user context, as such calls need
AS_USER set). This isn't strictly correct, as there's no association with the
(now invalid) context being freed and the call that causes conn->server_info to
be indirected, but it's good enough for most cases.
The hard part was to ensure that once a valid context is used again (via new
sessionsetupX calls, or new calls on a still valid vuid on this tid) that we
don't leak memory by simply replacing the stored conn->server_info pointer. We
would never actually leak the memory (as all conn->server_info pointers are
talloc children of conn), but with the previous patch a malicious client could
cause many server_info structs to be talloced by the right combination of SMB
calls. This new patch introduces free_conn_server_info_if_unused(), which
protects against the above.
Jeremy.
2009-05-04 19:31:40 +04:00
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2011-02-21 12:25:52 +03:00
static void free_conn_session_info_if_unused ( connection_struct * conn )
Fix bug #6315 smbd crashes doing vfs_full_audit on IPC$ close event.
The underlying problem
is that once SMBulogoff is called, all server_info contexts associated with the
vuid should become invalid, even if that's the context being currently used by
the connection struct (tid). When the SMBtdis comes in it doesn't need a valid
vuid value, but the code called inside vfs_full_audit always assumes that there
is one (and hence a valid conn->server_info pointer) available.
This is actually a bug inside the vfs_full_audit and other code inside Samba,
which should only indirect conn->server_info on calls which require AS_USER to
be set in our process table. I could fix all these issues, but there's no
guarentee that someone might not add more code that fails this assumption, as
it's a hard assumption to break (it's usually true).
So what I've done is to ensure that on SMBulogoff the previously used
conn->server_info struct is kept around to be used for print debugging purposes
(it won't be used to change to an invalid user context, as such calls need
AS_USER set). This isn't strictly correct, as there's no association with the
(now invalid) context being freed and the call that causes conn->server_info to
be indirected, but it's good enough for most cases.
The hard part was to ensure that once a valid context is used again (via new
sessionsetupX calls, or new calls on a still valid vuid on this tid) that we
don't leak memory by simply replacing the stored conn->server_info pointer. We
would never actually leak the memory (as all conn->server_info pointers are
talloc children of conn), but with the previous patch a malicious client could
cause many server_info structs to be talloced by the right combination of SMB
calls. This new patch introduces free_conn_server_info_if_unused(), which
protects against the above.
Jeremy.
2009-05-04 19:31:40 +04:00
{
unsigned int i ;
for ( i = 0 ; i < VUID_CACHE_SIZE ; i + + ) {
struct vuid_cache_entry * ent ;
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ent = & conn - > vuid_cache - > array [ i ] ;
Fix bug #6315 smbd crashes doing vfs_full_audit on IPC$ close event.
The underlying problem
is that once SMBulogoff is called, all server_info contexts associated with the
vuid should become invalid, even if that's the context being currently used by
the connection struct (tid). When the SMBtdis comes in it doesn't need a valid
vuid value, but the code called inside vfs_full_audit always assumes that there
is one (and hence a valid conn->server_info pointer) available.
This is actually a bug inside the vfs_full_audit and other code inside Samba,
which should only indirect conn->server_info on calls which require AS_USER to
be set in our process table. I could fix all these issues, but there's no
guarentee that someone might not add more code that fails this assumption, as
it's a hard assumption to break (it's usually true).
So what I've done is to ensure that on SMBulogoff the previously used
conn->server_info struct is kept around to be used for print debugging purposes
(it won't be used to change to an invalid user context, as such calls need
AS_USER set). This isn't strictly correct, as there's no association with the
(now invalid) context being freed and the call that causes conn->server_info to
be indirected, but it's good enough for most cases.
The hard part was to ensure that once a valid context is used again (via new
sessionsetupX calls, or new calls on a still valid vuid on this tid) that we
don't leak memory by simply replacing the stored conn->server_info pointer. We
would never actually leak the memory (as all conn->server_info pointers are
talloc children of conn), but with the previous patch a malicious client could
cause many server_info structs to be talloced by the right combination of SMB
calls. This new patch introduces free_conn_server_info_if_unused(), which
protects against the above.
Jeremy.
2009-05-04 19:31:40 +04:00
if ( ent - > vuid ! = UID_FIELD_INVALID & &
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conn - > session_info = = ent - > session_info ) {
Fix bug #6315 smbd crashes doing vfs_full_audit on IPC$ close event.
The underlying problem
is that once SMBulogoff is called, all server_info contexts associated with the
vuid should become invalid, even if that's the context being currently used by
the connection struct (tid). When the SMBtdis comes in it doesn't need a valid
vuid value, but the code called inside vfs_full_audit always assumes that there
is one (and hence a valid conn->server_info pointer) available.
This is actually a bug inside the vfs_full_audit and other code inside Samba,
which should only indirect conn->server_info on calls which require AS_USER to
be set in our process table. I could fix all these issues, but there's no
guarentee that someone might not add more code that fails this assumption, as
it's a hard assumption to break (it's usually true).
So what I've done is to ensure that on SMBulogoff the previously used
conn->server_info struct is kept around to be used for print debugging purposes
(it won't be used to change to an invalid user context, as such calls need
AS_USER set). This isn't strictly correct, as there's no association with the
(now invalid) context being freed and the call that causes conn->server_info to
be indirected, but it's good enough for most cases.
The hard part was to ensure that once a valid context is used again (via new
sessionsetupX calls, or new calls on a still valid vuid on this tid) that we
don't leak memory by simply replacing the stored conn->server_info pointer. We
would never actually leak the memory (as all conn->server_info pointers are
talloc children of conn), but with the previous patch a malicious client could
cause many server_info structs to be talloced by the right combination of SMB
calls. This new patch introduces free_conn_server_info_if_unused(), which
protects against the above.
Jeremy.
2009-05-04 19:31:40 +04:00
return ;
}
}
/* Not used, safe to free. */
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TALLOC_FREE ( conn - > session_info ) ;
Fix bug #6315 smbd crashes doing vfs_full_audit on IPC$ close event.
The underlying problem
is that once SMBulogoff is called, all server_info contexts associated with the
vuid should become invalid, even if that's the context being currently used by
the connection struct (tid). When the SMBtdis comes in it doesn't need a valid
vuid value, but the code called inside vfs_full_audit always assumes that there
is one (and hence a valid conn->server_info pointer) available.
This is actually a bug inside the vfs_full_audit and other code inside Samba,
which should only indirect conn->server_info on calls which require AS_USER to
be set in our process table. I could fix all these issues, but there's no
guarentee that someone might not add more code that fails this assumption, as
it's a hard assumption to break (it's usually true).
So what I've done is to ensure that on SMBulogoff the previously used
conn->server_info struct is kept around to be used for print debugging purposes
(it won't be used to change to an invalid user context, as such calls need
AS_USER set). This isn't strictly correct, as there's no association with the
(now invalid) context being freed and the call that causes conn->server_info to
be indirected, but it's good enough for most cases.
The hard part was to ensure that once a valid context is used again (via new
sessionsetupX calls, or new calls on a still valid vuid on this tid) that we
don't leak memory by simply replacing the stored conn->server_info pointer. We
would never actually leak the memory (as all conn->server_info pointers are
talloc children of conn), but with the previous patch a malicious client could
cause many server_info structs to be talloced by the right combination of SMB
calls. This new patch introduces free_conn_server_info_if_unused(), which
protects against the above.
Jeremy.
2009-05-04 19:31:40 +04:00
}
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/****************************************************************************
Setup the share access mask for a connection .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
static uint32_t create_share_access_mask ( int snum ,
bool readonly_share ,
const struct security_token * token )
{
uint32_t share_access = 0 ;
share_access_check ( token ,
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lp_const_servicename ( snum ) ,
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MAXIMUM_ALLOWED_ACCESS ,
& share_access ) ;
if ( readonly_share ) {
share_access & =
~ ( SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA | SEC_FILE_APPEND_DATA |
SEC_FILE_WRITE_EA | SEC_FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTE |
SEC_DIR_DELETE_CHILD ) ;
}
if ( security_token_has_privilege ( token , SEC_PRIV_SECURITY ) ) {
share_access | = SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY ;
}
if ( security_token_has_privilege ( token , SEC_PRIV_RESTORE ) ) {
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share_access | = SEC_RIGHTS_PRIV_RESTORE ;
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}
if ( security_token_has_privilege ( token , SEC_PRIV_BACKUP ) ) {
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share_access | = SEC_RIGHTS_PRIV_BACKUP ;
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}
if ( security_token_has_privilege ( token , SEC_PRIV_TAKE_OWNERSHIP ) ) {
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share_access | = SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER ;
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}
return share_access ;
}
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/*******************************************************************
Calculate access mask and if this user can access this share .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
NTSTATUS check_user_share_access ( connection_struct * conn ,
const struct auth_session_info * session_info ,
uint32_t * p_share_access ,
bool * p_readonly_share )
{
int snum = SNUM ( conn ) ;
uint32_t share_access = 0 ;
bool readonly_share = false ;
if ( ! user_ok_token ( session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
session_info - > info - > domain_name ,
session_info - > security_token , snum ) ) {
return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
}
readonly_share = is_share_read_only_for_token (
session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
session_info - > info - > domain_name ,
session_info - > security_token ,
conn ) ;
share_access = create_share_access_mask ( snum ,
readonly_share ,
session_info - > security_token ) ;
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if ( ( share_access & ( FILE_READ_DATA | FILE_WRITE_DATA ) ) = = 0 ) {
/* No access, read or write. */
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DBG_NOTICE ( " user %s connection to %s denied due to share "
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" security descriptor. \n " ,
session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
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lp_const_servicename ( snum ) ) ;
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return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED ;
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}
if ( ! readonly_share & &
! ( share_access & FILE_WRITE_DATA ) ) {
/* smb.conf allows r/w, but the security descriptor denies
* write . Fall back to looking at readonly . */
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readonly_share = true ;
DBG_INFO ( " falling back to read-only access-evaluation due to "
" security descriptor \n " ) ;
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}
* p_share_access = share_access ;
* p_readonly_share = readonly_share ;
return NT_STATUS_OK ;
}
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/*******************************************************************
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Check if a username is OK .
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2011-02-21 12:25:52 +03:00
This sets up conn - > session_info with a copy related to this vuser that
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later code can then mess with .
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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static bool check_user_ok ( connection_struct * conn ,
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uint64_t vuid ,
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const struct auth_session_info * session_info ,
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int snum )
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{
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unsigned int i ;
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bool readonly_share = false ;
bool admin_user = false ;
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struct vuid_cache_entry * ent = NULL ;
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uint32_t share_access = 0 ;
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NTSTATUS status ;
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for ( i = 0 ; i < VUID_CACHE_SIZE ; i + + ) {
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ent = & conn - > vuid_cache - > array [ i ] ;
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if ( ent - > vuid = = vuid ) {
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if ( vuid = = UID_FIELD_INVALID ) {
/*
* Slow path , we don ' t care
* about the array traversal .
*/
continue ;
}
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free_conn_session_info_if_unused ( conn ) ;
conn - > session_info = ent - > session_info ;
conn - > read_only = ent - > read_only ;
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conn - > share_access = ent - > share_access ;
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conn - > vuid = ent - > vuid ;
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return ( True ) ;
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}
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}
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status = check_user_share_access ( conn ,
session_info ,
& share_access ,
& readonly_share ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
return false ;
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}
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admin_user = token_contains_name_in_list (
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session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
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session_info - > info - > domain_name ,
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NULL , session_info - > security_token , lp_admin_users ( snum ) ) ;
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2012-12-21 02:42:55 +04:00
ent = & conn - > vuid_cache - > array [ conn - > vuid_cache - > next_entry ] ;
2008-05-07 17:51:42 +04:00
2012-12-21 02:42:55 +04:00
conn - > vuid_cache - > next_entry =
( conn - > vuid_cache - > next_entry + 1 ) % VUID_CACHE_SIZE ;
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2012-12-20 23:53:11 +04:00
TALLOC_FREE ( ent - > session_info ) ;
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2012-12-20 23:53:11 +04:00
/*
* If force_user was set , all session_info ' s are based on the same
* username - based faked one .
*/
2008-05-11 02:25:27 +04:00
2012-12-20 23:53:11 +04:00
ent - > session_info = copy_session_info (
conn , conn - > force_user ? conn - > session_info : session_info ) ;
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2012-12-20 23:53:11 +04:00
if ( ent - > session_info = = NULL ) {
ent - > vuid = UID_FIELD_INVALID ;
return false ;
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}
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2018-05-03 16:04:30 +03:00
if ( admin_user ) {
DEBUG ( 2 , ( " check_user_ok: user %s is an admin user. "
" Setting uid as %d \n " ,
ent - > session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
sec_initial_uid ( ) ) ) ;
ent - > session_info - > unix_token - > uid = sec_initial_uid ( ) ;
}
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/*
* It ' s actually OK to call check_user_ok ( ) with
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* vuid = = UID_FIELD_INVALID as called from become_user_by_session ( ) .
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* All this will do is throw away one entry in the cache .
*/
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ent - > vuid = vuid ;
ent - > read_only = readonly_share ;
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ent - > share_access = share_access ;
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free_conn_session_info_if_unused ( conn ) ;
conn - > session_info = ent - > session_info ;
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conn - > vuid = ent - > vuid ;
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if ( vuid = = UID_FIELD_INVALID ) {
/*
* Not strictly needed , just make it really
* clear this entry is actually an unused one .
*/
ent - > read_only = false ;
ent - > share_access = 0 ;
ent - > session_info = NULL ;
}
2012-12-20 23:53:11 +04:00
2008-12-04 22:20:57 +03:00
conn - > read_only = readonly_share ;
2013-01-05 02:25:55 +04:00
conn - > share_access = share_access ;
2000-08-02 06:11:55 +04:00
return ( True ) ;
1996-06-01 19:25:30 +04:00
}
2019-07-12 22:10:35 +03:00
static void print_impersonation_info ( connection_struct * conn )
{
struct smb_filename * cwdfname = NULL ;
if ( ! CHECK_DEBUGLVL ( DBGLVL_INFO ) ) {
return ;
}
cwdfname = vfs_GetWd ( talloc_tos ( ) , conn ) ;
if ( cwdfname = = NULL ) {
return ;
}
DBG_INFO ( " Impersonated user: uid=(%d,%d), gid=(%d,%d), cwd=[%s] \n " ,
( int ) getuid ( ) ,
( int ) geteuid ( ) ,
( int ) getgid ( ) ,
( int ) getegid ( ) ,
cwdfname - > base_name ) ;
TALLOC_FREE ( cwdfname ) ;
}
delineation between smb and msrpc more marked. smbd now constructs
pdus, and then feeds them over either a "local" function call or a "remote"
function call to an msrpc service. the "remote" msrpc daemon, on the
other side of a unix socket, then calls the same "local" function that
smbd would, if the msrpc service were being run from inside smbd.
this allows a transition from local msrpc services (inside the same smbd
process) to remote (over a unix socket).
removed reference to pipes_struct in msrpc services. all msrpc processing
functions take rpcsrv_struct which is a structure containing state info
for the msrpc functions to decode and create pdus.
created become_vuser() which does everything not related to connection_struct
that become_user() does.
removed, as best i could, connection_struct dependencies from the nt spoolss
printing code.
todo: remove dcinfo from rpcsrv_struct because this stores NETLOGON-specific
info on a per-connection basis, and if the connection dies then so does
the info, and that's a fairly serious problem.
had to put pretty much everything that is in user_struct into parse_creds.c
to feed unix user info over to the msrpc daemons. why? because it's
expensive to do unix password/group database lookups, and it's definitely
expensive to do nt user profile lookups, not to mention pretty difficult
and if you did either of these it would introduce a complication /
unnecessary interdependency. so, send uid/gid/num_groups/gid_t* +
SID+num_rids+domain_group_rids* + unix username + nt username + nt domain
+ user session key etc. this is the MINIMUM info identified so far that's
actually implemented. missing bits include the called and calling
netbios names etc. (basically, anything that can be loaded into
standard_sub() and standard_sub_basic()...)
(This used to be commit aa3c659a8dba0437c17c60055a6ed30fdfecdb6d)
1999-12-12 04:25:49 +03:00
/****************************************************************************
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
Become the user of a connection number without changing the security context
2006-01-14 00:22:25 +03:00
stack , but modify the current_user entries .
delineation between smb and msrpc more marked. smbd now constructs
pdus, and then feeds them over either a "local" function call or a "remote"
function call to an msrpc service. the "remote" msrpc daemon, on the
other side of a unix socket, then calls the same "local" function that
smbd would, if the msrpc service were being run from inside smbd.
this allows a transition from local msrpc services (inside the same smbd
process) to remote (over a unix socket).
removed reference to pipes_struct in msrpc services. all msrpc processing
functions take rpcsrv_struct which is a structure containing state info
for the msrpc functions to decode and create pdus.
created become_vuser() which does everything not related to connection_struct
that become_user() does.
removed, as best i could, connection_struct dependencies from the nt spoolss
printing code.
todo: remove dcinfo from rpcsrv_struct because this stores NETLOGON-specific
info on a per-connection basis, and if the connection dies then so does
the info, and that's a fairly serious problem.
had to put pretty much everything that is in user_struct into parse_creds.c
to feed unix user info over to the msrpc daemons. why? because it's
expensive to do unix password/group database lookups, and it's definitely
expensive to do nt user profile lookups, not to mention pretty difficult
and if you did either of these it would introduce a complication /
unnecessary interdependency. so, send uid/gid/num_groups/gid_t* +
SID+num_rids+domain_group_rids* + unix username + nt username + nt domain
+ user session key etc. this is the MINIMUM info identified so far that's
actually implemented. missing bits include the called and calling
netbios names etc. (basically, anything that can be loaded into
standard_sub() and standard_sub_basic()...)
(This used to be commit aa3c659a8dba0437c17c60055a6ed30fdfecdb6d)
1999-12-12 04:25:49 +03:00
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2019-07-11 18:02:15 +03:00
static bool change_to_user_impersonate ( connection_struct * conn ,
const struct auth_session_info * session_info ,
uint64_t vuid )
1996-06-01 19:25:30 +04:00
{
2019-10-31 19:56:56 +03:00
const struct loadparm_substitution * lp_sub =
loadparm_s3_global_substitution ( ) ;
1998-09-30 00:24:17 +04:00
int snum ;
2000-06-23 09:57:20 +04:00
gid_t gid ;
1998-09-30 00:24:17 +04:00
uid_t uid ;
2019-01-19 01:24:30 +03:00
const char * force_group_name ;
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
char group_c ;
2007-05-18 02:27:42 +04:00
int num_groups = 0 ;
gid_t * group_list = NULL ;
2011-04-05 15:54:31 +04:00
bool ok ;
1996-06-01 19:25:30 +04:00
2018-06-12 16:39:51 +03:00
if ( ( current_user . conn = = conn ) & &
( current_user . vuid = = vuid ) & &
( current_user . ut . uid = = session_info - > unix_token - > uid ) )
{
DBG_INFO ( " Skipping user change - already user \n " ) ;
return true ;
}
2018-05-25 15:22:43 +03:00
set_current_user_info ( session_info - > unix_info - > sanitized_username ,
session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
session_info - > info - > domain_name ) ;
1998-08-14 21:38:29 +04:00
snum = SNUM ( conn ) ;
2011-04-05 15:54:31 +04:00
ok = check_user_ok ( conn , vuid , session_info , snum ) ;
if ( ! ok ) {
2018-06-25 03:19:34 +03:00
DBG_WARNING ( " SMB user %s (unix user %s) "
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
" not permitted access to share %s. \n " ,
2011-07-15 09:55:31 +04:00
session_info - > unix_info - > sanitized_username ,
session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
2018-06-25 03:19:34 +03:00
lp_const_servicename ( snum ) ) ;
2008-12-04 22:20:57 +03:00
return false ;
2004-05-18 04:26:06 +04:00
}
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
uid = conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > uid ;
gid = conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > gid ;
num_groups = conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > ngroups ;
group_list = conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > groups ;
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
/*
2011-04-05 15:54:31 +04:00
* See if we should force group for this service . If so this overrides
* any group set in the force user code .
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
*/
2019-10-31 19:56:56 +03:00
force_group_name = lp_force_group ( talloc_tos ( ) , lp_sub , snum ) ;
2019-01-19 01:24:30 +03:00
group_c = * force_group_name ;
2006-02-04 01:19:41 +03:00
2019-01-19 01:24:30 +03:00
if ( ( group_c ! = ' \0 ' ) & & ( conn - > force_group_gid = = ( gid_t ) - 1 ) ) {
/*
* This can happen if " force group " is added to a
* share definition whilst an existing connection
* to that share exists . In that case , don ' t change
* the existing credentials for force group , only
* do so for new connections .
*
* BUG : https : //bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13690
*/
DBG_INFO ( " Not forcing group %s on existing connection to "
" share %s for SMB user %s (unix user %s) \n " ,
force_group_name ,
lp_const_servicename ( snum ) ,
session_info - > unix_info - > sanitized_username ,
session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ) ;
}
if ( ( group_c ! = ' \0 ' ) & & ( conn - > force_group_gid ! = ( gid_t ) - 1 ) ) {
/*
* Only force group for connections where
* conn - > force_group_gid has already been set
* to the correct value ( i . e . the connection
* happened after the ' force group ' definition
* was added to the share definition . Connections
* that were made before force group was added
* should stay with their existing credentials .
*
* BUG : https : //bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13690
*/
2009-03-04 03:08:56 +03:00
2011-04-05 15:54:31 +04:00
if ( group_c = = ' + ' ) {
int i ;
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
/*
2011-04-05 15:54:31 +04:00
* Only force group if the user is a member of the
* service group . Check the group memberships for this
* user ( we already have this ) to see if we should force
* the group .
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
*/
2007-05-18 02:27:42 +04:00
for ( i = 0 ; i < num_groups ; i + + ) {
2011-04-05 15:54:31 +04:00
if ( group_list [ i ] = = conn - > force_group_gid ) {
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > gid =
2009-03-04 03:08:56 +03:00
conn - > force_group_gid ;
gid = conn - > force_group_gid ;
2011-02-21 12:25:52 +03:00
gid_to_sid ( & conn - > session_info - > security_token
2010-08-31 03:32:52 +04:00
- > sids [ 1 ] , gid ) ;
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
break ;
}
}
1998-08-14 21:38:29 +04:00
} else {
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > gid = conn - > force_group_gid ;
2009-03-04 03:08:56 +03:00
gid = conn - > force_group_gid ;
2011-02-21 12:25:52 +03:00
gid_to_sid ( & conn - > session_info - > security_token - > sids [ 1 ] ,
2008-05-08 17:09:02 +04:00
gid ) ;
1998-08-14 21:38:29 +04:00
}
}
2008-05-08 14:14:43 +04:00
2011-04-05 15:54:31 +04:00
set_sec_ctx ( uid ,
gid ,
2020-01-17 16:42:22 +03:00
num_groups ,
group_list ,
2011-02-21 12:25:52 +03:00
conn - > session_info - > security_token ) ;
1996-06-01 19:25:30 +04:00
1998-08-14 21:38:29 +04:00
current_user . conn = conn ;
current_user . vuid = vuid ;
2019-07-11 18:02:15 +03:00
return true ;
}
2019-07-13 17:17:17 +03:00
/**
* Impersonate user and change directory to service
*
* change_to_user_and_service ( ) is used to impersonate the user associated with
* the given vuid and to change the working directory of the process to the
* service base directory .
* */
bool change_to_user_and_service ( connection_struct * conn , uint64_t vuid )
2011-04-05 15:54:31 +04:00
{
int snum = SNUM ( conn ) ;
2020-01-01 03:06:45 +03:00
struct auth_session_info * si = NULL ;
NTSTATUS status ;
2019-07-16 15:11:22 +03:00
bool ok ;
2011-04-05 15:54:31 +04:00
2019-07-13 17:10:53 +03:00
if ( conn = = NULL ) {
DBG_WARNING ( " Connection not open \n " ) ;
return false ;
2011-04-05 15:54:31 +04:00
}
2020-01-01 03:06:45 +03:00
status = smbXsrv_session_info_lookup ( conn - > sconn - > client ,
vuid ,
& si ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
2018-06-25 03:19:34 +03:00
DBG_WARNING ( " Invalid vuid %llu used on share %s. \n " ,
( unsigned long long ) vuid ,
lp_const_servicename ( snum ) ) ;
2011-04-05 15:54:31 +04:00
return false ;
}
2020-01-01 03:06:45 +03:00
ok = change_to_user_impersonate ( conn , si , vuid ) ;
2019-07-16 15:11:22 +03:00
if ( ! ok ) {
return false ;
}
2019-07-16 15:20:33 +03:00
if ( conn - > tcon_done ) {
2019-07-16 15:11:22 +03:00
ok = chdir_current_service ( conn ) ;
if ( ! ok ) {
return false ;
}
}
print_impersonation_info ( conn ) ;
return true ;
2011-04-05 15:54:31 +04:00
}
2019-07-13 17:20:11 +03:00
/**
* Impersonate user and change directory to service
*
* change_to_user_and_service_by_fsp ( ) is used to impersonate the user
* associated with the given vuid and to change the working directory of the
* process to the service base directory .
* */
bool change_to_user_and_service_by_fsp ( struct files_struct * fsp )
2018-05-23 12:54:58 +03:00
{
2019-07-13 17:17:17 +03:00
return change_to_user_and_service ( fsp - > conn , fsp - > vuid ) ;
2018-05-23 12:54:58 +03:00
}
1996-06-01 19:25:30 +04:00
/****************************************************************************
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
Go back to being root without changing the security context stack ,
but modify the current_user entries .
1996-06-01 19:25:30 +04:00
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
2011-05-31 07:18:37 +04:00
bool smbd_change_to_root_user ( void )
1996-06-01 19:25:30 +04:00
{
2000-06-23 09:57:20 +04:00
set_root_sec_ctx ( ) ;
1996-06-01 19:25:30 +04:00
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
DEBUG ( 5 , ( " change_to_root_user: now uid=(%d,%d) gid=(%d,%d) \n " ,
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
( int ) getuid ( ) , ( int ) geteuid ( ) , ( int ) getgid ( ) , ( int ) getegid ( ) ) ) ;
1996-06-01 19:25:30 +04:00
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
current_user . conn = NULL ;
current_user . vuid = UID_FIELD_INVALID ;
1996-06-01 19:25:30 +04:00
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
return ( True ) ;
}
/****************************************************************************
Become the user of an authenticated connected named pipe .
When this is called we are currently running as the connection
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
user . Doesn ' t modify current_user .
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2013-10-23 13:02:39 +04:00
bool smbd_become_authenticated_pipe_user ( struct auth_session_info * session_info )
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
{
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
if ( ! push_sec_ctx ( ) )
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
return False ;
2021-03-11 13:20:52 +03:00
set_current_user_info ( session_info - > unix_info - > sanitized_username ,
session_info - > unix_info - > unix_name ,
session_info - > info - > domain_name ) ;
2011-07-15 08:59:14 +04:00
set_sec_ctx ( session_info - > unix_token - > uid , session_info - > unix_token - > gid ,
session_info - > unix_token - > ngroups , session_info - > unix_token - > groups ,
2011-04-30 02:37:05 +04:00
session_info - > security_token ) ;
2000-06-23 10:27:05 +04:00
2013-07-31 17:52:44 +04:00
DEBUG ( 5 , ( " Impersonated user: uid=(%d,%d), gid=(%d,%d) \n " ,
( int ) getuid ( ) ,
( int ) geteuid ( ) ,
( int ) getgid ( ) ,
( int ) getegid ( ) ) ) ;
2000-06-23 10:27:05 +04:00
return True ;
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
}
/****************************************************************************
Unbecome the user of an authenticated connected named pipe .
When this is called we are running as the authenticated pipe
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
user and need to go back to being the connection user . Doesn ' t modify
current_user .
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2013-10-23 13:02:39 +04:00
bool smbd_unbecome_authenticated_pipe_user ( void )
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
{
2000-06-23 09:57:20 +04:00
return pop_sec_ctx ( ) ;
1996-06-01 19:25:30 +04:00
}
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
/****************************************************************************
Utility functions used by become_xxx / unbecome_xxx .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
static void push_conn_ctx ( void )
{
struct conn_ctx * ctx_p ;
2018-05-25 15:22:43 +03:00
extern userdom_struct current_user_info ;
2008-05-08 14:14:43 +04:00
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
/* Check we don't overflow our stack */
2008-05-08 14:14:43 +04:00
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
if ( conn_ctx_stack_ndx = = MAX_SEC_CTX_DEPTH ) {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " Connection context stack overflow! \n " ) ) ;
smb_panic ( " Connection context stack overflow! \n " ) ;
}
2008-05-08 14:14:43 +04:00
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
/* Store previous user context */
ctx_p = & conn_ctx_stack [ conn_ctx_stack_ndx ] ;
2008-05-08 14:14:43 +04:00
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
ctx_p - > conn = current_user . conn ;
ctx_p - > vuid = current_user . vuid ;
2018-05-25 15:22:43 +03:00
ctx_p - > user_info = current_user_info ;
2008-05-08 14:14:43 +04:00
2012-06-05 18:19:01 +04:00
DEBUG ( 4 , ( " push_conn_ctx(%llu) : conn_ctx_stack_ndx = %d \n " ,
( unsigned long long ) ctx_p - > vuid , conn_ctx_stack_ndx ) ) ;
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
conn_ctx_stack_ndx + + ;
}
static void pop_conn_ctx ( void )
{
struct conn_ctx * ctx_p ;
2008-05-08 14:14:43 +04:00
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
/* Check for stack underflow. */
if ( conn_ctx_stack_ndx = = 0 ) {
DEBUG ( 0 , ( " Connection context stack underflow! \n " ) ) ;
smb_panic ( " Connection context stack underflow! \n " ) ;
}
conn_ctx_stack_ndx - - ;
ctx_p = & conn_ctx_stack [ conn_ctx_stack_ndx ] ;
2018-05-25 15:22:43 +03:00
set_current_user_info ( ctx_p - > user_info . smb_name ,
ctx_p - > user_info . unix_name ,
ctx_p - > user_info . domain ) ;
2018-06-13 14:30:33 +03:00
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
current_user . conn = ctx_p - > conn ;
current_user . vuid = ctx_p - > vuid ;
2018-06-13 14:30:33 +03:00
* ctx_p = ( struct conn_ctx ) {
. vuid = UID_FIELD_INVALID ,
} ;
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
}
/****************************************************************************
Temporarily become a root user . Must match with unbecome_root ( ) . Saves and
restores the connection context .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2000-11-15 00:56:32 +03:00
2011-05-31 07:18:37 +04:00
void smbd_become_root ( void )
1997-10-16 01:53:59 +04:00
{
2008-03-15 01:26:28 +03:00
/*
* no good way to handle push_sec_ctx ( ) failing without changing
* the prototype of become_root ( )
*/
2008-03-17 23:00:16 +03:00
if ( ! push_sec_ctx ( ) ) {
smb_panic ( " become_root: push_sec_ctx failed " ) ;
}
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
push_conn_ctx ( ) ;
2000-06-23 09:57:20 +04:00
set_root_sec_ctx ( ) ;
1997-10-16 01:53:59 +04:00
}
2000-06-23 09:57:20 +04:00
/* Unbecome the root user */
1999-12-13 16:27:58 +03:00
2011-05-31 07:18:37 +04:00
void smbd_unbecome_root ( void )
1997-10-16 01:53:59 +04:00
{
2000-06-23 09:57:20 +04:00
pop_sec_ctx ( ) ;
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
pop_conn_ctx ( ) ;
}
/****************************************************************************
Push the current security context then force a change via change_to_user ( ) .
Saves and restores the connection context .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
2019-07-19 12:14:13 +03:00
bool become_user_without_service ( connection_struct * conn , uint64_t vuid )
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
{
2020-01-02 19:24:47 +03:00
struct auth_session_info * session_info = NULL ;
2019-07-16 15:03:57 +03:00
int snum = SNUM ( conn ) ;
2020-01-02 19:24:47 +03:00
NTSTATUS status ;
2019-07-13 17:10:53 +03:00
bool ok ;
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if ( conn = = NULL ) {
DBG_WARNING ( " Connection not open \n " ) ;
return false ;
}
2020-01-02 19:24:47 +03:00
status = smbXsrv_session_info_lookup ( conn - > sconn - > client ,
vuid ,
& session_info ) ;
if ( ! NT_STATUS_IS_OK ( status ) ) {
2019-07-16 15:03:57 +03:00
/* Invalid vuid sent */
DBG_WARNING ( " Invalid vuid %llu used on share %s. \n " ,
( unsigned long long ) vuid ,
lp_const_servicename ( snum ) ) ;
return false ;
}
2019-07-13 17:10:53 +03:00
ok = push_sec_ctx ( ) ;
if ( ! ok ) {
return false ;
}
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
push_conn_ctx ( ) ;
2020-01-02 19:24:47 +03:00
ok = change_to_user_impersonate ( conn , session_info , vuid ) ;
2019-07-13 17:10:53 +03:00
if ( ! ok ) {
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
pop_sec_ctx ( ) ;
pop_conn_ctx ( ) ;
2019-07-13 17:10:53 +03:00
return false ;
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
}
2019-07-13 17:10:53 +03:00
return true ;
2001-10-19 00:15:12 +04:00
}
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bool become_user_without_service_by_fsp ( struct files_struct * fsp )
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{
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return become_user_without_service ( fsp - > conn , fsp - > vuid ) ;
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}
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bool become_user_without_service_by_session ( connection_struct * conn ,
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const struct auth_session_info * session_info )
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{
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bool ok ;
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SMB_ASSERT ( conn ! = NULL ) ;
SMB_ASSERT ( session_info ! = NULL ) ;
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ok = push_sec_ctx ( ) ;
if ( ! ok ) {
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return false ;
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}
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push_conn_ctx ( ) ;
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ok = change_to_user_impersonate ( conn , session_info , UID_FIELD_INVALID ) ;
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if ( ! ok ) {
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pop_sec_ctx ( ) ;
pop_conn_ctx ( ) ;
return false ;
}
return true ;
}
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bool unbecome_user_without_service ( void )
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{
pop_sec_ctx ( ) ;
pop_conn_ctx ( ) ;
return True ;
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}
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/****************************************************************************
Return the current user we are running effectively as on this connection .
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I ' d like to make this return conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > uid , but become_root ( )
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doesn ' t alter this value .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
uid_t get_current_uid ( connection_struct * conn )
{
return current_user . ut . uid ;
}
/****************************************************************************
Return the current group we are running effectively as on this connection .
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I ' d like to make this return conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > gid , but become_root ( )
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doesn ' t alter this value .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
gid_t get_current_gid ( connection_struct * conn )
{
return current_user . ut . gid ;
}
/****************************************************************************
Return the UNIX token we are running effectively as on this connection .
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I ' d like to make this return & conn - > session_info - > unix_token - > but become_root ( )
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doesn ' t alter this value .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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const struct security_unix_token * get_current_utok ( connection_struct * conn )
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{
return & current_user . ut ;
}
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/****************************************************************************
Return the Windows token we are running effectively as on this connection .
If this is currently a NULL token as we ' re inside become_root ( ) - a temporary
UNIX security override , then we search up the stack for the previous active
token .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
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const struct security_token * get_current_nttok ( connection_struct * conn )
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{
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if ( current_user . nt_user_token ) {
return current_user . nt_user_token ;
}
return sec_ctx_active_token ( ) ;
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}